Linking Preference Falsification and Election Fraud in Electoral Autocracies: The Case of Russia
| Published date | 01 February 2018 |
| Date | 01 February 2018 |
| Author | Kirill Kalinin |
| DOI | 10.1177/0032321717706013 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321717706013
Political Studies
2018, Vol. 66(1) 81 –99
© The Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/0032321717706013
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Linking Preference Falsification
and Election Fraud in Electoral
Autocracies: The Case of Russia
Kirill Kalinin
Abstract
This study sheds new light on whether responses to public opinion polls, namely, preference
falsification, can affect the level of election fraud by employing Kuran’s model of preference
falsification, which is empirically tested on the data collected from the most recent presidential
campaign in Russia (2012). My research findings reveal the presence of a statistically significant
effect of preference falsification on election fraud, thus enabling me to conclude that preference
falsification is, indeed, conducive to election fraud. My findings can be generalised to a broad set of
electoral autocracies, enabling scholars to get a better understanding of the mechanism by which
survey polls can incentivise officials to commit election fraud.
Keywords
Russia/Former Soviet Union, preference falsification, election fraud, election forensics, electoral
autocracies, hybrid regimes
Accepted: 19 January 2017
In elections under authoritarian rule, the ruling party or an incumbent usually enjoys
overwhelming electoral support, with the elections often considered fraudulent (Diamond,
2002). Electoral autocracies or hybrid regimes combine democratic and authoritarian ele-
ments, masking the authoritarian nature of the regime with democratic political institu-
tions, such as multi-party elections. These regimes conduct public opinion polls in
addition to holding elections, and surprisingly, a close match between public opinion
polls and election results is often observed, even when obvious vote stealing takes place.
What is the general mechanism behind a close match between the polls and the rigged
election results? Can pre-election polls constrain the autocrat’s ability to commit election
fraud? Can pre-election polls be used as a reliable way to detect election fraud? The
Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
Corresponding author:
Kirill Kalinin, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, 5700 Haven Hall, Ann Arbor, MI
48109-1045, USA.
Email: kkalinin@umich.edu
706013PSX0010.1177/0032321717706013Political StudiesKalinin
research-article2017
Article
82 Political Studies 66(1)
answers to this set of questions are consequential to our understanding of how elections
are organised in electoral autocracies and of how helpful the polling data can be as a tool
of election fraud detection in democracies (Charnin, 2012). Indeed, the importance of
pre-election polling is hard to overestimate since a single opinion poll can serve as a
coordination mechanism, having a significant influence on election outcomes and allow-
ing the incumbent to guarantee the credibility of rigged election results (Andonie and
Kuzmics, 2012).
The electoral research on preference falsification is usually focused on misprediction
of the final outcomes by the pollsters (Bischoping and Schuma, 1992). However, no
research has focused, so far, on the striking accuracy of election polls in electoral autocra-
cies when the presence of election fraud is common knowledge among the populace.
Major national polling organisations issued election forecasts based on Vladimir Putin’s
electoral ratings that successfully predicted official election results within the margin of
error (see Table S2 in the Online Appendix). Surprisingly, however, despite his high pop-
ularity oftentimes driven by exaggeration of external threats and terrorist dangers (Arce,
2003; Ekman, 2009; Mansfield and Snyder, 1995), election fraud has always been an
integral part of his presidency and is characterised by an upward trend over Putin’s time
in office (Mebane and Kalinin, 2009). This especially applies to the most recent Russian
presidential election in 2012, which was marked by the spread of massive protests associ-
ated with the growing public awareness of alleged election fraud and a substantial voter
mobilisation effort (Enikolopov et al., 2013; Frye et al., 2014; Kalinin and Mebane, 2013;
Kalinin and Shpilkin, 2012; Shpilkin, 2011).
The observed close congruence between Putin’s official electoral support and the poll-
ing election forecasts has three explanations: (1) in reality, election fraud has never
occurred; therefore, the election polls are correct; (2) since a significant amount of elec-
tion fraud is present, the election polls are incorrect; and (3) both electoral results and
election polls are fabricated and therefore fraudulent. Based on anecdotal evidence from
election observers and scholarly research, this article argues that the second explanation
provides the most plausible argument.
There are many reasons for which polls can be incorrect in electoral autocracies, from
crude data fabrication to issues with the sampling frame. The abuse of non-probability
sampling design can contribute to unintentional upward inflation. Measurement error,
specifically social desirability bias (or preference falsification), can inflate the incum-
bent’s election ratings due to the respondents’ eagerness to portray themselves in a
socially desirable way. Two explanations can be readily excluded. Previous research on
the 2012 presidential election indicates that the non-probability sampling design used by
a majority of the organisations cannot explain the observed inflation in the estimates
(Kalinin, 2014). Since across all the survey organisations, with a range of relationships to
the Kremlin, polling estimates vary within the margin of error, it is unlikely that data
fabrication took place. The final explanation is linked to the preference falsification. It
implies that respondents give dishonest answers to conform to societal norms, thus con-
tributing to an increase in response bias in the autocrat’s electoral ratings.
This article provides an innovative perspective on the mechanism by which the auto-
crats in electoral autocracies strategically benefit from preference falsification, which
boosts their own electoral ratings and encourages perpetration of election fraud. By doing
so, the autocrats are able to organise election fraud up to the level of the discrepancy,
effectively hiding the extent of election rigging and avoiding the political risks associated
with revealed mismatch. Ideally, the presence of the observed close match between
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