Meta-Jackson: Rethinking Patrick Thaddeus Jackson’s Conduct of Inquiry
| DOI | 10.1177/0305829812463474 |
| Date | 01 January 2013 |
| Author | Hidemi Suganami |
| Published date | 01 January 2013 |
| Subject Matter | Forum |
Millennium: Journal of
International Studies
41(2) 248 –269
© The Author(s) 2013
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DOI: 10.1177/0305829812463474
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MILLENNIUM
Journal of International Studies
Meta-Jackson: Rethinking
Patrick Thaddeus Jackson’s
Conduct of Inquiry
Hidemi Suganami
Aberystwyth University, UK
Abstract
In his The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations, Patrick Jackson identifies four distinct ways of
studying world politics: ‘neopositivism’, ‘critical realism’, ‘analyticism’ and ‘reflexivity’. According
to him, they all fall under the broad umbrella of ‘science’ but they each stem from a distinct
philosophical foundation. In his view, which foundation one subscribes to is a matter of faith,
which leads him to advocate pluralism. He classifies the underlying philosophical foundations in
terms of two criteria: ‘mind–world dualism’ versus ‘mind–world monism’ and ‘phenomenalism’
versus ‘transfactualism’. Through a step-by-step analysis of his complex text, I show that what
divides (1) neopositivism, (2) analyticism and (3) critical realism and reflexivity (classed together)
is not in fact their philosophical foundations but the nature of the questions they ask, each
reflecting distinct human interests. Accordingly, while praising Jackson’s philosophical vigilance
against the dominance of neopositivism, I conclude by pointing to a need to consider the political
underpinnings of different modes of knowledge production.
Keywords
International Relations, Jackson, meta-theory
Introduction
Patrick Jackson’s recent book The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations:
Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics1 is a major
Corresponding author:
Hidemi Suganami, Aberystwyth University, Penglais, Aberystwyth, SY23 3FE, UK.
Email: hss@aber.ac.uk
463474MIL41210.1177/0305829812463474Millennium: Journal of International StudiesSuganami
2013
Forum
1. Patrick Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science
and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics (London: Routledge, 2011). Hereafter, I
refer to this book as ‘Jackson’ followed by relevant page numbers or simply with a page refer-
ence in brackets, as appropriate.
Suganami 249
contribution to the meta-theory of International Relations (IR). Jackson exhibits an
impressive range of knowledge and a reassuring depth of understanding on important
philosophical issues. Although his key message is one that endorses pluralism in the ways
world politics is to be studied, this is aimed at countering the dominance of one particular
approach – what he calls ‘neopositivism’, or neopositivist scientific methodology – espe-
cially in American IR.2 Jackson’s endorsement of pluralism has a self-conscious motive
to accord or restore legitimacy to other ways of studying world politics which are often
treated by neopositivists as unworthy because they do not, so they claim, satisfy the
criteria of ‘science’ – albeit on the narrow conception to which they subscribe.3
It is unsurprising, therefore, to find that Jackson dedicates much space to identifying
the parameters of science in a manner that does not privilege one mode of studying world
politics (neopositivism, in particular) over the others in some a priori manner.4 He defines
‘science’ in terms of the following features:
(1) systematicity;
(2) public criticism; and
(3) worldly knowledge.
‘Worldly knowledge’, according to Jackson, ‘is a realm of facts, not of ethical evalua-
tion or mystical contemplation’.5 He remarks: ‘The only kinds of works against which
the charge of being “non-scientific” could be legitimately deployed – works of norma-
tive analysis and works of political advocacy or commentary, and probably works of art
– would, almost certainly, not be particularly interested in classifying themselves as
“scientific”’.6 Jackson rightly remarks that public criticism of a scientific work must not
be dismissive but aimed at improving it. And although his book is not itself a work of
science but a contribution to meta-science concerning world politics, such works must
2. ‘Neopositivism’ is a label Jackson uses to denote a positivistic scientific methodology which
takes into account criticisms of logical positivism by the falsificationist philosophers (most
famously, Karl Popper) but, in his view, the position, despite its stress on hypothesis-testing,
is akin to logical positivism in its tendency to picture science as a search for certainty rather
than conjectural provisionality. See Jackson, 50–9. A leading neopositivist in IR is Robert
Keohane.
3. Jackson notes: ‘In many ways, the field has not gotten beyond the situation that Wendt
lamented in 1992, in which “Science disciplines Dissent for not defining a conventional
research program, and Dissent celebrates its liberation from Science”’ (182). According to
Jackson, however, what is science is not settled among philosophers, and IR scholars are in
danger of picking up a criterion that suits them (15); ‘science ought to stop functioning as a
trump card in our internecine debates’ (189); and because ‘science’ is used to disqualify the
opponents, it is best to adopt a wide definition (18). He remarks sharply: ‘It is a lie that only
the neopositivist way of studying world politics is scientific – a lie that derives some of its
power and plausibility … from our general lack of familiarity with issues in the philosophy of
science and their implications for IR scholarship’ (206).
4. Jackson, 1–26, 193–6.
5. Jackson, 194.
6. Jackson, 24.
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