Multilateral Export Control Regimes
| Published date | 01 September 1998 |
| Date | 01 September 1998 |
| Author | Andrew Latham,Brian Bow |
| DOI | 10.1177/002070209805300305 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
ANDREW
LATHAM
&
BRIAN
BOW
Multilateral
export
control
regimes
Bridging
the
North-South
divide
M
ULTILATERAL
EXPORT
CONTROL
REGIMES
(MERCS)
are
formal
con-
sultative
mechanisms
created
by
industrialized
states
that
have
agreed
to
co-operate
in
their
efforts
to
curb
the
proliferation
of
certain mili-
tary
and
dual-use
technologies.
In
the
post-cold
war era,
disputes
over
the
necessity
and
legitimacy
of
export
controls
have
emerged
as
major
sources
of
tension
in
several
non-proliferation,
arms
control,
and
dis-
armament
forums.
These
disputes
often
have
a
North-South
compo-
nent.
Many
Northern
states
argue
that
national
export
controls
are
an
important
and
necessary
element
of
most
non-proliferation
regimes
and
often
play
a
key role in
retarding-
if
not
preventing
-
the
diffusion
of
sensitive
military
and
dual-use technologies
to
potential
prolifera-
tors.'
They
also
argue
that
national
measures
to manage
or
restrict
Andrew
Latham
is
Assistant
Professor,
Department
oflPolitical
Science,
Macalester
College,
St
Paul,
Minnesota'former
Assistant
Director,
Centre
for
International
and
Security
Studies,
York
University,
Toronto.
Brian
Bow
is
a
graduate
student,
Department
of
Political
Science,
Cornell
Universitny
Ithaca,
N7Y'former
Research
Associate,
Centre
for
International
and
Security
Stud-
ies, York
University
Toronto.
The
authors
gratefully
acknowledge
the
support
of
the
Department
ofForeign
Affairs
and
International
Trade.
The
views
expressed
are
theirs
alone
and
do
not
nec-
essarily
reflect
those
of
the
government
of
Canada.
i
In
this
article,
'Northern'
is
used
for
states
that
are
economically
and
technological-
ly
developed.
While
the
core
members
of
this
group (for
example,
the
United
States,
Canada,
Britain,
France)
are
all
predominantly white
and
culturally
rooted
in
Western
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
Summer
1998
Andrew
Latham
&
Brian
Bow
technology
transfers
can
be effective
only
if
their
design
and
imple-
mentation
are
co-ordinated with
most
or
all
of
the
states
that
possess
the
relevant
technologies.
Finally,
many
Northern
governments
insist
that
export
controls
are
legitimate
instruments
of
statecraft,
that
there
is
nothing
in
any
global
non-proliferation
agreement
such
as
the
Nuclear
Non-Proliferation
Treaty
(NPT)
or
the
Chemical Weapons
Convention
(cwc)
which
explicitly
prohibits
such
controls,
and
that
such
agreements often
create
an
obligation
to
control
exports.
From the
perspective
of
many
Southern
states,
on
the
other hand,
export
controls,
especially
when
co-ordinated
within
Northern-domi-
nated
multilateral
regimes,
are
illegitimate, unnecessary,
and
'discrim-
inatory.'
Southern
critics
argue
that
MERCs
are
little
more
than
'white
nations'
clubs'
created
to
deny
developing
countries
access
to
needed
military and
commercial
technologies.
2
This
view
is
compounded
by
the
widespread
belief
that
MERCs
violate
both
the spirit
and
the
letter
of
many
global
non-proliferation
agreements,
which
many
Southern
capitals
see
as
'free
trade'
arrangements,
and
by
what
one observer has
called
the
South's
'restitution
ethic'
-
that
is,
a
belief
that
the former
colonial
powers
of
the
North
'owe
restitution
to
the
South
for
past
transgressions."
The
adversarial
positions
taken
by states
on
both
sides
of
the
dispute
contribute
to
a
climate
of
confrontation
that
seriously
complicates
the
task
of
negotiating and
improving the
kind
of
inclusive,
co-operative,
and
widely
agreed
arrangements
that
are
ultimately
necessary
to
the
long-term
success
of
the non-proliferation project.
4
Indeed,
differences
European
traditions,
some
are
not
(for
example,
Japan).
Similarly,
'Southern'
is
used
for
states
that
are
in
varying
degrees
developing,
non-aligned,
and
non-Western.
2
The
South is
not,
of
course,
monolithic.
While
all
Southern
countries
are
sensitive
to
what
they
perceive
as
the
'discriminatory'
nature
of
export
controls,
only
a
minor-
ity
are
actively hostile
to
export
controls.
However,
this minority
is
disproportion-
ately visible
and
influential
within
non-proliferation
forums.
3
C.W.
Robinson,
'Technological
advances
-
their
impact
on
US
foreign
policy
rela-
tive
to
the
developing
world,'
in
Anne
G.
Keatly,
ed,
Technological
Frontiers
and
For-
eign Relations
(Washington
DC:
National
Academy
Press
1985),
267.
4
This
article
assumes
that
export
controls
do not,
by
themselves,
constitute
a
prac-
tical
and
sustainable non-proliferation
strategy.
While
they
may
be
necessary
in
the
short-
to
medium-term,
ultimately
the
best
approach
to
managing the
diffusion
of
militarily
relevant
technologies
is
a
multifaceted
strategy
based
on
non-discrimina-
tory,
co-operative
arrangements
that
involve
the
active
consent
of
all
relevant
par-
ties.
The
cwc
is
a
good example
of
such
an
arrangement.
466
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1998
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