Localising ‘radicalisation’: Risk assessment practices in Greece and the United Kingdom
| Author | Rita Augestad Knudsen,Dimitris Skleparis |
| Date | 01 May 2020 |
| Published date | 01 May 2020 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1369148120910987 |
| Subject Matter | Original Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148120910987
The British Journal of Politics and
International Relations
2020, Vol. 22(2) 309 –327
© The Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/1369148120910987
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Localising ‘radicalisation’:
Risk assessment practices
in Greece and the
United Kingdom
Dimitris Skleparis1
and Rita Augestad Knudsen2
Abstract
This article juxtaposes anti-radicalisation policy in the United Kingdom, one of the pioneers in
the field, with Greece, one of the latecomers. Drawing on localisation theory, our aim is to
understand how ‘common knowledge’ of radicalisation and counter-radicalisation has materialised
in the United Kingdom and Greece by exploring the development and use of radicalisation-related
risk and vulnerability assessment tools. We argue that the radicalisation ‘knowledge’ was localised
more seamlessly in the United Kingdom, which can be attributed to the country’s ‘norm producer’
status on the field of European counter-radicalisation. By contrast, the ‘knowledge’ was subjected
to significant ‘re-framing’ and ‘stretching’ to fit with the Greek context. This is associated with
the country’s ‘norm adopter’ status on the field of European counter-radicalisation, as well as
with a ‘spill-over effect’ from a national context of deeply polarising and contentious counter-
terrorism policies. We maintain that these localisation processes reveal two distinct assemblages
of governing radicalisation.
Keywords
assemblage, critical security studies, Greece, localisation, radicalisation, risk, terrorism, threat,
United Kingdom
Introduction
Several critical approaches to counter-terrorism have focused on the genealogy of the much-
discussed and much-disputed concept of ‘radicalisation’. Besides problematising the dif-
fuse meaning and uncertain analytical value of the concept (Kundnani, 2012; Neumann,
2013), these have enhanced our understanding of terrorism- and radicalisation-related poli-
cies as a mode of government (De Goede and Simon, 2013; Ragazzi, 2016); how such poli-
cies construct social and political actors as terrorist threats (Heath-Kelly, 2013; Heath-Kelly
et al., 2014; Jackson et al., 2009; Kundnani, 2014; Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009); the
1School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK
2Security and Defence Group, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo, Norway
Corresponding author:
Dimitris Skleparis, School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, Newcastle University, Room 4.51, Henry
Daysh Building, NE1 7RU, UK
Email: Dimitris.Skleparis@newcastle.ac.uk
910987BPI0010.1177/1369148120910987The British Journal of Politics and International RelationsSkleparis and Augestad Knudsen
research-article2020
Original Article
310 The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 22(2)
relations between counter-terrorism, counter-radicalisation and social policy (Mythen et al.,
2017; Ragazzi, 2017); and various discriminatory effects of the logics of suspicion and
anticipation involved in counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation policies (Amoore and
De Goede, 2008; Aradau et al., 2008; Aradau and Van Munster, 2009; Mythen and Walklate,
2008). More recently, scholars have engaged with the development of indicators-based
approaches to counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation that aim to identify and act upon
individuals who might resort to politically and religiously motivated violence (e.g. Augestad
Knudsen, 2020; Monaghan and Molnar, 2016).
So far, the majority of these works has been single-case studies, most of which have
focused on the United Kingdom (e.g. Bigo and Guittet, 2011; Heath-Kelly, 2013; Mythen
et al., 2017; Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009). Within that context, studies have explored
the ways in which counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation policies are developed
and justified (Bentley, 2018; Edwards, 2016; Heath-Kelly, 2013; Mythen et al., 2017).
Others have analysed the broader repercussions of such policies for Muslim communities
and other ‘suspect populations’ (Heath-Kelly, 2012; Kundnani, 2015; Pantazis and
Pemberton, 2009; Thomas, 2010). Possible implications of the involvement of educa-
tional institutions – such as schools and universities – (Chadderton, 2012; Cram, 2012) as
well as the National Health Service (NHS) in such policies have been explored too
(Heath-Kelly, 2017; Summerfield, 2016). Recent studies have been attentive to the impli-
cations and dilemmas of developing and using indicators-based approaches to counter-
terrorism and counter-radicalisation (Augestad Knudsen, 2020).
While a few cross-country comparisons exist (Haverig, 2013; Poynting and Perry,
2007; Spalek and Alia, 2007), these have tended to analyse countries at the ‘forefront’ of
counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation policies. ‘Late adopters’ of such policies are
considerably underrepresented, leaving unexplained how countries of this kind have cho-
sen to follow the trendsetting countries, as well as which parts of the forerunners’ radicali-
sation ‘knowledge’ they have implemented in policy, and how. Attempting to correct this
imbalance, this article employs the diverse case-selection strategy, which has as its main
objective the achievement of maximum variance along relevant dimensions (see
Seawright and Gerring, 2008). In this regard, we juxtapose anti-radicalisation policy in
the United Kingdom, a typical/representative case of the pioneers in the field, with
Greece, a typical/representative case of the latecomers, and a country on which no critical
radicalisation research has been conducted to date. Indeed, the diverse case-selection
strategy is particularly useful when the investigation is exploratory. Moreover, it demon-
strates stronger claims to representativeness than any other small-N case study, and the
additional advantage of introducing variation (i.e. ‘pioneers’ vs ‘late adopters’) on the key
variable of interest (i.e. the adoption of radicalisation-related risk and vulnerability
assessment tools) (see Seawright and Gerring, 2008).
Drawing on the research critically engaged with indicators-based approaches to coun-
ter-radicalisation, we also place our article in the literature framing counter-radicalisation
policies as a mode of government. Following De Goede and Simon (2013: 316) in par-
ticular, we conceptualise radicalisation-related risk assessment tools as part of an ‘assem-
blage’ of governing radicalisation; an assemblage comprised of ‘particular threat
representations, knowledge practices, training programmes and strategies for interven-
tion’. Like they do, we acknowledge that ‘countering radicalisation does not necessarily
materialise in the same ways across different localities’ (De Goede and Simon, 2013:
327); indeed, the focus of this article is on processes of localising (counter-)radicalisation
in the two locales of the United Kingdom and Greece.
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