Mapping coercive institutions: The State Security Forces dataset, 1960–2010
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343320913089 |
| Date | 01 March 2021 |
| Published date | 01 March 2021 |
| Author | Erica De Bruin |
| Subject Matter | Special Data Features |
Mapping coercive institutions: The State
Security Forces dataset, 1960–2010
Erica De Bruin
Government Department, Hamilton College
Abstract
How rulers organize and use their security forces is thought to have important implications for regime survival,
repression, and military effectiveness. While a number of studies provide insight into the coercive institutions of
individual states, efforts to understand systematic patterns have been hampered by a lack of reliable data on state
security forces that can be compared across states and within them over time. This article presents the State Security
Forces (SSF) dataset, which includes 375 security forces in 110 countries, 1960–2010. It tracks how each force is
commanded, staffed, equipped, and deployed, as well as the number of security forces and potential counterweights
in each state’s security sector as a whole. After illustrating how the SSF dataset differs from related ones and
presenting descriptive trends, the article shows how it can be used to deepen our understanding of coup-proofing
and strategic substitution, and identifies additional research uses of the dataset.
Keywords
coup-proofing, military organization, militia, paramilitary, police, security forces
Introduction
How rulers design their coercive institutions varies
widely. Some, like Chile’s Augusto Pinochet, centralize
coercive power under military command, while others,
like Muammar Qaddafi in Libya, rely on a complex web
of overlapping security forces, including presidential
guards, militarized police, and state-run militia, to check
and balance one another (Weeks, 2003; Vandewalle,
2006). While these security forces are used for a variety
of purposes, they can be distinguished from the regular
military in that they do not serve as the state’s primary
line of defense against external threats (Janowitz, 1988).
They can also be distinguished from paramilitaries and
non-state militias by their official status as part of the
state’s security sector. The types of security forces that
rulers employ – and how such forces are organized,
staffed, equipped, and deployed – are thought to have
important implications for regime survival, repression,
and military effectiveness.
Yet as Art (2012), Greitens (2016), and others have
pointed out, while a number of studies provide impor-
tant insight into the coercive institutions of individual
states, efforts to understand systematic patterns in the
organization and use of security forces beyond the regu-
lar military have been limited. In part, this is due to a
lack of data that can be reliably compared across coun-
tries and within them over time. Existing cross-national
studies depend almost exclusively on the Military Bal-
ance, an annual defense review published since 1959 by
the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).
However, several scholars have documented biases,
inconsistencies, and errors in IISS data that limit its
utility (e.g. Mundy & Smith, 1980; Ostrich & Green,
1981; Leitenberg, 1982; Colgan, 2011).
This article presents the first complete release of the
State Security Forces (SSF) dataset, which addresses
some limitations of existing datasets through expanded
temporal and geographic scope, the use of consistent
inclusion criteria, and the triangulation of over 2,200
primary and secondary sources to reduce measurement
error and missing data. It includes 375 security forces in
Corresponding author:
edebruin@hamilton.edu
Journal of Peace Research
2021, Vol. 58(2) 315–325
ªThe Author(s) 2020
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/0022343320913089
journals.sagepub.com/home/jpr
To continue reading
Request your trial