Meeting Principles and Lifeworlds Halfway: Jürgen Habermas on the Future of Europe
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2011.00907.x |
| Date | 01 June 2012 |
| Author | Peter J. Verovšek |
| Published date | 01 June 2012 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
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P O L I T I C A L S T U D I E S : 2 0 1 2 VO L 6 0 , 3 6 3 – 3 8 0
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2011.00907.x
Meeting Principles and Lifeworlds Halfway:
Jürgen Habermas on the Future of Europepost_907363..380
Peter J. Verovšek
Yale University
Although Jürgen Habermas is widely recognized as a philosopher and social theorist, his political philosophy is often
accused of excessive formalism. Habermas has not only responded to these critiques in his theoretical writings, but also
by showing how his critical theory can be applied to concrete situations in his Short Political Writings (Kleine politische
Schriften). Using his political commentaries on the future of Europe and the European Union (EU), I explore
Habermas’ melding of abstract principles with concrete political developments. The case of Europe reveals an ongoing
process of adjustment, where Habermas’ theoretical insights and the place of the EU in his political thought have to
respond to political developments. I argue that this process of ‘meeting halfway’ (Entgegenkommen), a concept I borrow
from Habermas’ social theory, demonstrates how the formalism of his theoretical commitments may be applied to
politics. This approach also allows me to critique Habermas when he does not go far enough in adjusting his theory
to account for concrete developments in European politics.
Keywords: European Union; Jürgen Habermas; lifeworld; crisis of the nation state;
meeting halfway
Jürgen Habermas is one of the most politically engaged intellectuals of our time. A
long-time observer of events in Germany, since the Wende (‘turning point’) brought about
by the fall of communism, Habermas has brought his experiences to bear on European
problems. The reception of this German-centric approach to Europe has been mixed. Some
commentators have rejected Habermas’ attempt to apply lessons from Germany as ‘restrict-
[ing] the horizon within which the legitimacy of a European polity might be discussed’
(Turner, 2004, p. 293). Others argue that this perspective is fitting, since Germany’s
experience of reintegration mirrors many of the difficulties faced by Europe after 1989
(Matuštík, 2001, p. 215; compare Boon, 2007, pp. 300–2, p. 305).
Habermas’ engagement with contemporary political issues and his efforts to shape public
opinion are an expression of his broader philosophical commitments.Within the tradition
of the Frankfurt School, Habermas’ engaged perspective is hardly surprising. His approach,
which seeks to diagnose societal problems and suggest theoretically grounded solutions,
recalls the differences between ‘Traditional and Critical Theory’ outlined by Max Hork-
heimer in 1937. Horkheimer argues that whereas traditional theory ‘corresponds to the
activity of the scholar which takes place alongside all the other activities of a society but in
no immediate connection with them ... a critical theory of society ... [is] dominated at every
turn by a concern for the reasonable conditions of life’ (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 197,
pp. 198–9).
Habermas’ desire to apply his philosophy to social problems is a constant in his work
from his first book onward. In The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Habermas
(1989 [1962]) shows how debates within the public sphere can legitimize political authority
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through discussion and reasoned agreement. Drawing on a historical sociology of the salon
culture of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe, Habermas argues that the rise of
newspapers created a new ideal of political legitimacy.1 As a result, the opinions of
individuals not directly involved in the state apparatus or bureaucracy became important.
Habermas’ work since Structural Transformation continues to develop this view of legitimacy
by examining the cultural, psychological and social barriers to the realization of a just,
emancipated society. Thus, Habermas’ social and political theory is based on concrete
historical developments and important events in its formulation as well as in its critical
orientation (McCarthy, 1978, ch. 2, ch. 3).
Despite its historical approach and practical intent, Habermas’ political theory, especially
his deliberative conception of democracy and discourse ethics, has often been accused of
excessive formalism (see Cohen and Arato, 1992, pp. 375 ff.). Many have found Habermas’
claims unsatisfying since he only provides procedural requirements to realize substantive
principles, not the principles themselves (see Döbert, 1990; Dwars, 1992; Günther, 1989;
Heller, 1984/5; Taylor, 1986). In addition to his direct responses to these critiques,
Habermas has also sought to demonstrate how his principles should be applied in his
political commentaries.
In this article I explore the process of melding abstract principles to politically important
events. I connect Habermas’ political writings to his social and political theory, examining
how developments in the EU have forced him to adapt his views and the place of Europe
in his political philosophy.While Habermas’ political commentaries cover a broad array of
issues, his writings on the EU are particularly interesting. First, Habermas’ writings on the
European projet are extensive, covering the entire post-Cold War period. Second, the
emerging ‘Euro-polity’ has generated an extensive literature, including a ‘normative turn’ in
European Union Studies ( Bellamy and Castiglione, 2003). Lastly, since Europe is still
developing, these public debates have the potential to influence its future.
I argue that the evolution of Habermas’ theoretical insights has to be understood within
the concrete historical and political development of the EU. I proceed dialectically,
examining European developments through Habermas’ theory and evaluating his theory
through these developments. This approach sheds light on Habermas not only as a social
commentator, but also as a critical theorist mapping his principles on to concrete political
developments in a ‘dialectic of universality and situation’ (Pensky, 2008, p. 69).
I frame my argument using the idea of ‘meeting halfway’. In his social theory, Habermas
distinguishes between universal ‘open’ networks or systems and the ‘closed’ lifeworld
(Lebenswelt) that defines a concrete community (Peters, 1993). Unlike networks that are
based on rational principles, lifeworlds require the acceptance of cultural traditions, existing
social structures and conditions of socialization (Habermas, 1992, pp. 193–200). However,
in a globalized world dominated by international systems, these lifeworlds also have to open
to meet the theoretical principles of rational networks ‘halfway’ (Habermas, 2001a, p. 82).
The traditional lifeworld, which was accepted without reflection, becomes ‘rationalized’ in
a process of opening and closing, while remaining distinct from systems governed by
universal principles of theoretical reflection (Habermas, 1984, p. 340). By opening itself up
to systems, the lifeworld is able to ‘meet up with’ or ‘coincide’ (Zusammentreffen) with
universal principles for long enough to be institutionalized. This process of ‘coming
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together’ – the literal translation of Entgegenkommen, usually rendered as ‘meeting halfway’
– is the adjustment of universal principles to the lifeworlds of concrete communities
(Habermas, 1996, p. 302; Offe, 1992, pp. 62–5).
I argue that the image of ‘meeting halfway’ also describes the way Habermas interacts
with political developments in the EU (for another example of how the idea of ‘meeting
halfway’ has been redefined, see Schiemann, 2000). The development of the Union over
the past two decades has opened some possibilities while closing the door on others. As
a result, Habermas has been forced to re-evaluate the place and potential of the EU.
By outlining these developments and placing them in their historical context, I detail
how Habermas adjusts his theory in response to concrete events. Such a historical
approach should prove especially useful for those who are only familiar with these essays
after they have been republished in Habermas’ Kleine politische Schriften (Short Political
Writings).
I divide the history of the EU since 1989 into four crucial ‘moments’. My choice of these
specific periods is based on both their importance for the EU and the changes they provoke
in Habermas’ commentaries. I argue that the transitions between these moments represent
significant breaks in Habermas’ thought where concrete events have prompted him to
modify his opinion of the EU and its place in his political philosophy.
The argument is organized around these four periods. In the first, defined by the
disintegration of the Iron Curtain, the role of Europe is unclear, as Habermas grapples with
the profound changes of the Wende. By the second, centered on the treaties that deepened
EU integration from 1992 to 2001, the hope for a common European citizenship emerges.
In the third moment, Habermas responds to the division between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe
brought on by the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 by calling for a common identity based on
shared European institutions. By the fourth, the rejections of the Constitutional Treaty
(2004) and the Treaty of Lisbon (2007) have brought Habermas’ pleas for the...
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