Moral emotions and offending: Do feelings of anticipated shame and guilt mediate the effect of socialization on offending?
| Author | Frank M. Weerman,Robert Svensson,Wim Bernasco,Lieven J.R. Pauwels,Gerben J.N. Bruinsma |
| Published date | 01 January 2013 |
| Date | 01 January 2013 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/1477370812454393 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
European Journal of Criminology
10(1) 22 –39
© The Author(s) 2013
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DOI: 10.1177/1477370812454393
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Moral emotions and
offending: Do feelings of
anticipated shame and
guilt mediate the effect of
socialization on offending?
Robert Svensson
Malmö University, Sweden
Frank M. Weerman
Netherlands Institute for the Study of Crime and Law Enforcement (NSCR), The Netherlands
Lieven J.R. Pauwels
Ghent University, Belgium
Gerben J.N. Bruinsma and Wim Bernasco
Netherlands Institute for the Study of Crime and Law Enforcement (NSCR), The Netherlands
Abstract
In this study we examine whether feelings of anticipated shame and anticipated guilt when being
caught for an offence mediate the relationship between parental monitoring, bonds with parents
and school, deviant peers, moral values and offending. We use data from the SPAN project,
a study that collected detailed information about offending, moral emotions and socialization
among 843 adolescents in The Hague, the Netherlands. The results show that moral emotions of
both anticipated shame and guilt have a strong direct effect on offending. The results also show
that the relationship between parental monitoring, deviant peers, moral values and offending is
substantially mediated by anticipated shame and guilt. This study clearly suggests that both shame
and guilt need to be included in the explanation of offending.
Corresponding author:
Robert Svensson, Department of Criminology, Malmö University, SE-205 06 Malmö, Sweden.
Email: robert.svensson@mah.se
454393EUC10110.1177/1477370812454393European Journal of CriminologySvensson et al.
2013
Article
Svensson et al. 23
Keywords
Adolescent offending, anticipated guilt, anticipated shame, moral emotions, moral values,
socialization
Introduction
Moral emotions, especially the moral emotions of shame and guilt, have been
assumed to play an important role in restraining people from committing crimes (for
example, Rebellon et al., 2010; Tibbetts, 2003). It is assumed that we do everything
we can to avoid the painful feeling of the two emotions (for example, Elster, 1999;
Tangney et al., 2007). A number of studies have reported a negative association
between offending and the feeling of shame or the feeling of guilt (for example,
Loeber et al., 1998; Rebellon et al., 2010). Additionally, there is empirical evidence
that moral emotions like shame and guilt can be seen as a consequence of the sociali-
zation process (for example, Grusec, 2011; Tangney and Dearing, 2002). However,
we know relatively little about the extent to which shame and guilt mediate the rela-
tionship between socialization variables (family and school bonds, parental monitor-
ing and deviant peers), moral values and offending. The current study examines to
which extent anticipated shame and guilt when being caught for an offence are both
related to adolescent offending and to what extent the effects of these socialization
variables are mediated by the levels of anticipated shame and guilt. We use data from
the Study of Peers, Activities and Neighbourhoods, a self-report study conducted by
the NSCR (Netherlands Institute for the Study of Crime and Law Enforcement)
among 843 adolescents in The Hague, the Netherlands.
Theoretical background
Emotions play an important role in everyday life. Jon Elster commented: ‘We do not
choose to have them; rather, we are in their grip’ (1989: 61). He went on to say that
‘Emotions are the most important bond or glue that links us to others’ (1999: 403). Some
emotions are triggered by acts that violate moral rules of behaviour. These emotions are
moral emotions. Moral emotions play a central role in guiding people’s choice of behav-
iour and moral emotions are closely linked to moral behaviours (Lewis, 1992; Sheikh
and Janoff-Bulman, 2010a; Tangney and Dearing, 2002). It has been suggested that the
two most central moral emotions are shame and guilt (for example, Elster, 1999; Tangney
et al., 2007).
Shame has been defined as one of the most important, painful and intensive of all
emotions (Elster, 1999; Lewis, 1992; Scheff, 1997; Tangney, 1995). Shame emerges
when an individual commits an act that violates internalized norms and feels that he or
she has failed to live up to the norms of the group (Elster, 1999; Svensson, 2004a). It is
not the act in itself that is important, it is the fact that the individual as a person has com-
mitted that act (for example, Tangney et al., 2007). The individual feels ashamed in front
of other people. It has been pointed out that ‘we often do everything we can to avoid the
feeling of shame … the anticipation of shame acts as a powerful regulator of behavior’
(Elster, 1999: 154). Guilt on the other hand emerges when an individual commits a
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