Motivations of diaspora support in homeland civil conflict
| Author | Lucia Bird |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00223433211064795 |
| Published date | 01 March 2023 |
| Date | 01 March 2023 |
| Subject Matter | Regular Articles |
Motivations of diaspora support
in homeland civil conflict
Lucia Bird
Independent scholar
Abstract
Although diasporas often leave their homelands due to violence or political upheaval, these groups may engage in
homeland politics by providing financial, material, or diplomatic assistance to militants engaged in civil conflicts.
Conversely, diasporas may ignore homeland civil conflicts and exclusively focus on opportunities available in their
host states. This study argues that variation in diasporas’ degree of integration into their host states influences
whether diasporas support militants opposing homeland governments. Diaspora members may be dissimilated,
which undermines their ability to consolidate resources in support of homeland militants, or incorporated, which
limits their will to engage in homeland civil conflicts. Moderately integrated diasporas, which maintain identity ties
with the homeland and have access to beneficial resources, are most likely to aid militants fighting homeland civil
conflicts. Using original data, I test and find support for this integration-based theory.
Keywords
civil conflict, diaspora, foreign support
Introduction
‘Direct every dollar [ ...] to the ones who need it most
inside Syria or in Turkey [ ...] If you wish to help plz
contact my brother [ ...] & he’ll come to you wherever
you are in Sydney to collect the money’.
1
Mustapha al-Majzoub, a Syrian Australian diaspora
member, solicited funds and allegedly provided humani-
tarian aid in Syria, during which he became the first
Australian killed in the civil conflict (Shanahan, 2018).
Mustapha was a highly regarded Sydney teacher and in
touch with mainstream Australian culture who nonethe-
less sought funds, disseminated extremist propaganda,
and recruited jihadists to Syria (Barnett, 2012; Ray,
2020). Instead of capitalizing on opportunities available
in his host state, Mustapha opted to provide financial
and material aid to militants in his family’s homeland.
Mustapha’s decision to participate in the Syrian civil
conflict represents the puzzle motivating this article: why
do diasporas economically, materially, or politically
support militants fighting homeland civil conflicts rather
than take advantage of host state opportunities?
I argue that segmented assimilation, or a moderate
level of integration, into host states produces diasporas
that are most likely to aid militants opposing the dia-
spora’s homeland government. A diaspora’s decision to
provide such support is a function of its motivation and
capacity to mobilize on behalf of militants fighting
homeland civil conflicts. Diasporas that are fully incor-
porated into their host states may have resources that
would benefit homeland militants, but they lack the
motivation to send aid. Conversely, diasporas that are
fully dissimilated from their host states are likely to be
motivated to provide support but lack necessary
resources. Diasporas that experience segmented assimila-
tion, however, have a resource base that is sufficient to
provide assistance to militants and maintain strong
enough ties to homeland politics to inspire motivation.
I will next address relevant literature on foreign inter-
vention into civil conflicts and offer a novel framework
Corresponding author:
luciaellen.bird@gmail.com
1
Quote from Mustapha al-Majzoub, a Syrian Australian cleric, in
2012 (Shanahan, 2018).
Journal of Peace Research
2023, Vol. 60(2) 226–242
ªThe Author(s) 2022
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/00223433211064795
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to explain why diasporas experiencing segmented assim-
ilation are most likely to support homeland militants. I
develop new measures of diaspora support to homeland
militants and socio-economic integration, which repre-
sents a unique indicator of diasporas’ experience in host
states. I find evidence corroborating my theory and con-
clude with academic and policy-relevant implications.
Existing scholarship evaluates individual diasporas’ roles
in discrete conflicts, but this study presents an innovative
theory on diaspora participation in homeland conflicts
and produces generalizable insights supported by rigor-
ous statistical analyses of various diaspora branches span-
ning several developed host states.
Foreign sponsors in civil conflict
Diasporas are population subgroups living abroad in
‘host states’, diasporas’ countries of residence, rather
than ‘homelands’, or locations of origin (Brinkerhoff,
2011; Connor, 1986). Diaspora members or their
ancestors left their homelands to escape trauma, such
as conflict, or profit via host state trade or professiona-
lization opportunities (Cohen, 2008; Safran, 1991).
Diaspora members, who often share cultural, ideologi-
cal, ethnic, and linguistic attributes, straddle a transna-
tional space between and within their homelands and
host states (Adamson, 2013; Sheffer, 1986). Diaspora
members typically have a ‘collective memory’ of an
‘idealized’ version of their homeland, which may incen-
tivize members’ return (Cohen, 2008). Diaspora mem-
bers’ ‘empathy and co-responsibility’ for homeland kin
activate homeland identity ties and contributions to
stability and economic development, especially during
crises (Cohen, 2008; Desai & Kharas, 2018; Safran,
1991). Some scholars argue that diasporas remain iso-
lated from mainstream society in host states and partic-
ipate in ‘long-distance nationalism’ (Anderson, 1991;
Safran, 1991), but others suggest diasporas may even-
tually fully integrate (Cohen, 2008).
Variation in destination of and reason for migration,
education level, and socio-economic status may affect
political preferences of and fragmentation within dia-
sporas. Social choice theory, however, suggests dia-
sporas may choose a method to aggregate individual
members’ preferences, such as concentrating efforts to
achieve a diaspora-wide optimal outcome or establish-
ing a voting mechanism (Brown, 1975). Also, leaders
may emerge from diasporas and act as norm entrepre-
neurs to encourage ‘public ethnic behavior’ within
diaspora communities in host states (Finnemore &
Sikkink, 1998; Kuran, 1998; Nome & Weidmann,
2013). Furthermore, transnational groups are increas-
ingly overcoming collective actionproblemsashorizon-
tal communication improves via social media and
technology advancements (Brinkerhoff, 2009).
Scholars identify some patterns in relationships
between diasporas and their host states (Baser, Ema-
nuelsson & Toivanen, 2015; Betts & Jones, 2016;
Østergaard Nielsen, 2006). This relationship demands
further examination due to its impact on diaspora sup-
port in homeland civil conflicts, which I define as those
fought in diasporas’ homelands between the govern-
ment and opposition, motivated by competition over
land or political power, and responsible for 25 or more
battle-deaths yearly (Cunningham, Gleditsch & Saleh-
yan, 2013). Byman observes that insurgencies receive
aid from diasporas nearly as frequently as states
(Byman, 2013).
2
Much scholarship exists on state sup-
port, some of which concerns salient domestic or for-
eign minorities (Byman, 2013; Rubenzer & Redd,
2010; Saideman, 2001).
Recent scholarship has developed insights into dia-
sporas’ civil conflict roles, including their capacity to
exacerbate violence and facilitate peace (Collier & Hoef-
fler, 2004; Shain, 2002; Smith & Stares, 2007); how-
ever, a theoretical framework for why diasporas support
homeland militants is lacking. Initially perceived as inef-
fective, diasporas are now recognized as capable of
enhancing militant violence by financing salaries, com-
munication, and logistics; materially aiding militants
with weapons or foreign fighters; and raising interna-
tional awareness of homeland politics (Hess, 2007; Lin-
demann & Wimmer, 2018; Miller & Ritter, 2013;
Moss, 2019). Conversely, diasporas may contribute to
homeland stability, by encouraging militants to use non-
violence and accept host states’ liberal values, and eco-
nomic development (Baser, 2017; Bercovitch, 2007;
Cochrane, Baser & Swain, 2009; Koser, 2007; Laffey
& Nadarajah, 2012; Orjuela, 2018; Petrova, 2019).
3
The puzzling phenomenon of diasporas’ choice to aid
militants in homeland civil conflicts diasporas could
avoid, since they reside abroad, requires further explana-
tion and empirical analysis.
To support homeland militants, diasporas must have
both motivation and capacity. Diasporas’ participation
occurs as a function of their integration into host states,
2
Diasporas supported 44% and states aided 51% of insurgencies
from 2008 to 2013.
3
Diasporas may support homeland governments, but this is beyond
my theoretical scope (Mencutek & Baser, 2018).
Bird 227
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