Michael Oakeshott on Civility, Civil Society and Civil Association
| Published date | 01 October 2004 |
| Date | 01 October 2004 |
| Author | Richard Boyd |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2004.00498.x |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Michael Oakeshott on Civility, Civil
Society and Civil Association
Richard Boyd
University of Wisconsin-Madison
Contemporary treatments of ‘civil society’ have struggled to formulate clear and explicit criteria
for determining which associations ought to count as part of a truly ‘civil’ society and, conversely,
which other kinds of groups a liberal democracy would best avoid. Michael Oakeshott’s idealized
distinction between ‘civil’ association and ‘enterprise’ association may prove extremely helpful in
sharpening these contemporary discussions of civil society. Rather than a conservative value with
exclusionary and anti-democratic overtones, as many have alleged, the virtue of civility entails
immanent inclusivity, democratic equality and the active recognition of others. Understanding
civility in this way argues for both its normative and conceptual value in distinguishing the good
from the bad in associational life. On the other hand, the contemporary literature on civil society
draws attention to ambiguities in Oakeshott’s thought that make his understanding of the liberal
state, for better or worse, an improbable means of encouraging a rebirth of associational life.
Scarcely two decades ago, social and political scientists declared the importance of
‘bringing the state back in’ (Evans et al., 1985). Of late, however, we have heard
less about the state and more about the tribulations of ‘civil society’. Robert
Putnam, Benjamin Barber and Michael Sandel have not only complained of a crisis
of public life (Barber, 1984; Putnam, 1995; Sandel, 1996), but they and others have
also located the sources of public apathy in an attrition of ‘civil society’ – a domain
that has been described as ‘bigger than the family, smaller than the state’ (Barber,
1998; Putnam, 2001; Zakaria, 1995). But despite the appearance of these debates
having left the state behind, questions endure about the proper relationship
between the state and civil society (Gutmann, 1998; Rosenblum and Post, 2002).
As one of the most penetrating explorations of the systematic ambiguities of the
modern state, Michael Oakeshott’s On Human Conduct may sharpen these discus-
sions (Oakeshott, 1990; hereafter referred to as OHC). The vocabulary of recent
literature on civil society is reminiscent of his distinction between what he calls
‘civil’ association or the civitas (concerned only with the means we are obliged to
respect in our conduct) and ‘purposive’ or ‘enterprise’ associations (whereby we
pursue a variety of self-chosen ends). And yet his distinction also testifies to the
difficulties of trying to imagine civil society as a physical or metaphorical ‘space’,
‘place’ or ‘location’ – one that has variously been characterized as the realm of vol-
untary initiative, the sphere of the market place, the private or domestic sphere,
or the proper location for morality in a liberal state.1Exploring the nature of civil
association may help us to make better sense of the vast and contradictory range
of contemporary opinions about what counts as civil society.
Just as the distinction between enterprise association and civil association is of great
help in sharpening recent discussions of civil society, these contemporary debates
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2004 VOL 52, 603–622
© Political Studies Association, 2004.
Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
604 RICHARD BOYD
are equally useful in bringing to light tensions at the heart of Oakeshott’s own writ-
ings. We will see, first, that his emphasis on the strictly voluntary nature of enter-
prise association has difficulty capturing the quasi-voluntaristic aspects of much of
what passes under the heading of ‘civil society’. Secondly, although what he calls
‘the virtue of civility’ is a promising moral criterion by which to distinguish the
good from the bad in associational life – one sorely absent from many contempo-
rary discussions – this is a move he is reluctant to make. By defining enterprise
association so broadly as to include voluntary associations of every imaginable
variety – potentially ranging from economic firms to churches, militias, terrorist
conspiracies and hate groups – he makes it even more difficult to determine which
sorts of associations ought, ideally, to count as part of a truly ‘civil’ society. Finally,
his flirtation with the idea that the modern state actually should, if possible, be
reduced to the idealized model of civil association highlights the inescapable diffi-
culties confronted by the liberal state in encouraging a vibrant life of enterprise
associations.
What Civil Association Is Not
We are in danger of overlooking Oakeshott’s forceful defense of enterprise associ-
ation if we focus, like many interpreters, only on his more explicit conceptual dis-
cussion of civil association and the modern state. Yet these two elements are
necessarily connected; and in order to understand the former, we must closely scru-
tinize the latter. He is initially concerned with what the moral relationship of civil
association is not. On Human Conduct begins with a rigorous and highly abstract
attempt to come to grips with the fact that human associations take many forms.
Our confusion stems from this variety, and especially from the tendency to con-
found these ‘modes’. As he cautions:
There are, then, two categorially discrete modes of human relationship
to be reckoned with: the one substantial, concerned with the satisfaction
of chosen wants from which an agent may extricate himself by a choice
of his own, the other formal and in terms of the considerations which
compose a practice. (OHC, p. 121)
The first mode includes the whole range of voluntary associations that we create
in pursuit of our various enterprises:
Agents thus related may be believers in a common faith and concerned
or not concerned to propagate it, or they may be partners in a produc-
tive undertaking (a bassoon factory); they may be comrades or allies in
the promotion of a ‘cause’, colleagues, expeditionaries, accomplices or
conspirators; they may be joined in belonging to the same profession or
in having the same trade ... The ties of this association may be close like
those of a corporation; or they may be looser ties of partnership or
alliance. (OHC, p. 114)
Oakeshott’s terminological equivocation between ‘enterprise’ and ‘purposive’ asso-
ciation has nothing to do with upholding the distinction ‘between association in
terms of cooperative enterprise and association in terms of transactional engage-
ments’ that he dismisses as being ‘without significant difference’ (OHC, p. 321).
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