A Lockean Theory of Territory
| Published date | 01 March 2008 |
| Date | 01 March 2008 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.00687.x |
| Subject Matter | Article |
A Lockean Theory of Territory
Cara Nine
University College Cork
In this article I defend a straightforward application of Lockean property arguments to territorial rights.
The article is divided into three parts. In the first part I explain the difference betweentwo r ights to land:
property rights and territor ial rights. In the second part I explain why an individualistic account of a
Lockean theory of territory cannot be used to theor ise about territorial rights. In the third part I defend
a collectivist version of Lockean theory of territory. I argue that it is possible to apply directly Lockean
principles regarding land use to territorial r ights.I punctuate my defence with examples where Lockean
principles are intuitively helpful in resolving conflicts over territorial rights.
Terr itory is important. It is important to individuals, to ethnic, cultural, national
and religious collectives, to rulers and to bureaucrats. Evidence of territory’s
importance is not hard to find, and the devastation created by territor ial disputes
is ever present.
Terr itory is also (therefore) important to political philosophers. We are only
recently coming to theorise about the foundational role that territor ial divisions
play in theories of justice. Far from assuming that territorial divisions should be
taken for granted, we now realise that territor y itself should be included in and
under the principles of justice. This move requires that we first understand what
territor ial rights are. This article defends one way of understanding territorial
rights – as governed by Lockean principles regarding rights to land.
There are two general ways to spell out a Lockean theory of terr itorial rights.
One is an individualistic account in which the Lockean right is an individual right
to property, and individuals who own land contract together to form a state that
has territor ial jurisdiction over their individual properties (Rothbard, 1978, pp.
26–37). Alternatively, there is a collectivist account in which a group of persons
such as a state can gain territor ial rights to certain lands through their collective
labour on the land (Meisels, 2003, p. 35).
The application of Lockean principles to territor ial rights is not new. However,
the literature on territorial r ights has failed to provide a comprehensive defence
of a collectivist Lockean account of territorial r ights by directly applying Lockean
principles regarding property rights to the case of terr itorial rights. Instead, the
literature is divided into three general camps: (1) those defending an individual-
istic account of Lockean territorial r ights,an account based on individual consent
(Steiner, 1996); (2) those abandoning a Lockean theory of ter ritorial r ights
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.00687.x
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2008 VOL 56, 148–165
© 2007The Author.Jour nal compilation © 2007 Political StudiesAssociation
because the individualistic account does not work;1and (3) those appealing to
Lockean principles as only metaphorically relevant to theories of terr itory. Tamar
Meisels represents those in the final camp, and in her Lockean-inspired account
of territor ial rights she states that‘for all the references to property argumentation
and to Locke himself throughout this book, none of its arguments entails the
straightforward and unequivocal application of Lockean property arguments ... to
the national case’ (Meisels, 2005, p. 8).
In this article I defend a straightforward application of Lockean property argu-
ments to territor ial rights. I defend the collectivist account of territorial rights in
which a direct application of Lockean principles regarding rights to land can be
employed in theorising about territorial r ights. I present Lockean principles
boldly – as directly applicable to theories of territor ial rights – and humbly – as
only part of a larger body of considerations important to theories of ter ritorial
rights, although I do not go into these other consideration in this article.
The article is divided into three parts. In the first part I explain the difference
between two rights to land: property rights and ter ritorial r ights. In the second
part I explain why an individualistic account of a Lockean theory of territory
cannot be used to theorise about terr itorial rights. In the third part I defend a
collectivist version of Lockean theory of territory. I argue that it is possible to
directly apply Lockean principles regarding land use to territorial r ights. I punc-
tuate my defence with examples where Lockean principles are intuitively helpful
in resolving conflicts over territorial rights.
Property Rights and Territor ial Rights
The Lockean argument for property acquisition explains how individuals can
come to acquire exclusive rights to common land. It does not obviously explain
state claims to territory.2In this section I explain that the primar y distinction
between the two rights is that the central function of a property right is to give
the right holder control over other people’s access to the use and benefits from a thing,
and the central function of a territor ial right is to give the right holder the power
to establish justice within a particular region.
In Lockean theory, a property right in land gives the owner of the land the right
to control access to that land and to use that land in any way that does not violate
the law of nature or civil laws. Property rights are individual rights to control
other people’s use of and benefit from a thing (Locke, 2003 [1690], ch. V). A
state territor ial right, by contrast,descr ibes a relationship between the state and a
geographic region. It is a jurisdictional right – the state has the right to make,
adjudicate and enforce law within a certain area.
The need to distinguish property rights from territor ial rights is evident in
examples of these rights. For instance, if Mexico buys real estate in the US, that
land is still US territor y; it is still under US jurisdiction. It is not annexed to
A LOCKEAN THEORY OF TERRITORY 149
© 2007The Author.Jour nal compilation © 2007 Political StudiesAssociation
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2008, 56(1)
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