Motivation and opportunity for conflict-induced migration: An analysis of Syrian migration timing
| Date | 01 January 2019 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343318806044 |
| Published date | 01 January 2019 |
| Author | Justin Schon |
| Subject Matter | Research Articles |
Research Articles
Motivation and opportunity for conflict-
induced migration: An analysis of Syrian
migration timing
Justin Schon
Department of Anthropology, University of Florida
Abstract
How do civilians decide when to leave their homes during conflict? Existing research emphasizes the role of violence
in driving civilian migration decisions. Yet, migration timing often does not correspond with the timing of violence.
To explain this discrepancy, I argue that violence fits within broader considerations of motivation and opportunity to
migrate. Witnessing violence triggers post-traumatic growth that delays narrative ruptures and the subsequent
migration that they motivate. Civilians who have ‘wasta’ – an advantaged social position resulting from some
combination of money and connections – have the opportunity to migrate safely. Civilians who possess both
motivation and opportunity migrate earlier. I use over 170 structured interviews with Syrian refugees in Turkey
to test this argument. Descriptively, respondents who did not witness violence (early motivation) left their homes
seven months earlier, on average. Respondents with wasta (opportunity) left their homes one full year earlier, on
average. Respondents who both did not witness violence (early motivation) and had wasta left their homes approx-
imately one and a half years earlier, on average. Cox proportional hazard models reveal that respondents only
migrated earlier in the conflict if they had both early motivation and opportunity. Open-ended responses from the
interviews support the quantitative results and help explain their causal mechanisms. These findings contribute to
understandings of conflict-induced migration, civil war, and the Syrian conflict.
Keywords
armed conflict, civil war, migration, narratives, refugees, Syria
Introduction
By the end of 2016, civil war in Syria had produced
roughly six million internally displaced persons and six
million refugees, including about one million in Europe.
These numbers have provoked global alarm, strained
host country resources, and contributed to fears of the
spread of conflict within and outside Syria (Salehyan &
Gleditsch, 2006). Syrian conflict-induced migration
skyrocketed in 2013, just as pro-government and anti-
government violence increased and became more indis-
criminate (Lynch, 2013). Violence levels, violence types,
structural conflict conditions, or other factors could drive
this migration timing. Meanwhile, at the end of 2016,
about half of Syria’s pre-conflict population of approxi-
mately 24 million people had not migrated (McHugo,
2015). If we accept that some people will just never
move, then a crucial question remains: for people who
migrated, why did they leave when they did?
Explaining migration timing will highlight civilian
agency amidst the difficult circumstances of armed con-
flict and clarify how civilians respond to violence. Rather
than migration timing being the outcome of binary
choices of whether to fight or whether to flee – fight
or flight – people select from large repertoires of protec-
tion strategies such as daily movement, bribery, or pro-
test (Baines & Paddon, 2012; Jose & Medie, 2016;
Kaplan, 2017). These choices may lead civilians to stay
in violent areas as they find alternative protection strate-
gies to migration.
Corresponding author:
jschon7@gmail.com
Journal of Peace Research
2019, Vol. 56(1) 12–27
ªThe Author(s) 2018
Article reuse guidelines:
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343318806044
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Existing research suggests that perceived physical
threat from violence has the strongest effect upon
conflict-induced migration (Adhikari, 2013; Davenport,
Moore & Poe, 2003), but this relationship exists specif-
ically for violence in residential areas (Schon, 2016).
Violence has different kinds of effects upon migration
depending on the targeting patterns and location of vio-
lence, as well as whether people are considering their
awareness of violence or personal experiences of violence
(Balcells & Steele, 2016; Blattman, 2009; Schon, 2016;
Steele, 2019). Across these violence types, violence tim-
ing does not have a clear correlation with migration
timing (Melander & Oberg, 2006; Schon, 2015). For
a more effective explanation of migration timing, vio-
lence must be incorporated within a broader set of
considerations.
These broader considerations involve motivation and
opportunity. Building on frameworks of motivation and
opportunity from contentious politics and international
relations, motivation refers to the preferred choices for
civilians and opportunity refers to the ‘total set of envi-
ronmental constraints and possibilities’ (Most & Starr,
2015: 23; Tilly, McAdam & Tarrow, 2001).
As people consider when to migrate, I expect that
civilians are aware of violence during conflict, which
creates some level of perceived physical threat (Daven-
port, Moore & Poe, 2003; Moore & Shellman, 2004).
Perceived threat motivates responses, which are driven
by narratives – discrete stories that encapsulate a given
set of information (Olsen, 2014). Narratives are guides
for what is happening and how best to respond. New
information and experiences that are not consistent with
existing narratives strain belief in those narratives. Some
people break under this strain and suffer narrative rup-
tures – breaks in understanding of ongoing events due to
fundamental contradictions between existing narratives
and new information and experiences (Janoff-Bulman,
1992; Pemberton & Aarten, 2018). When people suffer
narrative ruptures, they often become motivated to
migrate (Rosen, 2017).
Different types of violent experiences – violence to
family, violence received, and violence witnessed – can
increase or decrease the ability to understand how to
reconcile new experiences and information with narra-
tives depending upon whether they trigger post-
traumatic growth (PTG) or post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD). Social support helps people under-
stand violent experiences, thereby helping people
undergo PTG and not PTSD, but it only helps up to
a certain threshold of trauma. Since violence witnessed is
unlikely to cross that threshold, it is the only type of
violent experience that is correlated with PTG without
having a clear correlation with PTSD (Blattman, 2009;
Kulkarni et al., 2011; MacDonell, 2012). Therefore,
people who witness violence tend to undergo PTG,
believe existing narratives for a longer duration and suffer
narrative ruptures later, and develop motivation to
migrate later than those who do not witness violence.
Motivation to migrate, however, does not indepen-
dently affect migration timing. Civilians also need
opportunity to migrate safely. This opportunity comes
from the security environment and resources available to
respond to that environment. This security environment
is shaped by the types and spatial distribution of vio-
lence. Specifically, civilians must monitor whether vio-
lence involves selective or indiscriminate targeting and
whether the mix of violence targeting is similar within
residential areas (home violence) and along migration
routes (road violence) (Kalyvas, 2006; Schon, 2016).
Often, home violence contains a higher share of indis-
criminate targeting and road violence contains a higher
share of selective targeting (Balcells & Steele, 2016;
Lombard, 2013; Pottier, 2006).
Civilians who have an advantaged social position –
resulting from some combination of money and connec-
tions – can protect themselves from the selective targeting
of road violence.Advantaged people protect themselves by
leveraging their own power and relationships withpower-
ful individuals and institutions (De Smedt, 2009;Peleg &
Waxman, 2011; Utas, 2012). This protection does not
help in the face of indiscriminate violence in residential
areas. Since conflict security environments tend to include
a larger share of selective violence along migration routes,
advantaged people can protect themselves more effectively
while moving. As a result, civilians who hold an advan-
taged socio-economic status should possess greater oppor-
tunity to migrate safely. If civilians already have
motivation to migrate, then holding an advantaged status
allows them to act on that motivation.
I test this argument using structured interviews with
over 170 Syrian refugees in Turkey. With Syria produc-
ing more refugees than any other country and Turkey
hosting the largest number of those refugees, this is an
especially important case to study. Syria’s conflict began
with protests in March 2011, but the regime of Bashar
Assad implemented a violent crackdown that, rather
than quashing dissent, escalated tensions into all-out
conflict (Pearlman, 2016). This conflict presents a case
that is extremely salient for its high levels of conflict-
induced migration. On a practical level for researchers,
the fact that Syria’s conflict is ongoing and began rela-
tively recently in 2011 contributes to the case’s value.
Schon 13
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