A Mark in Time Saves Nein
| DOI | 10.1177/019251219201300106 |
| Author | Bruce Bueno De Mesquita,A.F.K. Organski |
| Published date | 01 January 1992 |
| Date | 01 January 1992 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
81
A
Mark
in
Time
Saves
Nein
BRUCE
BUENO
DE
MESQUITA
AND
A.F.K.
ORGANSKI
ABSTRACT.
A
method
for
predicting
political
interactions
and
policy
outcomes
based
on
two
political
theorems
is
presented
and
illustrated
with
an
examination
of
the
decision
to
merge
the
two
German
currencies.
Political
perceptions
and
actions
are
anticipated
by
combining
the
substantive
knowledge
of
area
experts
with
the
theoretical
insights
embedded
in
the
median
voter
theorem
and
a
monotonicity
theorem
that
links
expectations
to
probabilistic
statements
of action.
The
proposed
model
has
proven
accurate
about
90
percent
of
the
time.
The
proposed
forecasting
method
identifies
a
sequential
strategy
that
may
have
been
followed
by
Chancellor
Kohl
in
forging
the
coalition
needed
to
merge
successfully
the
two
German
currencies.
Using
comparative
statics,
the
analysis
suggests
how
subtle
and
sophisticated
Chancellor
Kohl
had
to
be
to
succeed
in
getting
the
policy
outcome
he
desired
despite
stiff
opposition.
It
is
apparent
that
1990
will
be
remembered
as
the
time
of
passage
from
the
old
to
the
new
Europe.
The
speedy,
peaceful
unification
of
Germany
is
perhaps
the
most
remarkable
of
the
massive
changes
which
began
with
the
reversal
of
Soviet
policy
toward
the
Western
powers;
the
emergence
of
new,
friendly
relations
with
the
United
States;
and
the
liberation
of
Eastern
Europe.
Events
of
the
past
few
years
have
revolutionized
the
European
political
environment.
The
unification
of
Germany
has
transformed
power
realities
and
the
rules
under
which
Germany
and
Europe
will
operate
in
the
foreseeable
future.
A
united
Germany
appears
well
on
the
way
to
becoming
the
dominant
European
country
in
all
of
Western
Europe,
and
in
parts
of
Eastern
Europe
as
well,
making
Germany
the
cornerstone
of
the
new
Western
European
power
structure
and
the
new
American
interlocutor
in
Europe.
Two
points
should
be
made.
First,
it
should
be
kept
in
mind
that
the
West
German
leadership
echelons,
with
a
great
deal
of
popular
support,
have
persisted
for
almost
all
the
time
since
World
War
II
to
assert
the
unity
of
the
German
nation
(Dean,
1989;
Schweigler,
1989).
In
a
world
in
which
unification
appeared
unrealizable,
the
focus
of
West
German
strategy
was
on
minimizing
the
severity
of
the
division
of
82
Germany.
Ironically,
this
goal
was
pursued
with
policies
ranging
from
accommoda-
tion
to
the
division
of
Germany
(e.g.,
recognition
of
the
GDR)
at
one
end,
to
the
proffering
of
economic
assistance
to
East
Germany
on
the
other.
That
this
relationship
has
affected
the
nature
of both
the
GDR
and
the
FRG
should
be
recognized.
Both
the
FRG
and
the
GDR
were
the
richest
and
most
important
members
(other
than
the
superpowers
themselves)
of
the
two
economic
and
political
coalitions
that,
until
quite
recently,
confronted
one
another
(namely,
Comecon
and
the
Warsaw
Pact,
NATO
and
the
EEC).
Their
recovery
from
the
ravages
of
World
War
II
were
remarkable.
West
Germany
surpassed
France
in
the
production
of
steel
in
the
early
1950s
and
competes
as
an
exporter
of
manufactures
with
Japan.
Both
the
GDR
and
the
FRG
were
important
sources
of
manufactures
for
their
allies
not
only
for
civilian
products
but
also
for
defense
goods.
True,
East
Germany
lagged
substantially
behind
the
West
German
state
despite
extensive
economic
aid
received
through
its
special
relationship
with
West
Germany;
however,
this
appears
to
have
been
due,
in
large
part,
to
economic
mismanagement
which
disrupted
the
national
economy
more
severely
than
even
the
cruelest
war.
A
second
impressive
element
of
the
situation
in
regard
to
the
two
Germanies
was
the
unbelievable
stability
in
the
fundamental
socio-economic
processes
responsible
for
the
ongoing
systemic
change.
Despite
the
prospective
power
explosion
due
to
the
fusion
of
the
two
Germanys,
unification
has
proceeded
unimpeded
by
significant
elements
within
or
outside
either
Germany.
Despite
the
earthquakes
that
have
shaken
the
political
and
economic
topography
of
Germany
to
its
roots
over
the
previous
50
years,
the
new
Germany
can
be
expected
to
be
very
roughly
where
it
would
have
been
economically
had
no
war
occurred.
Although,
as
already
noted,
economic
performance
in
East
Germany
has
been
stifled,
West
Germany’s
economic
system
is
as
strong
or
even
stronger
than
it
was
before
the
war.
In
1936
the
FRG
portion
of
the
Reich
economic
system
produced
$26.8
billion
(or
41
percent
of
the
GNP
of
the
United
States,
then
about
$64.7
billion);
in
1980
the
same
territory
produced
32
percent
of
the
value
of
the
US
domestic
product
in
the
same
year
(Kaser,
1989).
Furthermore,
in
1937
West
Germany
competed
in
exports
with
the
United
Kingdom,
the
leading
exporter
of
manufactures
of
the
time;
today,
West
Germany
is
locked
in
a
close
race
with
Japan,
the
leading
exporter
of
manufactures
in
our
own
epoch.
Those
knowing
German
history
may
be
reminded
by
today’s
events
of
the
rise
of
Prussia
as
it
brought
under
control
the
other
German
states.
That
takeover
was
to
be
punctuated
by
the
rapid,
relatively
bloodless,
seven-week
conflict
between
Prussia
and
Austria,
which
the
former
won
easily.
It
was
a
signal,
and
all
of
Europe
knew
at
the
time
that
a
system
change
had
occurred
and
that
the
pecking
order
in
Europe
had
changed
(Bueno
de
Mesquita,
1990b).
Perhaps
we
are
witnessing
a
new,
peaceful
power
transition
in
Europe
(Organski
and
Kugler,
1980).
This
paper
addresses
one
fundamental
issue
regarding
the
process
of
German
unification
today.
It
seeks
to
answer
the
question
of
who
will
pay
the
bill
for
the
anschluss
of
East
Germany
and
the
Federal
Republic.
There
is
and
will
continue
to
be
a
substantial
tug
of
war
over
the
issue
of
costs.
This
is
a
central
political
and
economic
question,
and
economic
estimates
suggest
that
West
German
absorption
of
the
GDR
will
be
very
costly.
Thus
the
query
as
to
how
much
it
will
cost
and
how
such
costs
will
be
distributed
is
of
critical
importance.
Related
to
it is
the
question
of
why
the
parties
decide
the
issues
the
way
they
will.
The
political
dynamics
should
prove
crucial,
and
it
should
be
noted
that
the
decision
over
costs,
though
made
by
the
Germans,
is
one
in
which
actors
in
and
out
of
the
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