Lindsay Farmer, Making the Modern Criminal Law: Criminalization and Civil Order

Published date01 September 2017
Author
DOI10.3366/elr.2017.0449
Pages464-465
Date01 September 2017

Criminal law scholars are increasingly interested in criminalisation: that is, in the scope and limits of the criminal law. So far, their approach to this topic has been primarily normative: what should be the criminal law's scope? And where ought its limits to lie? For Lindsay Farmer, the interest is welcome, but the approach is problematic. For there are important prior questions – questions of what the criminal law is, what it is for, and how the answers to these questions have developed over time – that normative scholarship on criminalisation has so far neglected.

In Making the Modern Criminal Law, Farmer aims to remedy this neglect. The book pursues three projects: one substantive, one theoretical, one methodological. Substantively, it tells the story of the criminal law – specifically, the modern English criminal law – from its emergence in the late eighteenth century to the present day. Theoretically, it argues that the criminal law throughout this period has been organised around a specific aim: securing civil order. Methodologically, it suggests that normative scholarship on criminalisation is deficient, to the extent that it ignores these other insights. The three projects are related: the substantive history evidences the theoretical claim about civil order, which in turn reveals the methodological deficiencies of previous normative scholarship.

The substantive project is pursued mainly in the book's second and third parts. Each chapter in these parts examines a single area of the criminal law, explaining its development and how this reflected the law's aims at different times. (An exception is the long third chapter, which provides a more general and schematic history of English criminal law and scholarship). The areas examined are jurisdiction, codification, and responsibility (in part two of the book), and property offences, sexual offences, and offences against the person (in part three). In each case, Farmer's history of the area is intrinsically interesting, but it is also interesting for what it contributes to his theoretical and methodological projects.

Take the example of offences against the person. For the normative scholars, these offences lie at the heart of the criminal law: what is the criminal law for (they might ask rhetorically), if not for protecting our rights to bodily integrity and personal autonomy? But, says Farmer, these offences – and the rights underlying them – are a relatively recent invention. They emerge only in...

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