Multiple Infant Deaths: Expert Witness Testimony
Published date | 01 December 2005 |
Date | 01 December 2005 |
DOI | http://doi.org/10.1350/jcla.2005.69.6.473 |
Subject Matter | Court of Appeal |
statutory conspiracy. Contrary to the analysis in this commentary, and
appropriate identification of the insufficiency of recklessness as to cir-
cumstance, it was held that the appeals be dismissed. As stated, it was
the mere suspicion, as opposed to the knowledge of the fact that an
individual was engaged in nefarious behaviour, which crystallised liabil-
ity. This meant that for the purposes of s. 1(2) of the 1977 Act the mere
suspicion equated to a ‘fact or circumstance necessary for the commis-
sion of the offence’. As identified, although it was a prerequisite for the
offence that an alleged conspirator had to have knowledge of that
suspicion, nonetheless such ‘knowledge’ could be transplanted from his
own state of mind. For the future the prosecution have to prove the
suspicion of the defendant and, in doing so, they will inevitably prove
knowledge of that suspicion in accordance with the decision in the
present case.
The approach adopted in this case is inconsistent with earlier prece-
dents on conspiracy to commit criminal damage or rape—therein mere
recklessness as to a circumstance of the offence was insufficient. The
decision is reflective of recent trends aimed at curtailment of those
involved with proceeds of crime, or assisting others therein. A logical
extrapolation of s. 1(2) of the 1977 Act in the present case would have
been to impose a burden on the prosecution to prove that knowledge
must be established for charges of conspiring to launder such proceeds.
In truth, it is high time for the House of Lords to step in to clarify this
area of law.
Alan Reed
Multiple Infant Deaths: Expert Witness Testimony
Rv Donna Anthony [2005] EWCA Crim 952
The appellant was convicted of two counts of murder, each count
relating to one of her infant children. The appellant had two children: J
was born on 15 February 1995 and M was born on 10 November 1996.
Both children died in infancy. The prosecution contention was that the
appellant had killed J and M by smothering. In support of the prosecu-
tion case, expert opinion evidence was admitted together with in-
criminating testimony concerning the circumstances surrounding the
deaths. The appellant’s case was that she had not inflicted any harm on
the children and that they must have died naturally.
A subsequent appeal against conviction, stating two grounds of ap-
peal, had been rejected. Following a reference by the Criminal Cases
Review Commission, dated 2 February 2005, the Court of Appeal heard
the appellant’s case under s. 9 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995. The
appeal was not contested by the Crown. The appellant was
discharged.
H
ELD
,
ALLOWING THE APPEAL
,the principle in R v Cannings [2004]
EWCA Crim 1, [2004] 2 Cr App R 7, correctly stated, is that multiple
deaths, in the same family, though rare, remain unexplained unless
Multiple Infant Deaths: Expert Witness Testimony
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