Muslim brotherhood and the Jordanian state: Containment or fragmentation bets (1999–2018)?
| Author | Mohammed Torki Bani Salameh |
| DOI | 10.1177/2057891119891035 |
| Published date | 01 March 2021 |
| Date | 01 March 2021 |
| Subject Matter | Research articles |
Research article
Muslim brotherhood
and the Jordanian state:
Containment
or fragmentation bets
(1999–2018)?
Mohammed Torki Bani Salameh
Political Science Department, Yarmouk University, Jordan
Abstract
The Jordanian state was established on both secular and religious conservative principles. The
approval of the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan was on 19 November 1945,
and it was consistent with these principles. Until 1989, the relationship between the Muslim
Brotherhood and the regime varied between mutual symbiotic relations, based on mutual support
between the parties, and hostile and meta-interactions. In 1989, the process towards democra-
tization came as a testing phase for the ability of the Jordanian political system to coexist with the
manifestations of political pluralism, especially with the Muslim Brotherhood, their containment
and diminishing influence. The Jordanian political system preferred to limit the strength of the
Muslim Brotherhood and to retreat from democratic transformation, while keeping the channels
of communication effective between the system and the Muslim Brotherhood. When King
Abdullah II came to power in 1999, the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the
Jordanian political system went through three main stages. During the stage of the transition from
political to security side (1999–2003), the political file of the Muslim Brotherhood was delivered to
the General Intelligence Department, which tried to limit the strength of the group and restrict
their activities. In the second phase (2004–2008), a cold confrontation between the two parties
took place, and the parliamentary and municipal elections were rigged to prevent their access to
parliament, which ended in mistrust between the parties. In the third phase (2009–2018), the
Muslim Brotherhood used the boycott policy to deal with the royal initiatives and election enti-
tlements. The regime used the policy of fragmentation from inside the group, encouraging divisions
within the group instead of directly confronting or banning it.
Corresponding author:
Mohammed Torki Bani Salameh, Political Science Department, Yarmouk University, Irbid 2345, Jordan.
Emails: mohammadtorki@yu.edu.jo; mohammedtorki@yahoo.com
Asian Journal of Comparative Politics
2021, Vol. 6(1) 62–80
ªThe Author(s) 2019
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/2057891119891035
journals.sagepub.com/home/acp
Keywords
containment, fragmentation, Jordan, Muslim Brotherhood
Introduction
The state of Jordan was not established on religious principles, and its legitimacy was not built on a
sectarian basis. It was clear from the beginning that its founder, Emir Abdullah I, was keen to
clarify its civil and political nature in accordance with the country’s spirit and the political class
(Abu Rumman and Abu Haniya, 2014: 3). The Brotherhood was founded in Jordan by Haj Abdul
Latif Abu Qora on 19 November 1945 (Gharaibeh, 1997). The General Center of the Brotherhood
was established in Jordan on 19 November 1945 under the patronage of King Abdullah I, the
founder of the Kingdom (Al-Amoush, 2007: 9), and with the approval of the Council of Ministers
on the request submitted by Abu Qora to establish an Islamic Society under the name “Muslim
Brotherhood” (Dalloul, n.d.). Before 1999, the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and
the Jordanian political system varied considerably. It moved from the stage of reciprocal relations
based on mutual support between the two parties against the so-called common dangers (the most
important of which was the emergence of the nationalist and leftist tendencies and their supportive
regimes) to the stage of tidal relations constrained by the interest of the regime (Boulby, 1997), i.e.,
the Muslim Brotherhood should only be involved where the interests of the regime were positive.
After 1989, the stage of democratization came as a testing phase for the ability of the Jordanian
political system to coexist with the manifestations of political pluralism and partisan opposition,
especially within the Muslim Brotherhood. The main goal was to contain them in order to reduce
their influence. This stage has been developed by the Jordanian political system based on three
basic strategies (Al-Hourani and Yassin, 1999: 38):
1. Limiting the role of monarchical authority and moving towards a modern constitutional
monarchy, in which parliamentary power is monarchical.
2. The tendency to integrate both royal power and popular power within the political system.
3. Preserving the monarchy as the most important source of power in the political system,
controlling the opposing partisan forces and reducing their influence and opposition.
The Jordanian political system preferred to implement the third strategy and limit the strength of
the Muslim Brotherhood. Therefore, a new electoral law (the one-vote law) was adopted to limit
their political power (Al-Shadouh, 2017: 91). The law was a “strategic exit” for the regime to
retreat from democratic transition. This has made the regime’s relations with opposition parties and
political figures a superfluous reaction (Fares, 2011: 3).
This article reviews the relations between the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and the Hashemite
regime, and examines the internal, local and global aspects that have affected relations between the
two sides. After providing the historical background to the establishment of the Muslim Brother-
hood, the article reviews the important regional events such as the rise of Hamas, the influence of
al-Qaeda, the Arab Spring and the Islamic state, along with political changes that led to the decline
of the Muslim Brotherhood’s influence in parliament and to the boycott of elections.
Salameh 63
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