Morality and Command Delusions: Reviewing the Requirement of Wrongdoing in the M’Naghten Rules
| DOI | 10.1177/00220183221097324 |
| Published date | 01 April 2022 |
| Date | 01 April 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Case Notes |
Morality and Command Delusions:
Reviewing the Requirement of
Wrongdoing in the M’Naghten Rules
RvKeal[2022] EWCA Crim 341, [2022] 4 WLR 41
Keywords
insanity, M’Naghten, choice, delusions, wrongdoing, morality
The M’Naghten Rules have governed the law’s approach to the question of a defendant’s insanity at trial
since the mid nineteenth century. Under M’Naghten, a defendant is capable of availing himself of a plea
of insanity in circumstances where, at the time of committing the actus reus of the offence, the defendant
suffers from a defect of reason, caused by a disease of the mind, which has the effect that he either does
not know the nature and quality of his act, or that what he was doing was “wrong”.Keal was a case con-
cerning the breadth of the word “wrong”under the M’Naghten Rules and whether such wording extends
to the inability to choose.
The appellant, Keal, (K), was charged with three counts of attempted murder. It was alleged that he
attacked his father, mother, and grandmother with knives, scissors, a cricket bat and dumbbells, causing
serious harm in doing so.
At trial, K’s mother and father gave evidence that during the frenzied attack, K was apologetic, citing
the devil as the cause of his actions. In light of this, the defence contended that K was insane at the time of
committing the acts in question, and that a special verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity should be
available. The prosecution contended that a plea of insanity was not open to K on the basis that, at the
time of the attempted murders, K knew that what he was doing was wrong.
Four expert psychiatrists provided evidence to the court in the form of a joint report. That report laid
out the areas of agreement between the experts, and the areas of disagreement. The four expert witnesses
agreed that K was indeed suffering from a disease of the mind that led to a defect of reasoning. They also
agreed that K knew the nature and quality of his actions. However, the experts disagreed as to whether the
defendant knew what he was doing was wrong. In particular, the prosecution experts concluded that
although K may have been acting in response to delusional beliefs, his actions suggested that he knew
he was acting unlawfully. On the other hand, the defence experts contended that due to his mental
state, K was unable to form a rational understanding of right and wrong. The trial judge, Garnham J,
directed the jury that it was for them to determine which evidence they believed.
Prior to his summing up, the learned trial judge heard submissions from the parties regarding the legal
direction on insanity. Counsel for K argued that the defence of insanity is available to a psychotic and
deluded defendant who is aware that his act is wrong but believes himself to be compelled to perform
it or powerless to prevent it. Naturally, this interpretation was not accepted by the prosecution, who sub-
mitted that the word “wrong”in the M’Naghten Rules simply means “wrong in law”or “contrary to law”.
The trial judge directed the jury in accordance with the specimen direction in the Crown Court
Compendium and provided a Route to Verdict. In that, the trial judge explained that in order to avail
himself of the “defence”, K must prove, on the balance of probabilities, that he ‘did not know that
what he was doing was wrong, in the sense that it was against the law.’(at [21]).
Case Note
The Journal of Criminal Law
2022, Vol. 86(2) 130–133
© The Author(s) 2022
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DOI: 10.1177/00220183221097324
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