Mechanisms of Responsiveness: What MPs Think of Interest Organizations and How They Deal with Them
| Author | Marco Giugni,Maria Grasso |
| Date | 01 August 2019 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0032321718784156 |
| Published date | 01 August 2019 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
784156PCX0010.1177/0032321718784156Political StudiesGiugni and Grasso
research-article2018
Article
Political Studies
2019, Vol. 67(3) 557 –575
Mechanisms of Responsiveness:
© The Author(s) 2018
What MPs Think of Interest
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Organizations and How They
https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321718784156
DOI: 10.1177/0032321718784156
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Deal with Them
Marco Giugni1 and Maria Grasso2
Abstract
By employing individual-level data on MPs in 15 countries and 73 national and local assemblies, this
article examines the conditions under which individual MPs are responsive to interest organizations.
We show that MPs’ political values influence their responsiveness: MPs with more egalitarian and
socially open values are more responsive to interest organizations. Moreover, MPs’ conceptions of
democracy also matter in that more negative views of popular political involvement in democratic
decision making are linked to lower responsiveness to interest organizations. Reliance on
established ties with groups in society as well as support for technocracy have differential effects
for responsiveness toward “old” and “new” interest organizations characterized by diverse social
bases. These findings have important implications for democratic practice since they show how
MPs are not all equally responsive to organized citizens as well as how different types of factors
matter for responsiveness to “old” and “new” types of interest organizations.
Keywords
interest organizations, political elites, political attitudes and values, democratic responsiveness
Accepted: 29 May 2018
Introduction
Citizens routinely organize collectively to influence political representatives (Giugni and
Grasso, in press). Scholarship has investigated the outcomes of such efforts primarily in
two distinct research traditions: research on interest groups and that on social movement
outcomes. Research on interest groups has focused mainly on the impact of lobbying
activities on policy-making in the various stages of the legislative process (e.g.
Baumgartner et al., 2009; Dür and De Bièvre 2007; Klüver, 2013; Mahoney, 2008; see
1Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
2Department of Politics, The University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK
Corresponding author:
Marco Giugni, Département de science politique et relations internationales, Université de Genève, Uni-Mail,
1211 Genève 4, Switzerland.
Email: marco.giugni@unige.ch
558
Political Studies 67(3)
Hojnacki et al., 2012 for a review; Richardson, 2013), including how interest groups
influence how MPs from different parties cast their votes in parliament (Fellowes and
Wolf, 2004; Giger and Klüver, 2016) and how interest groups perceive their own level of
influence on representatives (Newmark and Nownes, 2017). Works on social movement
outcomes have inquired into the circumstances under which protest activities lead to pol-
icy changes (e.g. Amenta, 2006; Amenta et al., 1992; Andrews, 2001; Burstein, 1998b
[1985]; Gamson, 1990 [1975]; Giugni, 2004; Meyer, 2005; see Amenta et al., 2010 for a
review). Other works have examined both types of actors as well as political parties
(Burstein and Linton, 2002). Yet, while these strands of literature yield important insights
into the political effects of organized groups in society, we still know little about the
individual-level mechanisms of responsiveness and how certain features of MPs, such as
their values and democratic conceptualizations, impact on their responsiveness to interest
organizations (Burstein, 1999). This has important implications for making sense of dem-
ocratic practice and the avenues to solve the crisis of responsibility and responsiveness
currently afflicting advanced democracies (della Porta, 2015).
While scholars have recently started to examine policy-makers and political repre-
sentatives’ views about protest activities (Gilljam et al., 2012; Marien and Hooghe, 2013;
Uba, 2016; Wouters and Walgrave, 2017), research on the individual-level factors condi-
tioning how MPs respond to interest organizations is still sparse. We aim to contribute to
redressing this state of affairs by examining the following research question: What are the
individual-level mechanisms underlying MPs’ responsiveness to interest organizations?
To answer this question, we focus on various characteristics of MPs and examine the
responsiveness of politicians to interest organizations from an individual-level perspec-
tive. To this end, we follow Burstein’s (1999) approach which groups social movement
organizations and interest groups under the more general category of interest organiza-
tions as distinct from political parties on the basis that the latter have a special legal status,
whereas the former does not. This distinction is particularly relevant when studying elites’
responsiveness. Whereas political parties are specifically organized to represent citizen
interests democratically in parliamentary assemblies through the representative link,
interest groups and social movement organizations do not have immediate access to par-
liaments and legislative chambers and, as such, need to target party representatives in
order to have an impact on policy-making (Giugni and Grasso, in press). Therefore, when
analyzing the individual-level mechanisms that impact MPs’ responsiveness to interest
organizations, we consider these two types of organizations as very similar for the pur-
poses of this specific type of investigation. This focus on interest organizations allows us
to bring together the insights from two bodies of literature that have tended to talk past
each other, namely the literature on social movements and that on interest groups, allow-
ing us to develop on the insights from both fields.
Beyond the specific focus on how MPs view and deal with interest organizations, our
study speaks to broader concerns about the impacts of organized citizen participation in
the public sphere. This is an important area of investigation given the current “democratic
deficit” in advanced democracies (Norris, 2011). In this respect, the literature on social
movement outcomes has increasingly shifted focus on the targets of protest. These works
look at both state (Luders, 2006, 2016; Skrentny, 2006) and non-state targets (Balsiger,
2016; King, 2016; King and Pearce, 2010). This literature has shown that we should not
only study who participates in politics and why but also how the targets of interest organi-
zations, that is, policy-makers perceive them. Studies of democratic responsiveness have
mainly focused on the conditions under which political elites respond to shifts in public
Giugni and Grasso
559
opinion and react to citizens’ preferences as captured by opinion polls (Burstein, 1998a;
Page and Shapiro 1983, 1992; Soroka and Wlezien, 2010), including looking at whose
preferences are most influential in shaping policy decisions (Gilens, 2005), often provid-
ing mixed evidence (Burstein, 2014; Manza and Cook, 2002). Following the way paved
by Burstein (1998b [1985]) among others, in this article we aim to broaden the scope of
these forays by inquiring into the conditions under which representatives are responsive
to interest organizations in their everyday work “between elections” (Esaiasson and
Narud, 2013). Moreover, we do so by following a comparative approach providing added
value through generalization of the implications of our study beyond specific national
contexts.
Mechanisms of responsiveness
Why are some policy-makers more responsive to interest organizations? We can draw on
different strands of literature for insights on this question. To start with, the literature on
the political consequences of the actions of social movement organizations tends to
emphasize the incentivizing function of disruption and the way in which making claims
on representatives can disrupt governing institutions to such an extent that powerholders
might yield concessions to appease those petitioning them for change (Piven and Cloward,
1979). In addition to disruption, Andrews (2001) stresses two further mechanisms
explaining why policy-makers might respond to interest organizations such as social
movements: persuasion and negotiation. On the one hand, interest organizations might
succeed in persuading policy-makers about the need for policy change. On the other hand,
MPs might be persuaded through a process of negotiation. In terms of deliberative theory,
while persuasion can be seen as the outcome of a deliberation process, negotiation is more
akin to bargaining. Moreover, Lohmann (1993) noted how taking into account the claims
of organized citizens can be seen as a rather an instrumental attitude by elected officials
aimed at preserving their power. Within a representative democratic set-up, interest
organizations should not have a direct impact on public policy, since representatives
should in theory bear the interests of the majority of citizens into account in making deci-
sions, and not prioritize the needs and demands of particular interests or minority groups
(Krehbiel, 1991; Lohmann 1993). However, some representatives may give more atten-
tion to some interest organizations than others as they might see this as a useful means to
preserve power. While this could be seen to undermine democratic principles and the
quality of democracy at least under more...
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