Mediating power? Delegation, pooling and leadership selection at international organisations
| Author | Mirko Heinzel |
| DOI | 10.1177/1369148121992761 |
| Published date | 01 February 2022 |
| Date | 01 February 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Original Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148121992761
The British Journal of Politics and
International Relations
2022, Vol. 24(1) 153 –170
© The Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/1369148121992761
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Mediating power? Delegation,
pooling and leadership selection
at international organisations
Mirko Heinzel1,2
Abstract
The selection of the executive heads of international organisations represents a key decision in
the politics of international organisations. However, we know little about what dynamics influence
this selection. The article focuses on the nationality of selected executive heads. It argues that
institutional design impacts the factors that influence leadership selection by shaping the costs
and benefits of attaining the position for member states’ nationals. The argument is tested with
novel data on the nationality of individuals in charge of 69 international organisation bureaucracies
between 1970 and 2017. Two findings stand out: first, powerful countries are more able to
secure positions in international organisations in which executive heads are voted in by majority
voting. Second, less consistent evidence implies that powerful countries secure more positions
when bureaucracies are authoritative. The findings have implications for debates on international
cooperation by illustrating how power and institutions interact in the selection of international
organisation executive heads.
Keywords
decision-making, delegation, executive head, institutional design, international organisations,
pooling, selection
Introduction
Several authors have acknowledged the importance of the executive heads of interna-
tional organisation (IO) bureaucracies1 and their power in shaping organisational out-
comes (Fröhlich and Williams, 2018; Hall and Woods, 2018; Yi-chong and Weller, 2018).
Countries go to considerable length to try to make sure that their nationals head IOs. The
most prominent example is the power-sharing agreement between the Europeans and the
United States in ensuring that the President of the World Bank will be an American and
the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) will be a national from
a European country. Given the widespread attention to the selection of executive heads by
1Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Potsdam, Potsdam, Germany
2Berlin Graduate School of Global and Transregional Studies, Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin, Germany
Corresponding author:
Mirko Heinzel, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Potsdam, August-Bebel-Straße 89,
14482 Potsdam, Germany.
Email: mheinzel@uni-potsdam.de
992761BPI0010.1177/1369148121992761The British Journal of Politics and International RelationsHeinzel
research-article2021
Original Article
154 The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 24(1)
policymakers and media alike, it seems surprising that research on IOs has been mostly
silent on the matter (Kille, 2013). Some authors have developed single case studies on
selection decisions in IOs, like the UN secretariat (Fröhlich and Williams, 2018; Pouliot,
2020; Thakur, 2017), the European Commission (Hix, 1997) or the Food and Agriculture
Organisation (FAO; Weitz, 1997). Others have presented small-n comparisons on a few
organisations (Kahler, 2001; Yi-chong and Weller, 2018). However, the existing literature
mainly focuses on either explaining choices from a historical perspective (Fröhlich and
Williams, 2018) or derive recommendations for reform (Kahler, 2001; Woods et al.,
2015). Therefore, theoretical explanations are scarce and empirical testing of these expla-
nations across a large number of cases is, to the author’s knowledge, absent. Where large-
n comparative analyses exist, they focus on overall staffing patterns in IOs (Badache,
2020; Novosad and Werker, 2019; Parízek, 2017), which often follow different formal
and informal procedures than executive head selections. The lack of engagement with the
selection of executive heads from a comparative perspective is puzzling because it reflects
a key decision of member states in IOs.
The argument in this article posits that power is an important determinant of the
nationality of executive heads, but the institutional design of IOs mediates it. Powerful
countries are more able to secure executive head positions for their nationals because they
can use side payments and secure votes through existing dependencies. However, institu-
tional design shapes the costs that countries need to pay and are willing to pay in order to
attain the position of the executive head for one of their nationals. The argument is based
on theoretical arguments made in the literature on pooling and delegation of authority
(Hooghe and Marks, 2015; Moravcsik, 1993). Specifically, the degree to which legal
authority is pooled in decision-making and delegated to the IO bureaucracy influences
considerations of member states when selecting executive heads. I argue that pooling
decision-making affects the costs of selection, while delegation influences the benefits
states can reap from having their national in the position.
First, pooling decision-making decreases the size of the selectorate and, therefore, the
costs of convincing other countries to support one’s desired candidate. For example, the
CEO of the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) is selected through consensus by a
Council, which is made up of representatives of member states (Hooghe et al., 2017). On
the other hand, in the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), member states
vote with a simple majority for the ITU’s secretary-general during the plenipotentiary
conference (Hooghe et al., 2017). The fact that a GEF candidate needs to persuade all
member states representatives makes securing the position more demanding than in the
case of the ITU.
Second, delegating more decision-making authority to the IO bureaucracy increases
the attractiveness of having a national in the position. For example, the managing director
of the IMF has a ‘remarkable degree of gate-keeping power and proposal power as chair-
man of the Executive Board’ (Stone, 2011: 56). The member states of the IMF delegate
considerable authority to its bureaucracy (Hooghe and Marks, 2015). Compare that to the
World Trade Organization (WTO), who is a much more member-driven organisation
where few competencies are delegated (Elsig, 2010). Member states will be able to reap
more benefits from securing the position of managing director of the IMF for their nation-
als than from the director-general of the WTO. The article argues that powerful states
secure more positions when more authority has been pooled, or more authority has been
delegated to the IO. The arguments are tested using novel data on the nationality of the
executive heads in charge of 69 IOs between 1970 and 2017.
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