Monitoring Workers’ Rights: The Limits of Voluntary Social Compliance Initiatives in Labor Repressive Regimes
| Published date | 01 May 2017 |
| Date | 01 May 2017 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12385 |
| Author | Mark Anner |
Monitoring Workers’Rights: The Limits of
Voluntary Social Compliance Initiatives in Labor
Repressive Regimes
Mark Anner
The Pennsylvania State University
Abstract
Since the early 1990s, a range of corporate monitoring and multi-stakeholder initiatives have sought to address the violation
of workers’rights by monitoring suppliers in global supply chain and attempting to remediate violations. However, their effec-
tiveness in the area of freedom of association rights has been limited, particularly in labor-repressive regimes. This is because
these initiatives have pursued inadequate strategies and lack either traditional forms of state power, notably the ability to
sanction violators, or the leverage provided by activist campaigns. Recent social compliance program approaches, such as
forming of worker-management committees, are largely of limited effectiveness in regimes in which workers face employer or
state controlled unions. And most production in light industry supply chains such as apparel takes place in labor repressive
regimes.
In the early 1990s, a series of activist campaigns and media
expos
es revealed violations of workers’rights in light indus-
try global supply chains. These violations included child
labor, sexual harassment, forced overtime, violations in mini-
mum and overtime wages, and union avoidance (Anner,
2000; Esbenshade, 2004). States in apparel exporting coun-
tries were seen as either unable or unwilling to enforce
basic labor laws, and a range of voluntary social compliance
programs emerged to fill local governance gaps. Yet, these
programs have been notably deficient in their efforts to
address the right of workers to organize, bargain and strike
(Anner, 2012; Bartley and Egels-Zand
en, 2016; Seidman,
2007). This article argues that this deficit is particularly pro-
nounced in labor repressive regimes. The problem is particu-
larly pronounced because most apparel global supply chains
now locate production in labor repressive regimes.
The primary mechanism used by voluntary social compli-
ance programs to address freedom of association rights has
traditionally been training sessions, policy development, and
stakeholder engagement. Compliance programs recently
have promoted ‘worker voice’by requiring the formation of
worker-management committees. Such committees are
charged with meeting to discuss non-compliance issues,
and worker representatives on the committees are often
elected. At the same time, some factory owners are attempt-
ing to signal to social compliance programs that they
respect workers’rights because they have a union. But these
unions are often formed and/or controlled by management.
Indeed, employers often promote ‘company unions’while
repressing independent unions.
Training sessions and management policy documents are
not able to address issue deliberate acts of union repression.
And social compliance program mandated worker-manage-
ment committees are weak substitutes for democratic and
independent unionism. Freedom of Association rights ideally
require the authority of democratic states, because these
states enjoy legitimacy and the necessary power to address
violations. This suggests that state reform, not a proliferation
of social compliance programs, is what is most needed in
labor repressive regimes. Activist campaigns may also
address certain worker rights violations because they can
leverage lead firms in supply chains.
To explore the impact of social compliance programs in
labor repressive regimes, this article examines two social
compliance programs –the Fair Labor Association and Better
Work—and two labor repressive regimes, El Salvador and
Vietnam. Data for this article draws on field research
between 2011 and 2014 that included interviews with a
range of stakeholders and factory visits, and a review of fac-
tory audits, assessment reports, government statistical
sources, and an original survey.
Social compliance initiatives, workers’rights, and
the state
When labor unions in the global North and South, NGOs,
and student activists launched their first campaigns against
major apparel retailers and brands in the early and mid-
1990s, they often demanded these buyers ensure respect
for freedom of association rights in their suppliers (Anner,
2011; Esbenshade, 2004; Featherstone and USAS, 2002; Wil-
liams, 2001). Buyers in apparel global value chains at first
refused to accept responsibility for the conduct of their sup-
pliers (Shaw, 1999). Yet, as media and activist pressure
©2017 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Global Policy (2017) 8:Suppl.3 doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.12385
Global Policy Volume 8 . Supplement 3 . May 2017
56
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