Miscalculations in Deterrent Policy: Japanese-U.S. Relations, 1938-1941
| DOI | 10.1177/002234336800500201 |
| Author | Chihiro Hosoya |
| Date | 01 June 1968 |
| Published date | 01 June 1968 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
MISCALCULATIONS
IN
DETERRENT
POLICY:
JAPANESE-U.S.
RELATIONS,
1938-1941
By
CHIHIRO
HOSOYA
Hitotsubashi
University,
Tokyo
1.
Foreword
It
is
well
known
that
there
is
a
group
of
scholars
and
critics
in
the
United
States
referred
to
as
’revisionist’
who
criticize
the
foreign
policy
of
the
Roosevelt
ad-
ministration
from
the
viewpoint
of
Roose-
velt’s
responsibility
for
bringing
the
United
States
into
the
Second
World
War.
Charles
C.
Tansill,
who
represents
this
point
of
view,
asserts
in
his
book,
Back
Door
to
War,
that
Roosevelt
managed
to
involve
the
U.S.
in
the
European
War
by
maneuvering
Japan
into
attacking
the
U.S.
Although
this
thesis
of
the
Back
Door
to
War
takes
various
forms
depending
on
the
particular
writer,
it
is
the
common
basis
of
the
approach
of
the
’revisionist’
school.’
In
contrast,
Paul
W.
Schroeder
rep-
resents
a
different
critical
approach.
Schroeder
directs
his
criticism
more
against
Secretary
of
State
Hull
than
Pres-
ident
Roosevelt
and
against
the
’in-
flexibility’
and,
in
Kennan’s
terms,
the
’legalistic
and
moralistic
approach’
of
Hull’s
Japanese
policy.2
Schroeder
writes
that
’the
American
policy
from
the
end
of
July
to
December
in
1941
was
a
grave
mistake.’
If
U.S.
had
taken
a
conciliatory
attitude
on
its
objective
of
’the
liberation
of
China’,
Schroeder
assumes,
it
could
have
realized
its
other
two
objectives
of
’splitting
the
Axis’
and
’stopping
Japan’s
southward
advance’,
and
thus
have
avoided
war.
He
maintains
it
was
the
’inflexibility’
in
Hull’s
handling
of
foreign
policy
that
prevented
the
U.S.
from
achieving
its
objectives.3
In
contrast
to
his
criticism
of
Hull,
Schroeder
gives
high
praise
to
the
conciliatory
and
realistic
approach
of
the
American
Ambassador
to
Japan,
Joseph
C.
Grew.4
4
This
article
makes
some
critical
ob-
servations
on
U.S.
policy
towards
Japan
in
the
period
preceding
the
Pacific
War
in
a
way
differing
from
the
two
approaches
above.
Specifically,
it
attempts
to
analyze
the
miscalculations
in
the
deterrent
policy
adopted
by
the
hard
line
faction
within
the
U.S.
Government
and
to
describe
the
ways
in
which
this
policy
of
deterrence,
especially
in
regard
to
the
imposition
of
economic
sanctions,
acted
as
a
crucial
impetus
for
the
intensification
of
tensions,
stimulating
all
the
more
Japan’s
south-
ward
expansion
and,
in
the
end,
producing
the
unintended
result
of
a
Japanese-U.S.
armed
conflict.
This
is
not
to
deny
that
Japan’s
expansionist
policies
provided
a
direct
impetus
towards
the
Pacific
War.
Particular
attention
is
given
to
an
his-
torical
analysis
of
the
period
from
the
abrogation
of
the
Japanese-U.S.
Treaty
of
Commerce
(July
26,
1939)
to
the
im-
position
of
the
ban
on
the
export
of
pe-
troleum
to
Japan
(August
1,
1941).
2.
The
abrogation
of
the
Japanese- U.S.
Treaty
of
C’ommerce
and
Navigation
After the
Marco
Polo
Bridge
incident
of
July
7,
1937,
Japan’s
military
activities
on
the
China
mainland
followed
an
increasingly
expansionist
course.
Beginning
with
the
Panay
incident,
infringements
of
U.S.
economic
interests
in
China
became
more
and
more
frequent,
and
the
U.S.
attitude
towards
Japan
gradually
stif-
fened.5
Such
incidents led
the
U.S.
Government
repeatedly
to
issue
notes
of
98
protest.
When
confronted
with
the
reality
that
these
measures
were
having
no
appreciable
deterrent
effect
on
the
Jap-
anese
military,
however,
the
voices
within
the
Government
calling
for
the
imposition
of
economic
sanctions
against
Japan
became
steadily
more
clamorous
in
their assertions
that,
in
view
of
the
high
degree
of
Japan’s
economic
depen-
dence
on
the
U.S.,6
economic
sanctions
would
be
most
efficacious
in
constraining
the
actions
of
the
Japanese
Government.
In
spring-summer
1938,
several
studies
were
undertaken
within
the
State
De-
partment
on
the
question
of
economic
sanctions
against
Japan?
So
far
as
forms
of
economic
sanctions
were
concerned,
measures
ranging
from
the
prohibition
of
importing
and
exporting
certain
selected
goods
to
the
total
rupture
of
economic
relations,
measures
calling
for
the
suspen-
sion
of
the
extending
of
credits,
restrictions
on
monetary
exchange,
the
imposition
of
a
special
duty
on
shipping,
discrimi-
natory
tariffs
on
commodities,
and
other
restrictive
measures
were
considered.
The
legal
obstacle
to
most
of
these
sanctions
was
the
1911
Japanese-U.S.
Treaty
of
Commerce
and
Navigation.
State
De-
partment
expert
on
Far
Eastern
affairs,
Stanley
K.
Hornbeck
(Adviser
on
Po-
litical
Affairs)
came
out
as
the
first
official
to
stress
the
desirability
of
removing
this
obstacle
(memorandum
to
Cordell
Hull,
July
19,
1938).8
’Japan’
At
this
time
prevailing
opinion
within
the
State
Department
was
not
sympathetic
to
Hornbeck’s
view.
Japan’s
new
move
in
the
fall
of
1938
seemed
to
affect
the
U.S.
attitude
towards
Japan.
On
No-
vember
3,
the
Japanese
Government
made
public
its
program
for
a
’New
Order
in
East
Asia’9
and,
on
November
18,
the
new
Foreign
Minister,
Arita
Hachiro,
stated
in
a
reply
to
the
U.S.
Government
representation
of
October
6,
that,
be-
cause
of
the
demands
of
large
scale
mili-
tary
action,
some
violations
of
U.S.
economic
interests
in
China
were
un-
avoidable
despite
Japan’s
intentions
to
respect
such
interests
He
asserted,
more-
over,
that
it
would
be
impossible
to
apply
pre-war
standards
and
principles
in
un-
altered
form
to
present
and
future
situ-
ations
in
Asia.
‘U.S.’
This
was
taken
to be
an
outright
challenge
to
the
Nine
Power
Treaty
and
greatly
irritated
the
United
States
Govern-
ment.
As
a
result,
majority
opinion
within
the
State
Department
became
more
favor-
able
to
the
abrogation
of
the
Japanese-
U.S.
Treaty
of
Commerce,
and
on
De-
cember
5
the
report
of
Francis
Sayre,
Assistant
Secretary
of
State,
which
was
a
synthesis
of
this
opinion,
was
submitted.
This
document
argued
that
measures
of
full
scale
economic
reprisals
carried
the
serious
danger
of
a
military
conflict
and
the
likelihood
of
giving
rise
to
widespread
domestic
economic
confusion
and,
as
such,
should
be
avoided.
At
the
same
time
it
argued
that
notice
should
be
made
of
the
intention
to
abrogate
the
commercial
treaty
and
that
steps
be
taken
to
halt
the
granting
of
credits
and
loans
With
the
coming
of
1939,
the
U.S.,
so
as
not
to
violate
the
treaty
agreement,
instituted
a
’moral
embargo’
on
airplanes
and
parts
(January
14,
1939),
and
a
cessation
of credits
(February
7,
1939).
But,
so
far
as
notification
of
the
abrogation
of
the
commercial
treaty
was
concerned,
the
U.S.
Government
was
unable
to
arrive
at
a
final
decision.
This
was
almost
certainly
related
to
the
fact
that
opinion
within
the
Japanese
Government
in
regard
to
the
question
of
strengthening
the
coali-
tion
with
Germany
was
divided,
and
that
the
Japanese
course
in
foreign
affairs
was
at
a
delicate
stage.
Particularly,
there
was
a
group
within
the
State
Department,
represented
by
Joseph
Grew,
Ambassador
to
Japan,
and
Maxwell
Hamilton,
di-
rector
of
the
Far
Eastern
Division,
that
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