More in Expectation than Hope: The Blackpool Airport Case
| Author | Roger Brownsword,John N. Adams |
| Published date | 01 March 1991 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1991.tb02653.x |
| Date | 01 March 1991 |
More in Expectation than Hope:
The
Blackpool
Airport Case
John
N.
Adam*
and
Roger
Brownsword**
As
it
will be recalled,
in
Williarns
v
Rofey Bros and Nicholls (Contruetors)
Ltd,l
the Court of Appeal decided that an express promise by
A
to B, to pay
B
an
additional
sum
if
B
carried out his existing contractual obligations to
A,
could be contractually
binding. Although
Williams
v
Rofley
plainly signalled that
detrirnentul
reliance by
the promisee is not essential for
a
promise to be binding, its broader significance
is less clear. On one interpretation,
it
simply effected
a
minor modification to the
traditional consideration requirement, treating promises
as
contractually binding
provided that the promisor obtains some
reciprocal
berzejit
from the promisee.
Another
view
is
that
it
indicated that promises may be contractually binding provided
that the promisee
reasonably relies
on the promise. And, according to yet another
reading,
it
signified that promises may be contractually binding provided that the
promisee
reasonably expects
the promisor to keep his word. Although this last reading
is the most radical one,
it
can now derive some indirect support from the court's
more recent decision
in
Blackpool and
Fylde
Aero
Club
v
Blackpool Borough
Council.*
In this note, we
will
consider the
Bluckpool
case with
a
view
to
clarify-
ing both the idea of reasonable expectation and
the
significance of general judicial
ideologies.
The
Blackpool
Case
In the
Blackpool
case, the defendants, who owned and managed Blackpool airport,
raised revenue by granting concessions to operators to use
it.
The plaintiff club
was granted the concession
in
1975, 1978 and 1980. Shortly before the plaintiff's
last (1980) concession was due to expire, the council sent invitations to tender for
the new concession to the club
as
well
as
to
six
other parties. The invitations stated
that tenders were to be submitted
in
the envelope provided, that
they
were not to
bear any name or mark which would identify the sender, and that tenders received
after 12 noon on 17 March 1983 would not be considered. The plaintiff's tender
was put
in
the Town Hall letter box at
11
a.m. on 17 March, but the box was not
emptied
as
it
was supposed to be. As
a
result, the plaintiff's tender was incorrectly
recorded
as
having been received late, and
it
was not considered when the council's
relevant committee met to decide which tender to accept.
In
the event, the concession
was awarded
to
another tenderer, Red Rose Helicopters. When the council's mistake
came to light,
it
was initially proposed that
a
fresh start should be made by inviting
(and considering)
a
second round
of
tenders. However,
with
Red Rose Hclicopters
threatening legal proceedings, the council resolved to honour its contract
with
Red
Rose.
In
consequence, the plaintiff club brought an action alleging, on the part of
the defendants,
a
breach of
a
warranty to the effect that
if
a tender were received
*Professor
ol'
Cotiiiiicrciiil Law. Univcrsity
of
Kciit.
I
2
**Professor
of
Law, Uiiivcrsity
of
Shcfficltl.
I
19901
I
All
BR
512.
And
scc
Adniiis
iintl
Brownsword. 'Coiilriict, Considcralioii
and
tlic Critical
Path'
(1990)
53
MLR
536.
I
19901
3
All
ER
25.
28
I
To continue reading
Request your trial