Moral Cognition in Criminal Punishment
Author | Jason R. Steffen |
Position | Assistant Public Defender, State of Minnesota Board of Public Defense; and Adjunct Professor, Mitchell Hamline School of Law |
Pages | 143-179 |
Scholars often appeal to Kant in defending a retributivist view of criminal
punishment. In this paper, I join other scholars in rejecting this interpretation as
, a section of the . I then turn to the ,
should cause us to rethink the importance of lex talionis (an integral retributive
punishable criminals than we might otherwise be inclined to do. I end with a few
Punishment, Kant, Freedom, Virtue, Lex Talionis
© 2020 Jason R. Steffen, published by Sciendo.
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License.
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D. Objections to the Preceding Interpretation ...................................
E. Conclusion .....................................................................................
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Moral Cognition in Criminal Punishment
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