Managing volatile asymmetry: China’s emergence from the Korean dilemma
| DOI | 10.1177/1369148120980159 |
| Published date | 01 May 2021 |
| Author | Xiao Ren |
| Date | 01 May 2021 |
| Subject Matter | Special Issue: Chinese foreign policy: A Xi change? |
https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148120980159
The British Journal of Politics and
International Relations
2021, Vol. 23(2) 337 –352
© The Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/1369148120980159
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Managing volatile asymmetry:
China’s emergence from the
Korean dilemma
Xiao Ren
Abstract
Among the most complicated issues in contemporary Chinese foreign policy is that of the Korean
Peninsula and North Korea in particular. Critics have long complained, often internally, that China
dare not use, and did not know how to use, the leverage it possessed. Why was this the case given
that the relationship with North Korea is an asymmetric one with China the much more powerful
side? Has China managed this asymmetry better more recently, and why? This article tries to
address these questions. The relationship changed significantly in recent years when the Xi Jinping
leadership decided to take unprecedented measures. Those actions have been consequential.
China has emerged from being embarrassed by North Korea’s nuclear and missile development to
re-establishing itself as central to Korean and Northeast Asian security.
Keywords
asymmetric relationship, China and North Korea, emergence, ideology, interactive process,
nuclear problem
China is a major power that is the most populous in the world, while the Democratic
People’s Republic of North Korea (DPRK) is a much smaller country of merely 25 mil-
lion people. It is an asymmetric relationship. However, unlike some observers may
assume, this does not make handling the relationship any easier for China. Rather, over
the years, China has repeatedly had difficulties dealing with North Korea (Shen and Xia,
2018). As political scientist Brantly Womack (2010: 266-267), who has developed a
framework for understanding asymmetrical relations of power, puts it, ‘If any relationship
between countries that differ greatly in population, economy and military, the opportuni-
ties and risks of the relationship will be different for each side’. For several decades, the
asymmetric China–DPRK relationship was overlaid with a shared communist ideology.
Linked by this shared ideology, the two communist allies were described as like ‘lips and
teeth’. When China perceived its relations with Pyongyang from a strong ideological
perspective, the DPRK’s value to Beijing became disproportionally large. Moreover,
another key factor was the inertia of seeing North Korea as a security ‘buffer’. When
Institute of International Studies, Fudan University, Shanghai, China
Corresponding author:
Xiao Ren, Institute of International Studies, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China.
Email: renxiao2006@fudan.edu.cn
980159BPI0010.1177/1369148120980159The British Journal of Politics and International RelationsRen
research-article2021
Special Issue Article
338 The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 23(2)
these two ideas receded – shared ideology and North Korea’s role as a buffer – China
became less constricted in its behaviour and the DPRK could no longer take advantage of
its perceived geographical value and the other side’s ideological inclination. China’s han-
dling of the Beijing–Pyongyang relationship provides an illustrative case of managing a
volatile and special asymmetry.
A volatile asymmetric relationship can be hard to manage. In fact, among the most
complicated issues in contemporary Chinese foreign policy is North Korea. The Korean
nuclear problem has existed for over a quarter of a century (Kux, 1998; O’Hanlon and
Mochizuki, 2003), with China pursuing a nuclear-free and changed Korea, but only with
limited success (Ren, 2007, 2010, 2017). As Kim and Lee (2002: 133) write, in the
reshaping of the future of North Korea and the Korean peninsula, China’s influence ‘is
arguably greater than at any time since the Korean War and also greater than any other
neighbouring powers’. But why has China, the much stronger side, had such difficulties
in managing this asymmetric relationship?
Convinced that North Korea’s nuclear weapon and missile programmes could only
bring negative outcomes, China tried unsuccessfully for years to rein in Pyongyang
(Chinoy, 2008; Funabashi, 2007). When persuasion and inducement do not work, a differ-
ent approach must be adopted. However, Beijing is also wary of the consequences a North
Korean collapse or military conflict could bring. This makes it an extremely difficult bal-
ancing act. China’s geographical proximity to Korea and strategic interests explain its
awkward position. Contrary to some assessments (e.g. Kim, 2017), China’s policy towards
the DPRK changed significantly in 2016–2017 when North Korea achieved breakthroughs
in nuclear and missile development. With this background in mind, this article asks: How
did China manage to escape from the dilemma? What are the implications for asymmetry
theory? To answer these questions, this article first provides a critical analysis of China’s
hard policy adjustments towards North Korea using the framework of asymmetry theory.
It then analyses if these measures helped bring about any favourable outcomes for China.
Finally, it concludes with some general conclusions for asymmetry theory.
Deepening crisis and mounting pressures
Over the years, the DPRK’s nuclear weapon development activities, especially its nuclear
weapon tests that began in 2006, have repeatedly posed a challenge to the security inter-
ests of China and Northeast Asia. They forced China to think harder about what to do.
Resentments towards Pyongyang accumulated as numerous efforts of persuasion failed to
have an effect on North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, as evidenced by its fifth nuclear test
in September 2016. Once again frustrated by Pyongyang’s new nuclear test, China agreed
that it was necessary for the UN Security Council (UNSC) to pass a new resolution for
further sanctions. Clearly, Kim Jong-un, North Korea’s leader, was simply oblivious to
any of China’s well-intended calls or suggestions. Its acts gave rise to tensions regionally,
as well as with the United States, which made China increasingly anxious about the con-
sequences. Five central government agencies jointly released a list of products prohibited
from being exported to North Korea, which was compiled to comply with United Nations
(UN) sanctions imposed on North Korea. The items on the list could be used for both
military and civilian purposes, and included rocket and drone software, materials that can
be used to develop nuclear missiles and high-speed video cameras.
In between the fifth and sixth nuclear test, China was shocked by the assassination of
Kim Jong-nam, Kim Jong-un’s half-brother, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (FT 2017). For
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