Miss A Curtis v Milltek Sport Ltd: 2600108/2020

Judgment Date06 October 2021
Citation2600108/2020
Date06 October 2021
Published date21 October 2021
CourtEmployment Tribunal
Subject MatterUnfair Dismissal
RESERVED CASE NO: 2600108/2020
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EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Claimant: Miss A Curtis
Respondent: Milltek Sport Ltd
Heard at: Midlands (East) Region by Cloud Video Platform
On: 24, 25 and 26 May 2021
Reserved to: 16 July 2021 for deliberation with members
Before: Employment Judge R Broughton
Members: Ms C Hatcliff
Mr C Goldson
Representation
Claimant: Ms McGee of Counsel
Respondent: Mr A Barnes, Solicitor
RESERVED JUDGMENT
1. The clam of detrimental treatment pursuant to section 47B Employment Rights Act
1996 is well founded and succeeds.
2. The claim of ordinary unfair dismissal pursuant to section 98 Employment Rights Act
1996 is well founded and succeeds.
3. The claim of automatic unfair dismissal pursuant to section 103A Employment Rights
Act 1996 is well founded and succeeds.
RESERVED REASONS
1. The claim was presented to the Employment Tribunal on 13 January 2020 following a
period of ACAS Early Conciliation which started on 6 January 2020 and ended on 7
January 2020.
RESERVED CASE NO: 2600108/2020
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2. The claim in essence, relates to disciplinary action which was taken against the
Claimant and which resulted in the termination of her employment on 8 November 2019
on the grounds of gross misconduct.
3. The Claimant was employed by the Respondent as its Accounts and HR Manager. The
Claimant’s employment commenced on 1 July 2015.
4. The Claimant complains not only that the termination of her employment was unfair but
that the reason, or principal reason, for the dismissal was that she had made a
protected disclosure. Further, she complains of detrimental treatment in connection
with the disciplinary proceedings.
5. The legal issues for the Tribunal to determine were agreed between the parties and
those legal issues are as set out below.
The Issues
Detrimental treatment under section 47B ERA 1996
Did the Claimant make a qualified disclosure to the Respondent?
The Claimant asserts that a disclosure was made verbally to the Chair of the
Respondent, Mr Phillip Millington in April 2019. The Claimant relies on section
43C ERA 1996.
a. Was that disclosure a disclosure of information?
The Claimant asserts that a qualifying protected disclosure was made
verbally to Mr Phillip Millington in April 2019. During this conversation, the
Claimant alleges that she disclosed Mr Pound’s misuse of expenses in
addition to the misuse of company credit cards.
The Respondent accepts, if the above disclosure was made, then it would
be a disclosure of information. However, the Respondent disputes that such
a disclosure was made and disputes that it would be a qualified disclosure.
b. Did the Claimant have a reasonable belief that the disclosure was a
qualifying disclosure.
The Claimant relies on subsection(s) 43B(1)(a) and/or 43B(1)(b). The
Claimant asserts that she had a reasonable belief that the disclosure of
information tended to show:
a) A criminal offence has been committed, is being committed or is
likely to be committed namely that Mr Pound was using company
expenses and credit card for his own personal benefit which the
Claimant submits is fraudulent; and
b) That a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with
any legal obligation to which he is subject namely that Mr Pound
failed to comply with his legal obligations and fiduciary duty to
promote the business of the Respondent.
The Respondent defends the claim on the following basis in particular: that
the Claimant cannot have held a reasonable belief that the Managing
Director was in breach of his duties as a director or had committed a criminal
RESERVED CASE NO: 2600108/2020
3
act because it was his own company. Further the Respondent has no
knowledge of any such conversation, or why, if it happened it can be
considered as a protected disclosure as it would simply be the Claimant’s
job to point out anomalies in expenses.
Did the Claimant have a reasonable belief that the disclosure was in the
public interest?
The Respondent disputes that the disclosure was in the public interest as it
would not affect others.
Did the Respondent subject the Claimant to any detriments, as set out below;
Subjected the Claimant to unfounded allegations against her
and/or
The Claimant was not given a fair disciplinary procedure.
The Claimant alleges that her;
i. immediate suspension,
ii. lack of an investigatory meeting and
iii. lack of evidence provided prior to the disciplinary
was because a protected disclosure was made.
If so, was this done because the Claimant made a protected disclosure?
6. In discussing the issues at the outset, counsel for the Claimant clarified and it was not
contested by Mr Barnes, that in terms of the unfound allegations complaint, it covers
the allegation that Mr Pound created or added to a document relating to an alleged
discussion with a witness on 2 September 2019 and the discussions between Mr Pound
and Mr Thorpe before the decision to dismiss.
Issues: Time limit
Was the claim under section 47B brought within three months beginning with the date
of the act or failure to act to which the complaint relates or, where that act or failure is
part of a series of similar acts or failures, the last of them?
The Claimant asserts that Mr Pound subjected the Claimant to unfounded allegations
because of the qualified disclosure. It was those unfounded allegations that the
Claimant ultimately says lead to her dismissal on 8 November 2019. Therefore, the
Claimant asserts that time should start from 8 November 2019.
Further, the Claimant asserts that she was subjected to an unfair disciplinary process
in relation to the investigation carried out by Mr Pound. The disciplinary meeting did not
take place until 6 November 2019. The Claimant asserts that time should run, in the
alternative from 6 November 2019.
The Claimant asserts that the immediate suspension forms part of a series of acts
included in the unfair disciplinary process.
If not, was the complaint brought within such further period as the tribunal considers
reasonable in a case where it is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for the

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