Martin v Gribble

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
Judgment Date03 May 1865
Date03 May 1865
CourtExchequer

English Reports Citation: 159 E.R. 679

Exchequer Division

Martin
and
Gribble

S. C. 34 L. J. Ex. 108; 11 Jur. (N. S.) 490; 13 W. R. 690; 12 L. T. 395. Referred to, p. 973, post.

MARTIN V. GRD313Lt 679 itself " entitled." A man is entitled as soon as he has the right. In the next place he may be entitled "after an interval ," again, he may be entitled " contingently." Further, by sect. 20, the duty is payable only where the successor shall become entitled in possession to the succession. On the other hand a past disposition of property, by reason of which a person has become entitled on the death of a person dying [630] after the commencement of this Act, confers a succession. But in such case it cannot mean the accrual of the title, for that has taken place, so that the word must mean here intitled in possession. Further, if this were not so, the common case of a settlement for life, with following interests, would not confer a succession on the persons taking in remainder. This cannot have been intended, and indeed is contrary to several cases : The Attorney General v. Yelverton (7 H. & N. 306), The Attorney Gentle v. Gardner (1 H. & C. 639). We must hold, therefore, that the section applies, not merely to cases where the title accrues on death, but also to cases where the title has accrued before the Act, but is made an interest 111 possession at once or after au interval on a death occurring after the Act; so that it applies, not only where the death is the cause, but also where it is the occasion of the successor being entitled to possession immediately or after an interval. But, if so, that comprehends the present case. The death of his father did not entitle the defendant in the sense of giving him the title or right. But on that death the defendant became contingently entitled after an interval to possession. We must, therefore, give judgment for the Crown. Mr. liolt's argument has riot been lost sight of. But after all, if our construction of the statute is right, the question is, whether the father's death was the occasion of the son's right. We think it was. It may be that the consequence follows which Mr Rolt pointed out, viz., that if there were a gift for ten years and then to the rector of Dale for the time being, and A. was rector at the beginning of the ten years and died, and B. was rector at the end, that B. would be liable to a succession duty as being entitled on the death of A. It may be so. No doubt that [631] does not seem a case in ordinary parlance of being entitled " on the death " of A. But there is no other objection to such a law. There is no reason why such a subject of taxation should not be selected. It results in this, when anybody gains by a death the state shares his benefit. Judgment for the Crown. MARTIN GRIBBLE. May 3, 1865.A composition deed under the Bankruptcy Act, 1861, made between a debtor of the first part, the undersigned J. F , one of his creditors, and also all his other undersigned creditors of the second part, recited that the debtor was unable to pay his several creditors the full sum of 20s. in the pound, but was able and willing to pay each and all of them, on signing the deed, the composition of 5s. in the pound and that the debtor had applied to the several parties thereto of the second part to receive arid take the composition of 5s. in the pound, payable on signing the deed, in full satisfaction and discharge of their several and respective debts, which the parties of the second part had agreed to accept in full satisfaction and discharge as aforesaid, and in consideration thereof thereby respectively released the debtor.Held, that the deed was not binding on non-assenting creditors, since the composition was only payable on signing the deed, and therefore the creditors who signed were in a better position than those who dissented. [S. C. 34 L. J. Ex. 108; 11 Jur. (N. S.) 490; 13 W. R. 690; 12 L. T. 395. Referred to, p. 973, post.] Declaration by payee against maker of a promissory note, for 501., payable on demand. Plea. That after the last...

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