Mills v Stanway Coaches Ltd
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Year | 1940 |
| Date | 1940 |
| Court | Court of Appeal |
Damages - Measure of - Motor accident - Negligence causing death - Pain and suffering - Loss of expectation of life - Action by administrator -
The plaintiff, whose wife had died in consequence of injuries sustained by her in a collision between two motor vehicles through the negligence of the defendants, brought an action against the defendants claiming (inter alia) under the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1934, as administrator of the estate of the deceased, damages for her loss of expectation of life and for her pain and suffering.
As to the expectation of life of the deceased, it appeared that at the time of her death she was thirty-four years of age, that she had been a healthy woman who had never had an illness, that she had four children of her marriage, that her prospect of life according to actuarial tables was another thirty-four years, and that her social position was that her husband, the plaintiff, was a provision shop manager.
As to her pain and suffering, the medical and other evidence showed that her injuries consisted in fracture of the skull, of two ribs, and of the pelvis, and severe bruising of the chest and ankles; that she survived in hospital for four days after the accident, that after admission to hospital she suffered for a time from intense irritation which made it difficult to examine her nervous system, that next day she was quieter and would answer to her name, that her condition improved a little until the third day when she became more restless, resenting interference, that eventually her respiration became feeble and she collapsed and died, and that the degree of pain which she suffered was extremely difficult to estimate owing to her marked restlessness which was probably due to cerebral irritation rather than to actual pain:—
Held, by the Court of Appeal, reducing both the respective sums which had been allowed as damages by the trial judge, that the plaintiff should recover 1000 l. in respect of the loss of expectation of life of the deceased, and 50 l. in respect of her pain and suffering.
Observations on the principles to be applied, and the weight to be given to previous cases, in assessing damages for the loss of expectation of life and the pain and suffering of a person who has died in consequence of an accident.
APPEAL from the judgment of Greaves-Lord J.
On May 3, 1939, about 10.45 P.M., a motor-coach belonging to Stanway Coaches, Ld. (hereinafter called “the first defendants”), and driven by their driver, was passing along the Highway, Stepney, from west to east, and a motor-car owned and driven by Mr. Joseph Martin (hereinafter called “the second defendant”), was passing along Glamis Road, Stepney, from south to north, when a collision took place between the vehicles at the junction of these two roads, the front of the coach striking the near side of the car.
As a result of the collision Mrs. Milly Mills (hereinafter called “the deceased”), the wife of Mr. Ernest Mills, who was sitting in the back seat of the car on the near side, was seriously injured, and was taken to the London Hospital, Whitechapel Road.
On May 8, 1939, at 12.30 A.M., she died there from her injuries.
On the same date, at Mile End Hospital, a post-mortem examination was made of the body of the deceased, from which it appeared that her injuries included fracture of the skull, severe bruising of the back of the chest with fracture of two ribs, fracture of pelvis, and bruising of ankles.
On June 22, 1939, Mr. Ernest Mills, hereinafter called “the plaintiff,” brought the present action against the first defendants and the second defendant, alleging that he as the husband and administrator of the estate of the deceased brought the action under the Fatal Accidents Acts and the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1934, on his own behalf and for the benefit of the estate of the deceased, they having suffered damage from the negligence of the first defendants, their servant or agent in the management and control of the said motor-coach, their property, and/or owing to the negligence of the second defendant in the management and control of the said motor-car, his property, whereby the said collision took place between the vehicles, causing the deceased to suffer injuries from which she died; that these injuries were caused by particular acts of negligence there specified of the first defendants, or in the alternative of the second defendant, or in the further alternative of both defendants jointly; and that the plaintiff claimed — (a) damages under the Fatal Accidents Acts; (b) damages under the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1934, for the pain and suffering of the deceased from the time of the accident until her death, and for the shortening of her life; and (c) funeral expenses.F1
The defendants delivered defences in which they respectively denied the alleged negligence and damage, and each alleged that the death of the deceased was caused solely by the negligence of the other defendant.
On January 6, 1940, the action was tried by Greaves-Lord J. without a jury, when evidence was given on behalf of each of the parties on the several issues raised.
The evidence, so far as it related to the deceased's loss of expectation of life, went to show that at the time of her death she was thirty-four years of age, that she was a healthy woman who had never had an illness, that she had four children of her marriage, that her prospect of life according to actuarial tables was another thirty-four years, and that her social position was that her husband, the plaintiff, was a provision shop manager.
As to the pain and suffering of the deceased, it appeared from the medical report of Dr. M. D. Young, house surgeon at the London Hospital, that on admission to the hospital she was suffering from intense irritation, throwing herself about the bed and making no response to questions, but repeatedly demanding to get up; that it was very difficult to examine her nervous system on account of her marked restlessness; that on the day following she was much quieter and would answer to her name; that her condition improved a little until May 7, when she became much more restless, resenting interference; that very early on the following morning, May 8, her respiration suddenly became feeble, and she collapsed and died; that she had been kept as quiet as possible by sedatives; and that the degree of pain which she suffered was extremely difficult to estimate owing to her very marked restlessness, which was probably due to cerebral irritation rather than to actual pain. The evidence of the plaintiff in regard to his wife's condition in hospital is summarized below in the judgment of Slesser L.J.
Greaves-Lord J. found, on the evidence, that the first defendants, by their driver, had been negligent, but that the second defendant had not been negligent, and that the accident had been caused by the negligence of the first defendants' driver; and he gave judgment against the first defendants for 2000 l. in respect of loss of expectation of life of the deceased; 200 l. in respect of her pain and suffering during the four days between the accident and her death, and 28 l. 10s. for funeral expenses — making in all 2228 l. 10s.
The first defendants appealed. The appeal was heard on May 8, 9, 1940.
J. W. Morris K.C. and S. R. Edgedale for the first defendants, appellants. The evidence shows that the collision between the two vehicles was caused by the negligence not only of the first defendants, but also of the second defendant, Martin, and, that being so, they are jointly liable, and the damages should be divided between them in equal shares. The sum of 2000 l. awarded by the learned judge to the plaintiff as damages for the deceased's loss of expectation of life, and of 200 l. for her pain and suffering are excessive. He did not assess these damages in accordance with the principles laid down in Rose v. FordF2, and Flint v. LovellF3, and in view on the one hand of the circumstances of the present case, and on the other hand of the circumstances of these two cases and other cases such as The Aizkarai MendiF4; Shepherd v. HunterF5; Bailey v. HowardF6; and Gambling v. BenhamF7; the amount of the damages in the present case should be substantially reduced.
Fox-Andrews and F. W. Wallace for the second defendant, respondent. It appears by the evidence, and the learned judge has found as a fact, that the collision and resulting damage were caused by the negligence of the first defendants only, and not by any negligence on the part of the second defendant, and consequently the first defendants are alone liable for the assessed damages. If the second defendant was guilty of any negligence contributing to the accident, then, under the
J. P. Eddy K. C. and F. G. Paterson for the plaintiff, respondent. As to the persons liable for damage caused by the accident, the plaintiff has pleaded...
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