Mr R Mumford v Helston Garages Group (Management) Ltd: 1403855/2022
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judgment Date | 04 October 2023 |
| Date | 04 October 2023 |
| Published date | 10 November 2023 |
| Court | Employment Tribunal |
| Subject Matter | Public Interest Disclosure |
| Citation | 1403855/2022 |
Case Number: 1403855/2022
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EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Claimant: Mr R Mumford
Respondent: Helston Garages Group (Management) Ltd
At: Bristol Employment Tribunal
On: 7 September 2023
Before: Employment Judge Cuthbert
Appearances
For the Claimant: Mr R Mumford (represented himself)
For the Respondent: Mr Ryan (Counsel)
PRELIMINARY HEARING
RESERVED JUDGMENT
1. The claimant’s claims for whistleblowing detriment shall not, at this preliminary
stage, be dismissed on the basis that they were presented out of time.
2. The presentation by the claimant of those claims was not an abuse of process.
REASONS
Background to the hearing and issues
1. The claimant brought claims against the respondent for detriment on the grounds
of having made protected disclosures. The present hearing was listed for a one-
day, in person, public hearing to address the following issues, which had been
identified an earlier telephone case management preliminary hearing, on 9 March
2023:
1.1 Consider whether or not the Claimant’s claims for whistleblowing detriment
shall be dismissed if it was reasonably practicable for them to have been
Case Number: 1403855/2022
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brought within the relevant three months’ time limit under s.48(3) ERA 1996.
Such considerations are likely to involve when the Claimant first became
aware of the enhanced commission scheme.
1.2 Consider whether the Claimant’s presentation of his whistleblowing claims
by way of a second claim form on 29th November 2022 and not via the first
set of proceedings (1400622/2022) was an abuse of process in accordance
with the principles as set out in Henderson v Henderson (1843) 67 ER 313.
1.3 [issue not relevant as the respondent withdrew this issue].
1.4 (If the claims proceed), to conduct any case management necessary to
progress the case to a final hearing including listing for a final hearing and
setting directions.
2. At the start of the hearing, I explained to the parties that I proposed to deal with the
time limit issue (1.1) first in my decision, as the abuse of process issue (1.2) only
fell to be considered if the Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the claim in the first
place, if it were in time. I would, however, hear evidence and submissions on both
issues before reaching a decision.
3. During the course of the hearing, after the claimant’s oral evidence but before
closing submissions, I explained to the parties that, after reflecting over the lunch
break, it was apparent that a further issue needed to be addressed, in effect before
I could properly consider issue 1.1 above. This was as follows.
4. In order for the issues of reasonable practicability etc, set out under issue 1.1
above, to arise and to be determined if appropriate, consideration would be needed
in the first place as to when the normal time limit for presenting the claims expired.
Issues around reasonable practicability etc are self-evidently contingent in the first
place on a claim being found to be, or just very obviously, out of time and
furthermore require a determination as to precisely when the ordinary time limit
expired, so as to understand how late a claim was presented. In some cases, this
is very clear, such as when employment has terminated and there is no prospect
of any continuing acts having occurred after the termination date, and so calculating
the start of limitation is straightforward. In the present case, the claimant’s
employment was continuing at the point at which he presented his claim.
5. Issue 1.1 was framed narrowly, seemingly on the basis and assumption that the
claimant’s whistleblowing claims had invariably been presented out of time. The
judge at the last hearing expressly recorded her view that the complaint was out of
time. This was not a finding or judgment after hearing relevant evidence and
submissions, but was in effect an observation in the case summary. That summary,
and the subsequent definition of the issues to be determined, did not expressly
include the initial question of whether and when the normal period for presenting
the claims had expired. This meant that the parties had prepared for the present
hearing, and indeed the first part of that hearing had proceeded, without that crucial
initial question at the forefront of things.
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