Mughal hegemony and the emergence of South Asia as a “region” for regional order-building

AuthorManjeet S. Pardesi
Published date01 March 2019
Date01 March 2019
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1177/1354066118761537
E
JR
I
https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066118761537
European Journal of
International Relations
2019, Vol. 25(1) 276 –301
© The Author(s) 2018
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/1354066118761537
journals.sagepub.com/home/ejt
Mughal hegemony and the
emergence of South Asia
as a “region” for regional
order-building
Manjeet S. Pardesi
Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand
Abstract
The region known as South Asia today emerged as the locus for order-building only in
the early modern period (~1500–1750) as a “region” of Islamicate Asia. I demonstrate
this through a cognitive-strategic process based on the interactions between polities
and resources within and outside of South Asia. While the practices associated with
the primary institutions of warfare, great power management, diplomacy, and political
economy did not meaningfully differentiate South Asia from Eurasia in the pre-Mughal
millennium, the deep rules associated with them marked South Asia off from Islamicate
Asia after the rise of the Mughals. The practices of these four primary institutions
were co-constituted with Mughal hegemony. Unlike recent scholarship, I show that
the regional level existed before the emergence of a global-scale international system.
My analysis has two major theoretical implications. First, I clarify the distinction
between hegemonic and imperial orders, and argue that coercive hegemony must
be understood as a primary institution of an international/regional society. Since
all hegemonies are not alike, I explain why some hegemonic orders are based on
coercion while others mix coercion with legitimacy/acquiescence by elucidating the
structural differences between Mughal and Ming/Qing hegemonies. Second, I advance
the debate on balance of power versus hegemony by providing a historically grounded
explanation that demonstrates why the injection of extra-regional resources into early
modern South Asia produced hegemony while fostering systemic balancing behavior
in Europe (post-1500). My findings raise questions related to regionalization (order-
building) without regionalism (shared identities/threat perceptions), while showing
that region (trans)formation effects order.
Corresponding author:
Manjeet S. Pardesi, Victoria University of Wellington, Room 203, 16 Kelburn Parade, Wellington, 6140,
New Zealand.
Email: manjeet.pardesi@vuw.ac.nz
761537EJT0010.1177/1354066118761537European Journal of International RelationsPardesi
research-article2018
Article
Pardesi 277
Keywords
Hegemonic order, imperial order, Islamicate Asia, Mughal Empire, primary institutions,
region, South Asia
Introduction
The area known as South Asia today emerged as a distinct “region” for order-building in
the early modern period (~1500–1750) in tandem with the Mughal Empire (~1526/1555–
1739/1857). South Asia “before the Moghul Conquest seems to display less of a coherent
states-system than any of the world’s great macro-cultures — less too than that earlier
India [South Asia] which produced the Arthashastra [~3rd century BCE–3rd century
CE]” (Wight, 1977: 195).1 The Mughals transformed South Asia into a region of
Islamicate Asia, which was one of three early modern Eurasian international systems
along with Europe and East Asia (Pardesi, 2017).2
I argue that it was the interaction of three factors — the “cognitive priors” (Acharya,
2012: 194) of the Mughal elite, strategic geography, and the politico-military interaction
capacity in Islamicate Asia (stretching from Turkey to the Indian Ocean/South-east Asia)
— that led to the emergence of South Asia as a region of this system. I use the English
School’s “structural account” (Buzan and Lawson, 2017; Schouenborg, 2011) to demon-
strate this “cognitive-strategic” regionalization of South Asia through the practices asso-
ciated with four “primary institutions” (Bull, 2012: 71; Wight, 1979: 111–112) — warfare,
great power management, diplomacy, and political economy — that were co-constituted
with Mughal hegemony in South Asia, and marked it off as a distinct region of Islamicate
Asia.
My analysis demonstrates that South Asia was not formed through the process of
“colonization/decolonization,” as is widely assumed (Buzan, 2012: 24). The multi-polity
South Asian region formed under Mughal hegemony pre-dates colonialism. Therefore,
the argument that regions are “recent,” and that they did not exist “until the making of a
global-scale international system” led by Europe, must be amended (Buzan, 2012: 23–
26). Furthermore, my approach to region formation as an “interactive” outcome of
regional and extra-regional dynamics (of polities and resources within and outside South
Asia) is distinct from the internalist (Acharya, 2013: 4) and externalist (colonization/
decolonization) accounts in the literature on region formation.
As an “empirical IR theory,” structural English School approaches “generate con-
cepts, construct typologies, and provide historically grounded explanations” (Buzan
and Lawson, 2017: 5). My empirical analysis has two major theoretical implications.
First, I clarify the conceptual difference between imperial and hegemonic orders, and
demonstrate that the Mughal-led order in South Asia was hegemonic as it rested on
coercion (or the threat/use of force). Typologically, “coercive” hegemony must be
understood as a primary institution alongside “legitimate” hegemony, which has been
the focus of recent scholarship (Clark, 2011). Mughal coercive hegemony was durable
and survived for close to one-and-a-half centuries (~1580–1720). I explain why some
hegemonic orders are based on coercion while others mix coercion with legitimacy/
acquiescence by elucidating the structural differences between Mughal and Ming/Qing

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT