Moral Rights, Human Rights and Social Recognition
| Author | Peter Jones |
| Date | 01 June 2013 |
| Published date | 01 June 2013 |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2012.00988.x |
| Subject Matter | Original Article |
Moral Rights, Human Rights and Social
Recognition
Peter Jones
University of Newcastle
This article examines the thesis that rights are always and only conventional rights. It identifies two versions of the
conventionalist thesis by distinguishing how each understands a moral right.On one view, a moral right describes a
conventional right that ought to exist, irrespective of whether it actually exists; on the other view, a moral right
describes an actually existing conventional right that is morally justified. The article criticises both versions of the
conventionalist understanding of moral rights and human rights. It also distinguishes the kind of social recognitionthat
contemporary conventionalists insist is a prerequisite for a right from that proposed by T. H. Green.The article
concludes with a defence of the orthodox understanding of moral rights and human rights as rights that are moral in
foundation and that can be conceived as rights independently of conventional rights.
Keywords: rights; moral rights; human rights; conventionalism; T. H. Green
The language of rights has a well-established place in our moral vocabulary. There is
nothing forced or unusual in saying, for example, that we have a moral right to be repaid
a debt or a moral right to express our political or religious beliefs. When we speak of a
‘moral right’ in this way, we most commonly imply that the right is moral in foundation.
If we were asked to justify our claim of right, we would do so by citing the moral reasons
that, we believe,vindicate the claim. A right is an entitlement and, just as legal entitlements
have their foundation in law, so moral entitlements have their foundation in morality.
Nowadays,‘human r ights’ can describe legal rights, since human rights figure both in
international law and in the domestic law of many societies. Nevertheless,human r ights are
still widely conceived as moral rights – as rights that we have moral reason to ascribe to all
human persons.That is why we can speak of the violation of people’s human rights, even
if those rights remain unrecognised by international or domestic law. To that extent,
contemporary thinking on human rights remains connected to earlier thinking on natural
rights.
Conventionalism
In this article I examine a way of conceiving rights that rejects the notion that rights can
be ‘moral’in the way I have just described.It does not claim that there is no legitimate sense
in which rights can be described as ‘moral’, but it rejects the view that rights can be rights
in virtue of morality alone and without reference to convention. I shall describe this way
of conceiving rights as ‘conventionalism’, since it holds that rights are always and only
conventional rights.
Within conventionalism, rights are conceived first and foremost as legal rights, but
conventional rights can take other forms.They may be conferred by the rules of non-state
institutions, such as universities or trade unions or churches. People can also have rights
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doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2012.00988.x
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2013 VOL 61, 267–281
© 2012The Author.Political Studies © 2012 Political Studies Association
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