Mitigating violence by solving the commitment problem in post-conflict negotiations
| DOI | 10.1177/2057891118767765 |
| Author | Yukako Sakabe Tanaka |
| Published date | 01 June 2018 |
| Date | 01 June 2018 |
| Subject Matter | Research articles |
Research article
Mitigating violence by solving
the commitment problem in
post-conflict negotiations:
The case of Timor-Leste
Yukako Sakabe Tanaka
School of International Politics, Economics, and Communication, Aoyama Gakuin
University, Japan
Abstract
Why do some political groups choose to remain militant when they have the opportunity to
transform into political parties or become members of state organs? By scrutinizing the power-
sharing negotiations held before a country’s first election, this article argues that the group that
leads the negotiations faces the challenge of accepting or declining the policy proposed by its
counterpart who poses a threat of violence. Even if the counterpart proposes policy that is
acceptable to the leading faction, fulfilling the commitment in regard to the political deal is another
challenge for the leading faction. Such challenges often fail and consequently cause violence. In
contrast, some counterparts can successfully transform themselves into non-violent political
agencies regardless of whether they make compromises in policies or not. Third parties can play a
vital role in avoiding violence by influencing actors’ decision-making or enhancing the leading
faction’s ability to achieve its commitment. The article illustrates this argument by presenting a
formal model and then testing the model by examining the case of Timor-Leste. It suggests specific
conditions required for negotiations under which armed groups transform into peaceful actors
when introduction of democracy and state-building are ongoing.
Keywords
democratization, pre-election negotiation, state-building, Timor-Leste, violence
Introduction
Timor-Leste, a newly democratic country, has been the scene of a considerable degree of anti-
government violence: the riot in the capital Dili in December 2002 and the turmoil in 2006 that was
Corresponding author:
Yukako Sakabe Tanaka, School of International Politics, Economics, and Communication, Aoyama Gakuin University, 4-4-
25, Shibuya, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo 150-8366, Japan.
Email: tanaka-sakabe@sipeb.aoyama.ac.jp
Asian Journal of Comparative Politics
2018, Vol. 3(2) 149–166
ªThe Author(s) 2018
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DOI: 10.1177/2057891118767765
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provoked by a petition against discrimination by a group of soldiers. Although the country has
maintained a robust international presence—the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
(UNPKO) helped achieve Timor-Leste’s historic independence in 2002, which is referred to as
“a successful case of peacebuilding”—governments have periodically been challenged by violence
caused by dissatisfied political groups such as CPD-RDTL (Committee for the Popular Defense of
the Democratic Republic of East Timor) and Sagrada Familia.
This article seeks to explain why some political groups in post-conflict situations choose to
remain armed, while others decide to pursue a peaceful integration into the new country. I argue
that the state-building process, which attempts to strengthen state capacity, significantly influences
the organizational decisions of political groups because it could offer them reasonable power
sharing. Having said that, by examining the negotiation processes that occur between groups prior
to countries’ first elections, this article outlines the specific conditions required for negotiations
under which armed groups transform into non-violent actors. Specifically, the political group that
leads the negotiations (hereinafter the “leading faction”) faces the challenge of either accepting or
declining the policy proposed by their counterpart (hereinafter the “follower”) who poses a cred-
ible threat. While the leading faction is partly reluctant to resort to violence, declining the proposed
policies may cause violence instigated by the follower. On the other hand, occasionally accepting
the proposed policies requires the leading faction’s credibility regarding whether it will fulfill its
commitments to avoid violence.
Timor-Leste is selected for case analysis since, although both democratization and state-
building took place simultaneously and the elections for the new country were relatively success-
ful, political groups that use violence still emerged.
1
This article examines the fates of the
followers such as CPD-RDTL, of ex-resistance combatants who fought against Indonesia (some
of them joined state security organs while others did not) and of a group who composed a political
party named the Democratic Party (PD). As the leading faction has dominant bargaining power, the
cases confirmed that the followers had opportunities to propose policies that could be acceptable to
the leading faction in order to avoid violence. Analyzing a variety of cases should also offer a rich
analysis of how external actors can contribute to peaceful negotiations between political groups.
The next section begins by providing an overview of the existing, related literature and describ-
ing how the scope of this article relates to previous works. The following section presents a model
of how armed groups choose their means of organizational transformation. The subsequent section
applies the model developed in this study to the case of Timor-Leste. The final section concludes
the article.
Democratization, state-building, and political groups
Following ceasefires, not only democratization but also state-building processes increase political
groups’ expectations of gaining power in the upcoming political environment. Democratization
supports competent and free elections, which offer political concessions to political groups by non-
violent means. Simultaneously, such a peaceful outcome is questionable when the minority sus-
pects the majority could exclude them when state capacity is low (Gurr, 2000). Cederman et al.
(2010) assert that democratization can result in more violence between actors contending for the
government due to weak institutions compared to that between actors in territorial disputes.
Brancati and Snyder (2011, 2012) state that weak state institutions can revive violence if they are
associated with democratization. Because of the lack of functional electoral institutions, state
administration, or freedom of expression, armed groups supported by the majority would exclude
150 Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 3(2)
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