Mass Euroscepticism revisited: The role of distributive justice
| Published date | 01 December 2023 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/14651165231170789 |
| Author | Sharon Baute |
| Date | 01 December 2023 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Mass Euroscepticism
revisited: The role of
distributive justice
Sharon Baute
Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of
Konstanz, Germany
Abstract
This article advances research into mass Euroscepticism by investigating the role of dis-
tributive justice. Drawing on cross-national survey data from 23 countries, the study
shows that perceived injustice of individual opportunities (i.e. educational and job oppor-
tunities) and outcomes (i.e. earnings) nourish Eurosceptic sentiments, independent of
objective inequalities. However, the public response to distributive injustice varies
across European Union (EU) member states, as high domestic corruption levels dampen
the apparent link to EU accountability. Perceptions of injustice concerning earnings pro-
vide a potential breeding ground for Euroscepticism in member states with low levels of
corruption, while EU scapegoating regarding earnings injustice does not manifest itself in
member states with the highest levels of corruption. These results are supportive of a
justice-based approach in understanding varieties of Euroscepticism across Europe.
Keywords
Corruption, distributive justice, European integration, Euroscepticism, public opinion
Introduction
The literature on mass Euroscepticism can be broadly divided into three dominant
approaches: economic self-interest, identity and cue-taking theory (Abts et al., 2009;
Anderson, 1998; Foster and Frieden, 2021; Gabel, 1998; Hobolt and de Vries, 2016;
Hooghe and Marks, 2005; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2005; McLaren, 2004;
Sánchez-Cuenca, 2000). These theoretical perspectives attribute Euroscepticism to
Corresponding author:
Sharon Baute, Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Konstanz, Postbox 79,
Universitätsstraße 10, Baden-Württemberg, 78457 Konstanz, Germany.
Email: sharon.baute@uni-konstanz.de
Article
European Union Politics
2023, Vol. 24(4) 625–644
© The Author(s) 2023
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/14651165231170789
journals.sagepub.com/home/eup
economic, cultural and political factors, respectively. Yet, the social roots of mass
Euroscepticism have received little attention in scholarship to date (Lahusen, 2020;
Sørensen, 2007). This is somewhat surprising, because the European Union (EU) has
expressed an explicit social objective (Ferrera, 2017; Vandenbroucke et al., 2017),
which was reinforced by the announcement of the European Pillar of Social Rights
(EPSR) in 2017 (European Commission, 2018). The EPSR aims to provide new and
more effective social rights for all Europeans, directly touching on the notion of social
justice through its premise to promote fair wages and equal opportunities in a more
digital and sustainable economy.
1
Against this background, an important question that arises is whether justice-based
Euroscepticism constitutes a distinct threat to the EU. As a consequence of the gradual
shift of decision-making power from national to EU institutions in the multi-level govern-
ance architecture, Europeans may increasingly blame the EU for perceived distributive
injustice. In a similar vein, scapegoating of the EU could be sparked by structural
flaws in its governance. The EU’s predominant focus on economic integration through
the internal market (Scharpf, 2010) –that is, the embodiment of free trade liberalization
–has mainly left issues of distributive justice to the markets (Luo, 2017). From this point
of view, the EU can be seen as a cosmopolitan project that benefits elites and mobile citi-
zens, whose rights and opportunities have increased (Kriesi et al., 2006; Vandenbroucke,
2019), whereas, for others, European integration results in fear of job losses and reduced
social security (Baute, 2021; Baute et al., 2018; Grauel et al., 2013). This resonates with
popular views of the EU as an elitist project that has contributed to inequality
(Beaudonnet, 2015; Beckfield, 2019; Kuhn et al., 2016; Simpson, 2019).
Previous research has not directly investigated the link between distributive justice and
Euroscepticism. The Eurosceptic vote of people who feel ‘left behind’is often assumed
and has become increasingly included in empirical research, particularly focusing on
emotions such as anger and fear (Garry, 2014; Magni, 2017; Rico et al., 2017;
Vasilopoulou and Wagner, 2017). However, perceptions of distributive injustice often
remain implicit and poorly conceptualized (Capelos and Demertzis, 2018; Capelos and
Katsanidou, 2018; Fanoulis and Guerra, 2017). Other studies have investigated the
role of inequality at the individual (Halikiopoulou and Vlandas, 2018; Hooghe and
Marks, 2004; Sani and Magistro, 2016), regional (Lipps and Schraff, 2020) and
country level (Burgoon, 2012; Kuhn et al., 2016; Schraff, 2020) in explaining
Euroscepticism and trust in EU institutions. However, research into the psychology of
social justice shows that inequality is not always perceived as unjust (Hegtvedt and
Isom, 2014; Jost et al., 2004; Stephenson, 2000).
2
Hence, the extent to which
Eurosceptic sentiments are sparked by distributive injustice –capturing normative eva-
luations of the actual distribution of resources in society –rather than inequality per
se, remains unclear. Furthermore, whether and how the national context tempers or
fuels the rise of justice-based Euroscepticism is unknown.
This article addresses these lacunae in previous literature by focusing on two research
questions. First, to provide a fine-grained insight into the nexus between perceptions of
distributive justice and Euroscepticism, the current article distinguishes between the
justice of opportunities and justice of outcomes, and draws on detailed measurements
626 European Union Politics 24(4)
To continue reading
Request your trial