Mafia infiltration, public administration and local institutions: A comparative study in Northern Italy

AuthorDavide Donatiello,Luca Storti,Davide Pellegrino,Rocco Sciarrone,Valentina Moiso,Joselle Dagnes
DOI10.1177/1477370818803050
Published date01 September 2020
Date01 September 2020
Subject MatterArticles
/tmp/tmp-17mH85WfQ07Aw5/input 803050EUC0010.1177/1477370818803050European Journal of CriminologyDagnes et al.
research-article2018
Article
European Journal of Criminology
2020, Vol. 17(5) 540 –562
Mafia infiltration, public
© The Author(s) 2018
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institutions: A comparative
study in Northern Italy
Joselle Dagnes, Davide Donatiello,
Valentina Moiso, Davide Pellegrino,
Rocco Sciarrone and Luca Storti
University of Turin, Italy
Abstract
Nuanced explanations of the factors underpinning the mafia’s movements across territories
have recently been proposed. However, more light must be shed on the mechanisms through
which mafiosi try to infiltrate the legal economy in non-traditional territories. Accordingly, this
study aims to micro-found interactions and exchanges that mainly involve mafiosi, politicians and
economic actors in expansion areas. Focusing on the local level, we will show how the misuse
of several administrative tools generates a profitable opportunity structure for mafiosi. To this
end, we present an in-depth comparative case study of three events involving the construction
industry that took place in Northern Italy. The main findings show that: (i) mafiosi are skilled at
smoothing social relations, enlarging and consolidating opaque networks predating their arrival;
(ii) they give rise to different types of mutual exchanges and network structures.
Keywords
Mafia crime groups, mafia infiltration, mobility of crime groups, ’Ndrangheta, public
administration
Introduction
Italian mafias have demonstrated their ability to infiltrate the (formal) legal economy in
expansion territories (Sciarrone, 2014a; Varese, 2011).1 Even outside their territories of
origin, they are no longer a mere underworld phenomenon; rather, they are involved in
Corresponding author:
Luca Storti, University of Turin, Lungo Dora Siena, 100A, Turin 10153, Italy.
Email: luca.storti@unito.it

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541
controlling markets and in establishing collusive relationships with different actors (for
example, politicians and entrepreneurs).
From this perspective, this paper aims to shed more light on the mechanisms whereby
mafiosi infiltrate a particular traditional economic sector – that of construction – in a new
territory. The construction industry was chosen because it has also proved vulnerable to
infiltration by the mafia in areas the latter has moved into. Moreover, construction is
relevant from our standpoint because it is shaped both by market dynamics and by public
and administrative regulation at local level. In this connection, we will take a micro-
founded perspective to show how different concatenated misuses of administrative tools
generate a favourable opportunity structure for mafia infiltration. Essentially, the article
calls for a greater integration between the literature on the territorial expansion of mafias
and community studies focusing on the interconnections between politics, administra-
tion and the economy at local level.
We address these topics through an in-depth comparative case study of three ‘affairs’
that took place in three regions of mafia expansion in Northern Italy – Piemonte,
Lombardia and the Valle d’Aosta – and were selected for the following analytical rea-
sons: (1) they involve both economic and local political actors, and thus all in some way
address the complex relationships between economics, politics and the mafia (that is,
’Ndrangheta members); (2) they deal with deliberative processes at the governance level,
from which a particularistic use of public resources emerges.
Carrying out a comparative analysis situated at local level is the most suitable meth-
odological choice for identifying the ‘nuts and bolts’ of different relational patterns
whereby mafiosi participate in – or even partially control – the allocation of public
resources and infiltrate the legal economy. Accordingly, we present three ‘models’ of
mafia infiltration that – despite their idiosyncratic features – can be applied to further
empirical cases. Such cases could be located in other parts of the country or abroad, and
be affected by a mafia presence or by that of organized crime groups acting like a ‘quasi-
governmental structure’ in traditional economic sectors (Von Lampe, 2016).
The article proceeds as follows. In the next section, we will introduce the theoretical
background. We will then lay out a framework for analysing how particular modes of
applying administrative tools in local settings can be converted into a practice of miscon-
duct, opening a gateway for mafia infiltration. Once the main aspects regarding the
research design have been clarified, we will analyse three ‘affairs’: that of the ‘Il Mulino’
residential complex in the municipality of Leinì in Piemonte; the case of the Desio shop-
ping centre in Lombardia; and the Mont Blanc parking area in the Valle d’Aosta. Broader
suggestions concerning mafia infiltration into sectors of the legal economy that are sub-
ject to public regulation will be provided in the conclusion.
Conceptual and theoretical background
Mafia expansion: Brief overview
In the article, we use the concept of mafia to denote a form of organized crime that aims
to obtain a certain control over the local society. In so doing, mafiosi largely base their
power on exercising violence, whether actual or threatened, and on manipulating social

542
European Journal of Criminology 17(5)
relationships in order to establish mutual exchanges in political and economic circles
(Calderoni et al, 2016; Campana, 2011; Gambetta, 1993; Lupo, 2009; Paoli, 2014;
Varese, 2010, 2011).
The debate on a general definition of organized crime is still going on in the scientific
literature (Rege and Lavorgna, 2017; Sergi, 2016; 2017; Von Lampe, 2016). A critical
distinction in this debate is between key concepts such as organized crime and mafia
(Allum et al., 2010; Finckenauer, 2005), which recalls the distinction between species
and type, because mafia organizations are a specific type of organized crime. Ordinary
forms of organized crime are indeed involved in illicit activities, where making a profit
is their primary goal (Albanese, 2000). By contrast, mafia groups seek power, embed-
ding themselves in local societies. Briefly stated, organized crime mainly works to pro-
duce and trade illegal goods or legal goods produced in illegal ways, whereas mafia
groups mainly strive to gain control over local societies and markets (Varese 2010) by
selecting the economic players and their interconnections, and enforcing transactions
among them. According to this perspective, the resources of bridging social capital that
mafiosi are able to establish (that is, their ability to connect different social networks
outside mafia organizations) are crucial. In this respect, it has been pointed out that social
networks where mafiosi are embedded could be conceived as ‘organizational fields’: a
grey area made up of informal and illegal exchanges of resources among different kinds
of actor (for example, entrepreneurs, politicians, civil servants and mafiosi). Several
judicial investigations have shown that, even in areas of mafia expansion (for example,
Northern Italy), such grey areas have emerged and are enduring over time (Mete and
Sciarrone, 2017; Sciarrone, 2014a; Sciarrone and Storti, 2016).We thus address a spe-
cific feature of mafia presence in a given non-traditional territory: how mafiosi are able
to apply their networking capability in certain sectors of the legal economy (Allum,
2014, 2016; Calderoni et al., 2016; Campana, 2011; Morselli et al., 2011; Sciarrone and
Storti, 2014; Varese, 2011).
According to several scholars, among the Italian mafias the ’Ndrangheta – the mafia
we deal with in the article – is showing by far the highest orientation towards infiltration
in new areas (Sergi and Lavorgna, 2016). Mafia infiltration in new territories can take
different shapes according to the opportunity structure of the area concerned (Calderoni
et al., 2016; Catino, 2014; Savona and Calderoni, 2015; Sergi, 2016, 2017; Sergi and
Lavorgna, 2016). From this perspective, we will try to reconstruct how mafia members’
strategies can be interwoven with a specific context feature, related to illegal practices
emerging in the everyday management of the public administration. The role of the pub-
lic administration has been largely overlooked in the literature on mafia infiltration. By
contrast, we claim that the public administration is a crucial factor that deserves more
attention for its part in shaping the mafia’s opportunity structure at the local level: the
public administration is indeed a link between the economy and politics and an effective
means of regulating economic processes.
Informal or illegal practices in the public administration at local level could predate
mafia infiltration and interweave with mafia members’ action, producing different
effects. In other words, some forms of illegal behaviour by white-collar people can
encourage infiltration. From this perspective, we look not only at the relationships per se,
but also at the situated reciprocal exchange between mafiosi and politicians, local

Dagnes et al.
543
administrators and economic actors. Taking the context into account in this way is an
important departure from the tradition of studies on...

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