Merchant Shipping Act 1995, S. 58: Statutory Interpretation
| Author | Trevor Douglas |
| Published date | 01 October 2006 |
| Date | 01 October 2006 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1350/jcla.2006.70.5.385 |
| Subject Matter | Court of Appeal |
relevant sense clear law. Such a conclusion also made it unnecessary to
consider the controversial Commencement Order issue.
C
OMMENTARY
In many ways this is a classic instance of the problems associated with
the interpretation of legislation. Both the Divisional Court and the Court
of Appeal believed the meaning of the statute to be clear. Their reason-
ing which led to the ‘clarity’ produced opposite results. However, it
should be noted that the case turned on an issue that was never put
before the Divisional Court, namely the reference to s. 14 of the Public
Order Act 1986. Putting aside the various controversies attached to as-
pects of SOCPA, the interpretation of the legislation, when s. 14 of the
Public Order Act 1986 is taken into account, clearly reflects parliamen-
tary intention. The Court of Appeal made reference to the approach to
interpretation identified by Lord Nicholls in R v Secretary of State for the
Environment, Transport and the Regions, ex p. Spath Home [2001] 2 AC 349.
The passage provides an excellent explanation of the task of interpreta-
tion and is worth reproducing in full. Lord Nicholls stated (at 396):
Statutory interpretation is an exercise which requires the court to identify
the meaning borne by the words in question in the particular context. The
task of the court is often said to be to ascertain the intention of Parliament
expressed in the language under consideration. This is correct and may be
helpful so long as it is remembered that the ‘intention of Parliament’ is an
objective concept, not subjective. The phrase is a shorthand reference to
the intention which the court reasonably imputes to Parliament in respect
of the language used. It is not the subjective intention of the minister or
other persons who promoted the legislation. Nor is the subjective intention
of the draftsman, or of individual members or even a majority of individual
members of either House. These individuals will often have widely varying
intentions. Their understanding of the legislation and of the words used
may be impressively complete or woefully inadequate. Thus, when the
courts say that such-and-such a meaning ‘cannot be what Parliament
intended’, they are saying only that the words under consideration cannot
reasonably be taken as used by Parliament with that meaning.
Adopting this approach ensured that the Court of Appeal did not have to
consider the issue of whether the Commencement Order was ultra vires,
which was the particularly controversial aspect of the original case.
Nick Taylor
Merchant Shipping Act 1995, s. 58: Statutory
Interpretation
R vGoodwin [2005] EWCA Crim 3184, [2005] All ER (D) 111
The defendant was convicted in Salisbury Crown Court of doing an act
which caused or was likely to cause serious injury, contrary to s.
58(2)(a) of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 (‘the 1995 Act’), which
states:
Merchant Shipping Act 1995, s. 58: Statutory Interpretation
385
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