Modeling threats and promises: Explaining the Munich crisis of 1938
| Published date | 01 July 2023 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00223433221089729 |
| Date | 01 July 2023 |
| Subject Matter | Regular Articles |
Modeling threats and promises: Explaining
the Munich crisis of 1938
Frank C Zagare
Department of Political Science, University at Buffalo, SUNY
D Marc Kilgour
Department of Mathematics, Wilfrid Laurier University
Abstract
The use of an incomplete information game model to explore the strategic characteristics of the carrot and stick
approach to coercive diplomacy shows that the dynamics of this manipulative bargaining tactic are much more
nuanced than standard atheoretical accounts suggest. One unexpected finding is that when information is incom-
plete, there always exists a deterrence equilibrium under which no attempt is made to overturn the status quo. An all-
out conflict or an unsuccessful fait accompli is also possible, but only when information about preferences is not
common knowledge. Incomplete information, then, is a double-edged sword, sometimes enhancing the prospects for
peace and at other times making conflict more likely. We use a special case of the Carrot and Stick Game model to
shed theoretical light on the Munich crisis of 1938, a manufactured crisis if there ever was one. Hitler’s last-minute
about-face was motivated by his newfound belief that the British, French, and Czechs intended to resist his planned
military invasion of the Sudetenland and his preference to avoid an all-out war. While his preference was unchanged
in 1939, his beliefs were not; as our model suggests, the consequences were more than predictable.
Keywords
appeasement, coercive diplomacy, crisis bargaining, deterrence, game theory, incomplete information, Sudetenland
Most if not all bilateral interstate relationships are con-
ducted in the shadow of power. In the security studies
literature, an attempt to exercise this power is referred to
as ‘coercive diplomacy’. Alexander George (1991), who
prefers the term ‘forceful persuasion’, identifies five dis-
tinct stratagems he claims are commonly used by states
who hope to manipulate another’s behavior. In this arti-
cle we explore the strategic dynamic of one of them: the
carrot and stick approach.
1
As its name suggests, the carrot and stick approach
combines both the power to punish (i.e. the stick) with
the ability to reward (i.e. the carrot). The relationship of
the United States and Israel during the Obama admin-
istration is a good example. The (sometimes) executed
threat to withhold diplomatic support by the United
States was frequently accompanied by a (delivered)
promise of tangible military assistance to Israel. As will
be seen, at the Munich conference in 1938, Germany’s
Chancellor, Adolf Hitler, also combined the threat of
punishment (i.e. a war) with a promise to Britain’s Prime
Minister Neville Chamberlain not to forcefully disman-
tle Czechoslovakia. The promise, however, was not long
kept. Less than six months later he absorbed what little
remained of the Bohemian republic (Rock, 2000).
The conditions under which threats are more or less
likely to be successful have been extensively analyzed
game theoretically (e.g. Zagare & Kilgour, 2000), but
their interaction with promises is less well understood
Corresponding author:
Email: FCZagare@Buffalo.edu
1
The ‘classic’ ultimatum, the ‘tacit’ ultimatum, the ‘try-and-see’
approach, and the‘gradual turning of the screw’ are the othercoercive
bargaining strategies George identifies.
Journal of Peace Research
2023, Vol. 60(4) 661–674
ªThe Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/00223433221089729
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