Lock-in Strategies in International Negotiations: The Deconstruction of Bargaining Power
| DOI | 10.1177/0305829814550504 |
| Author | Diana Panke |
| Date | 01 January 2015 |
| Published date | 01 January 2015 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Millennium: Journal of
International Studies
2015, Vol. 43(2) 375 –391
© The Author(s) 2014
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DOI: 10.1177/0305829814550504
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MILLENNIUM
Journal of International Studies
Lock-in Strategies in
International Negotiations:
The Deconstruction of
Bargaining Power
Diana Panke
Albert-Ludwigs University, Germany
Abstract
There are hardly any instances of international negotiations, in which states do not at least
partially recur to bargaining strategies. This article argues that bargaining power is ultimately
a social construction, depending on perceptions about the plausibility of the realisation of a
threat. Effective bargaining rests on the credibility of the threats made (e.g. no-vote, veto). Thus,
even weak states can sometimes manipulate the threat-potential of seemingly more powerful
actors and, thereby, punch above their weight in international negotiations. To trigger a loss of
bargaining power, these states need to apply lock-in strategies that create linkages between the
issue on the international negotiation agenda and other international or sub-level norms or policy
commitments. Once such linkages are made, international-level bargaining threats of formerly
powerful actors lose credibility as carrying them out would bring about severe reputation
damages. This article distinguishes between different lock-in strategies and draws on three
case studies (UNGA resolutions on African descend, on Myanmar, and on the Latin American
Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zone) to provide an empirical plausibility probe on the scope conditions
under which the lock-in strategies are effective in reducing the power of seemingly strong actors
in international negotiations.
Keywords
bargaining power, social construction, international negotiations, deconstruction, framing
Introduction
With the spread of international regimes and organisations, the number of negotiations
that take place between states has increased tremendously and has, consequently, received
Corresponding author:
Professor Dr Diana Panke, Professur für Governance in Mehrebenensystemen, Seminar für
Wissenschaftliche Politik, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, Belfortstr. 20,79085 Freiburg, Germany.
Email: Diana.Panke@politik.uni-freiburg.de
550504MIL0010.1177/0305829814550504Millennium: Journal of International StudiesPanke
research-article2014
Article
376 Millennium: Journal of International Studies 43(2)
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wide scholarly attention.1 International negotiations are by their very nature a communi-
cative exercise, in which attachés, diplomats, ambassadors, ministers or even heads of
state and governments use a broad series of argumentative and bargaining strategies in
order to further national interests.2 Most importantly, the strategies can only be effective
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