Miss E Carozzi v University of Hertfordshire and Ms A Lucas: 3313342/2019 and 3304194/2020
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judgment Date | 15 July 2021 |
| Citation | 3313342/2019 and 3304194/2020 |
| Court | Employment Tribunal |
| Published date | 19 August 2021 |
| Subject Matter | Breach of Contract |
Case Numbers: 3313342/2019 & 3304194/2020
1
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Claimant Respondents
Miss E Carozzi v (1) University of Hertfordshire
(2) Ms A Lucas
Heard at: Watford via CVP On: 21-25, 28-30 June 2021, 1 July
and
(in private) 15 July 2021
Before: Employment Judge Hyams Members: Mr D Bean
Mr A Scott
Appearances:
For the claimant: In person
For the respondent: Mr T Sheppard, of counsel
UNANIMOUS RESERVED JUDGMENT
1. The claimant’s claim of direct discrimination because of race, contrary to
sections 13 and 39(2)(c) (read with section 39(7)(b)) and 39(2)(d) of the
Equality Act 2010 (“EqA 2010”) does not succeed and is dismissed.
2. The claimant’s claim of harassment within the meaning of section 26 of the EqA
2010, contrary to section 39(2)(c) (read with section 39(7)(b)) and 39(2)(d) of
that Act, does not succeed and is dismissed.
3. The claimant’s claim of victimisation within the meaning of section 27 of the
EqA 2010, contrary to section 39(2)(c) (read with section 39(7)(b)) and 39(2)(d)
of that Act, does not succeed and is dismissed.
Case Numbers: 3313342/2019 & 3304194/2020
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REASONS
Introduction; the claims and the parties
1 In these proceedings, the claimant claims that
1.1 she was discriminated against directly because of (1) her race (she is of
Brazilian nationality, and of Jewish ethnic origin) and/or (2) religion (Judaism),
contrary to sections 13 and 39 of the Equality Act 2010 (“EqA 2010”);
1.2 she was harassed within the meaning of section 26(2) of the EqA 2010, the
protected characteristic for that purpose being her race and/or her religion,
contrary to section 39 of that Act;
1.3 she was victimised within the meaning of section 27 of that Act, contrary to
section 39 of that Act, and
1.4 she was dismissed “constructively”, i.e. within the meaning of section 39(7)(b)
of that Act.
2 Two claims were made by the claimant (one was presented on 25 March 2019
and the other on 24 April 2020), and they were heard together as a result of an
order made by Employment Judge (“EJ”) R Lewis on 11 October 2020.
3 The first respondent was the claimant’s employer until the claimant resigned from
her employment with immediate effect by email on 14 January 2019. The
claimant’s employment with the first respondent started on 4 December 2017. The
second respondent was the claimant’s line manager throughout the period of the
claimant’s employment.
4 The parties had, before the hearing before us, agreed a list of issues by reference
to a list of claims which the claimant had, in discussion with the respondents’
solicitors, created, stating the claimant’s claims in a definitive way in preparation
for the serving of witness statements and the trial. The list of claims did not
encompass all of the factual elements of the claimant’s claims in the first claim,
and we were told expressly that those factual elements were no longer pursued
by the claimant.
5 In fact, as EJ Hyams said at the start of the hearing, and repeated several times
during the hearing, the claimant’s list of her claims was in many ways insufficiently
precise. In addition in some respects, the list was (it was clear, after discussion
with the claimant) repetitious. It contained, we were told by Mr Sheppard, 66
separate allegations of specific ways in which it was claimed that the respondents
had acted in breach of the EqA 2010. In fact, we counted 62 separate such
allegations, but in addition there were 15 alleged protected acts, all of which had
to be considered individually. Accordingly, in reality there were (as we calculated
Case Numbers: 3313342/2019 & 3304194/2020
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them; the precise number was not material) 77 separate allegations which had to
be addressed by us. Some of them were about the same process, and in two
respects it was possible, consistently with the need to consider properly all of the
claimant’s claims as pressed before us, to group those allegations together and
consider them as a group rather than individually. We nevertheless had to
determine 36 separate complaints and decide precisely what had been done by
way of each claimed protected act, so that we had to make 51 separate material
determinations concerning the claimant’s claims.
6 The claimant was employed by the respondent as “Marketing, Engagement and
Partnerships Manager” for the respondent’s team headed by the second
respondent and called “University of Hertfordshire Arts”. The parties called (and
we below refer to) that team as “UHA”. UHA was part of the first respondent’s
School of Creative Arts (“SCA”). The claimant’s employment was subject to a
probationary period which was of six months but was capable of being extended.
The claimant’s probation period was extended twice, and by the time of her
resignation it had not been completed. The first claim related to what happened
during the claimant’s employment and concerned the fact and manner of the
extensions of her probation period.
7 After the claimant had resigned, she applied to, and was accepted by, the first
respondent as a student on a Masters course in the first respondent’s Law School.
The second respondent discovered that that had happened and caused the Dean
of the School to be asked whether or not the claimant was in fact going to be a
student on the relevant course. The fact and manner in which that was done was
the subject of the second claim.
The evidence before us and the procedure which we followed
8 The hearing before us was listed to determine liability only. We heard oral
evidence from the claimant on her own behalf and, on behalf of the respondent,
from the following witnesses:
8.1 Dr Alana Jelinek
8.2 Ms Samantha Maitland
8.3 Ms Karen Withers
8.4 Dr Megan Knight
8.5 Mr Phil Healey
8.6 Ms Annabel Lucas, and
8.7 Mr Christopher Ivie.
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