Michael Oakeshott’s political philosophy of civil association and constructivism in International Relations
| Author | Davide Orsi |
| Date | 01 October 2015 |
| Published date | 01 October 2015 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1755088215575091 |
Journal of International Political Theory
2015, Vol. 11(3) 331 –350
© The Author(s) 2015
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DOI: 10.1177/1755088215575091
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Michael Oakeshott’s political
philosophy of civil association
and constructivism in
International Relations
Davide Orsi
Cardiff University, UK
Abstract
This article shows the relevance of Oakeshott’s political philosophy for the contemporary
constructivist debate in International Relations. First, the article argues that Oakeshott’s
perspective stresses that political institutions are based on norms and relationships which
result from human understanding. Second, it elaborates on Nicholas Rengger’s recent
work and reveals that Oakeshott’s On Human Conduct presents considerations pertaining
to international politics that are consistent with his broader political philosophy. These
observations concern the nature of war, the historical role of colonialism and the
evolution of international society. Third, this article discusses Terry Nardin’s notion
of ‘practical association’ and Christian Reus-Smit’s criticism of it. It contends that
international civil association is a relationship between states based on understood and
socially constructed moral values and practices. Finally, the article claims that customary
international law declares and reflects these values and practices. As such, it reveals
that Oakeshott’s notion of authority and his theory of civil association illuminate the
possibility of an international legal order without a legislative office. This is of particular
relevance also because of the Hobbesian influence on Oakeshott. Overall, this article
illustrates how Michael Oakeshott’s theory of civil association sheds light on the nature
of international society and law.
Keywords
Constructivism, customary international law, English School, international society,
Oakeshott, Hobbes
Corresponding author:
Davide Orsi, Department of Politics and International Relations, Cardiff University, Law Building, Museum
Avenue, Cardiff CF10 3AX, UK.
Email: orsid@cardiff.ac.uk
575091IPT0010.1177/1755088215575091Journal of International Political TheoryOrsi
research-article2015
Article
332 Journal of International Political Theory 11(3)
Introduction
Michael Oakeshott’s thought has been considered from a great variety of perspectives and
has been interpreted in many, often divergent, ways. For example, scholars have placed
his works in the context of the history of philosophy and they have highlighted their rela-
tionship with British and German idealism (Boucher, 2012; Nardin, 2001; Podoksik,
2010). His critique of rationalism, central planning and political dogmatism, as well as the
contraposition between civil association and enterprise association, has been considered
as a contribution to contemporary liberalism (Franco, 1990, 2004; Galston, 2012; Gamble,
2012; Giorgini, 1999; Gray, 1989: 199–216, 1993: 40–46; Haddock, 2005), conservatism
(Abel, 2010; Devigne, 2012) and republicanism (Boucher, 2005; Callahan, 2013; Coats,
1992). However, it often goes unnoticed that his work has occasionally influenced inter-
national political theory.1 In particular, the dichotomy between civil association and enter-
prise association, developed in On Human Conduct (Oakeshott, 1975: 111–122), has been
employed by Terry Nardin (1983) and Robert Jackson (2000) to revitalise the English
School’s notion of international society, and, more recently, Nicholas Rengger (2013) has
used it to interpret the evolution of the just war tradition (see also Astrov, 2005; Bain,
2003, 2007; Frost, 2002).
This article will elaborate on these works and will show the relevance of Oakeshott’s
political philosophy for the contemporary constructivist debate in International Relations.2
First, I will argue that Oakeshott’s perspective stresses that political institutions are based
on norms and relationships which result from human understanding. To this end, I focus on
the distinction between civil association and enterprise association, with particular regard
to the concept of authority, also in light of Oakeshott’s indebtedness to Hobbes. Second, I
will contend that in On Human Conduct it is possible to find some considerations about
world politics that are consistent with his broader political philosophy. Third, I will discuss
Terry Nardin’s theory of ‘practical international society’ (1983, but also 1998, 2008), and
the criticism of it made by Christian Reus-Smit (1999). With this discussion as a back-
ground, I will contend that the theory of civil association may represent the ground for a
constructivist understanding of international society: a relationship between states based
on understood and socially constructed moral values. Finally, I contend that these shared
moral values are substantiated in the norms of customary international law. As such,
Oakeshott’s political and legal philosophy illuminates the possibility of an international
legal order without a central legislative office or power. This is of particular importance,
not just because of the Hobbesian influence on Oakeshott, but also because it sheds light on
the historical nature of the criteria of conduct and on the obligations that states acquire, in
their relations with other states and their populations.
Civil association and enterprise association
Elaborating on the British idealist tradition (Boucher, 2012; Orsi, 2012), Oakeshott con-
tends that philosophy conceives concepts from a point of view as universal as possible,
sub specie aeternitatis. Political philosophers, in particular, see political ideas and values
not in relation to the normative or practical conflicts in which they are situated, but
instead ‘outside of the contingencies and ambiguities of actual goings-on in the world’
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