Miss V Scott v BAE Systems (Operations) Ltd and others: 3331423/2018 and 3331467/2018
| Judgment Date | 10 March 2021 |
| Citation | 3331423/2018 and 3331467/2018 |
| Published date | 22 March 2021 |
| Court | Employment Tribunal |
| Subject Matter | Disability Discrimination |
Case Numbers: 3331423/2018 & 3331467/2018
1
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Claimant Respondents
Miss V Scott
v
(1) BAE Systems (Operations)
Limited
(2) Mr J Haslam
(3) Mr S Archibald
Heard at: Aylesbury Crown Court in
person and in part via CVP in 2020 and
in 2021 wholly via CVP
On: 2-5 November 2020, 8-12 and (in
private) 15-17 February 2021
Before: Employment Judge Hyams
Members: Mr P Miller
Mr A Scott
Appearances:
For the claimant: Mr M Curtis, of counsel
For the respondent: Mr M Green, of counsel
UNANIMOUS RESERVED JUDGMENT
1. None of the claims of breaches of the Equality Act 2010 succeeds. They are
accordingly all dismissed, i.e. against all three respondents.
2. The claimant resigned and was not dismissed. Her claim of unfair dismissal
against the first respondent therefore does not succeed.
REASONS
Introduction; the claims and the parties
1 In these proceedings, the claimant claims that
Case Numbers: 3331423/2018 & 3331467/2018
2
1.1 she was discriminated against directly because of (1) her sex, and/or (2) a
disability in the form of depression and/or anxiety, contrary to sections 13
and 39 of the Equality Act 2010 (“EqA 2010”);
1.2 she was harassed within the meaning of section 26(2) of the EqA 2010, the
protected characteristic for that purpose being her sex, contrary to section
39 of that Act;
1.3 she was treated unfavourably because of something arising in consequence
of her disability, and that that treatment was not a proportionate means of
achieving a legitimate aim, contrary to sections 15 and 39 of the EqA 2010;
1.4 there was a failure to make reasonable adjustments within the meaning of
section 20 of that Act, contrary to section 39 of that Act; and
1.5 she was dismissed “constructively”, i.e. within the meaning of section
95(1)(c) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA 1996”).
2 Two claims were made by the claimant (one was presented on 18 July 2018 and
the other on 20 July 2018), and they were heard together as a result of decisions
made by Employment Judge (“EJ”) Finlay at a case management hearing on 20
September 2019. The first respondent was the claimant’s employer until the
claimant resigned from that employment with immediate effect by email on 19
April 2018. The claimant had by then worked for the first respondent (treating her
employment with a previous employer as part of her employment with the first
respondent, since her contract of employment was transferred to the first
respondent from that earlier employer under the Transfer of Undertakings
(Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006, SI 2006/246) for over 16 years.
The claimant went to work for the previous employer (Alenia Marconi Systems)
after leaving school, and worked for that previous employer as an apprentice.
The claimant has a Higher National Diploma in electrical and electronic
engineering and worked for the first respondent as an engineer.
3 The second respondent had line management responsibilities for the claimant, in
addition to the third respondent, who was the claimant’s direct line manager, in
the period before the claimant resigned. The second respondent was the third
respondent’s line manager.
The procedure which we followed
4 This case was listed to be heard on 2-11 November 2020 inclusive, to determine
liability only. In the event, it was capable of being heard only on 2-5 November
2020 in the first instance, because of a lack of judicial resources on 6 and 9-11
November 2020. As it happened, the hearing would have had to be adjourned at
the end of the 8 days originally listed, because there would not have been
enough time to hear the evidence and submissions by that date. That is because
when we adjourned the hearing at the end of 5 November 2020, we did so to 8-
Case Numbers: 3331423/2018 & 3331467/2018
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17 February 2021 inclusive, on the basis that we would subsequently issue a
reserved judgment on liability only, and on the basis that the parties would need
to be present on 8-11 or 12 February 2021 (depending on how well the cross-
examinations progressed). Counsel for the respondent was then unable for
practical reasons to be present at the hearing from half-way through the
afternoon of Tuesday 9 February to the end of the morning of Wednesday 10
February 2021, but we nevertheless were able to conclude the hearing with the
parties present by the close of business on Friday 12 February 2021, albeit that
we sat late in order to hear oral submissions from both parties, supplementing
their helpful written submissions.
5 We then deliberated in private over a period of three days and subsequently
prepared this reserved judgment.
6 The parties had, before the hearing before us, agreed a table in the form of a
Scott Schedule, stating 69 separate complaints. That table separated out each
and every element of the claim, when some of them could have been stated
compendiously by saying, for example, that the conduct in question was
harassment in the form of conduct related to the protected characteristic of sex
and/or direct discrimination because of sex and/or direct disability discrimination.
In some ways, the table nevertheless assisted us, because its first section was
to a certain extent a statement of the factual elements of the claims in the form of
a succinct chronology. In addition, it was a useful checklist of the precise way in
which each element of the claim was advanced. However, we concluded that it
would not be best to state our findings of fact by reference to each row in the
table. That was not least because the legal issues that we had to decide
depended in part on our determinations of some starkly differing factual
assertions of the parties. In what follows we first state the applicable legal
principles. We then state our determinations on all relevant factual matters,
taking them in chronological order as much as possible consistently with the
need to state how we resolved relevant conflicts of evidence. In the final part of
these reasons, we state our conclusions on the claims by reference to the
allegations in the Scott Schedule, taking them in turn.
The relevant legal principles
Time limits
7 The claimant was absent from work on account of sickness (her mental
condition) from 7 June 2017 until the date when she resigned, i.e. 19 April 2018.
Many of her claims related to events which preceded that period of absence.
Others related to things about which the claimant discovered as a result of being
provided with documents by the first respondent in response to a subject access
request (“SAR”) made under the Data Protection Act 1998 (which was the
applicable Act at the time). As a result, most of the elements of the claim
(assuming that they were not part of conduct extending over a period within the
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