Maps of mayhem
| Published date | 01 January 2018 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343317702956 |
| Author | Jesse Hammond |
| Date | 01 January 2018 |
| Subject Matter | Regular Articles |
Maps of mayhem: Strategic location
and deadly violence in civil war
Jesse Hammond
Department of Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School
Abstract
Disaggregated studies of civil violence attempt to predict where violence is most likely to break out within states, but
have been limited by a near-exclusive focus on political, economic, and accessibility-based factors in explaining local
patterns of violence. These factors are important, but the calculus of military conflict does not focus solely on lootable
resources or population distributions. Both states and insurgents try to exert control over geographic territory in order
to increase their resource base and political legitimacy. Historic evidence suggests that groups use violence to contest
control over strategically important locations that allow them to effectively attack and defend territory. I use GIS and
social network analysis to operationalize strategic location based on the network of roads and population settlements
that make up a country. I find that during conflicts, locations with high degree and betweenness centrality in the road
network – in other words, locations that control access to other areas within the state – are significantly more likely to
be fought over, even after controlling for a wide range of variables suggested by previous literature and testing for
reporting bias. These findings expand on the previous body of literature studying disaggregated violence and show
that the calculus of violence during civil conflict encompasses strategic considerations as well as economic, political,
or topographic factors.
Keywords
civil conflict, event data, GIS, networks
Introduction
During the Second Liberian Civil War, journalist James
Brabazon embedded himself in a unit of the Liberians
United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD)
insurgent group. His goal was to document the conflict,
recording the behavior and beliefs of LURD fighters in
the middle of a war characterized by social breakdown
and widespread violence. In 2001, during a period of
intense fighting between LURD and government forces,
the insurgent campaign toward the capital city of Mon-
rovia was bogged down in a week-long firefight over
control of Kolahun, a small town in northwestern
Liberia. When Brabazon asked other fighters why
LURD forces were expending so much firepower to
capture a small town, he was told that Kolahun was a
crucial strategic target (Brabazon, 2010: 206). Because of
its position in the country’s road network, Kolahun was a
major military obstacle: state forces could strike at
LURD convoys moving south from their bases on the
Guinean border, disrupting their supply chain and
making it difficult to defend any military gains made
in the area. By contrast, under LURD control Kolahun
would be in a prime position to protect supply lines,
allowing for military strikes deeper into government ter-
ritory. Until Kolahun was taken, insurgent forces would
have major difficulties making inroads against govern-
ment forces.
Current research on civil war violence tends to over-
look cases like Kolahun. The repeated battles over con-
trol of this small town were not due to its resources or
political status, but its strategic location. From Thermo-
pylae to Stalingrad, battles are fought over strategic loca-
tions – areas that control access to resources,
populations, or territory that one side seeks to defend
or attack. However, attempts to empirically measure and
Corresponding author:
jrhammon@nps.edu
Journal of Peace Research
2018, Vol. 55(1) 32–46
ªThe Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343317702956
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