Loving Freedom: Aristotle on Slavery and the Good Life
| Published date | 01 March 1999 |
| Author | Russell Bentley |
| Date | 01 March 1999 |
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9248.00190 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Loving Freedom: Aristotle on Slavery
and the Good Life
RUSSELL BENTLEY
University of Southampton
Most commentators on Aristotle's theory of natural slavery locate the source of
slavishness in an intellectual de®ciency that Aristotle describes. This paper sets out to
show that Aristotle's naturalslaves are not intellectually de®cient in the way normally
assumed, but are lacking an emotional faculty, thymos, which Aristotle connects
to actual enslavement through its power to generate a love of freedom. It is also
argued that Aristotle's understanding of slavishness entails a risk for a democratic
regime, such as Classical Athens, since such a system has highly inclusive criteria for
membership in the political association. Commentators have also failed to connect
natural slavery to Aristotle's ethical thought and to note the theory's practical
relevance to the goal of living a good human life.
Aristotle's theory of natural slavery remains for many readers a troublesome
spot on an otherwise rich and persuasive body of political thought. Whether or
not his defence of slavery is morally sound it remains necessary to assess its
internal consistency. The task may be a tall order, since Aristotle's statements
about slavery seem unclear in one major respect, which I propose to examine
here. He maintains in Politics Book I that the natural slave is intellectually
de®cient, lacking in foresight and deliberation. Later, in Book VII, he maintains
that the Asiatic races, which he describes as enslaved, are intelligent and
inventive, but lacking in spirit (thymos). If, as seems clear in the context, the
absence of spirit explains their enslavement entirely (that is, he does not say
that their enslavement is perpetuated solely by a repressive state apparatus)
Aristotle is begging a crucial question: why should an intellectual de®ciency
make one a natural slave, but a thymotic de®ciency actually result in
enslavement?
Even if it were not important to his political theory ± even if it told us nothing
of Aristotle's teleological conception of human development ± there are at least
two good reasons for examining the theory of natural slavery in some detail.
First, Aristotle strenuously insists thatthe concept of a natural slave is valid and
coherent. Since he attributes a great deal of importance to refuting contrary
positions, our attention is necessarily drawn to understanding his own views.
Second, since the views he attempts to refute may be some that we are tempted
to put forward ourselves, it is incumbent upon us to take account of Aristotle's
responses.
The argument of this paper can be summarized as follows. The absence of
thymos is prior to the absence of logos in Aristotle's account. The psychological
basis of natural slavery, therefore, is the absence of certain fundamental desires
#Political Studies Association 1999. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 CowleyRoad, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main
Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
Political Studies (1999), XLVII, 100±113
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