Narratives of rebellion
| Date | 01 September 2021 |
| Author | Paul Joosse |
| Published date | 01 September 2021 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1477370819874426 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/1477370819874426
European Journal of Criminology
© The Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/1477370819874426
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Narratives of rebellion
Paul Joosse
The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Abstract
Working from a narrative criminological framework, this article distinguishes and describes
the ‘narrative of rebellion’ as a generic form that can be encountered widely in situations of
asymmetrical struggle. Because narratives of rebellion furnish their tellers with agentic potential
across various stages of the ‘rebellious career’ (from contemplation, to participation, to capture,
and ultimately to peril), they are desirable cultural accoutrements for bringing into seditious
struggle. Rebellion stories typically (a) subsume individuals within collective avatars that are
represented as existing somehow ‘outside of life’ – often through legendary martyrdom, (b)
advance plots that draw causal connections between failure/death and regenerative proliferation
‘from below,’ and (c) promulgate of a sense of solidarity with many as-yet unseen fellow travelers.
These features offer protective resources for rebels engaging in criminal resistance, while also
providing a framework for sense-making that, rather than obfuscating danger (a prominent feature
of existing theories of rebellious participation), offers interpretive resources for contending with
the likelihood of a perilous fate.
Keywords
Edgework, genre, narrative criminology, rebellion, terrorism, charisma, contentious politics
Introduction
Why would individuals imperil themselves by engaging in seditious acts against estab-
lished regimes? The phenomenon is undeniable in the empirical record, but also seem-
ingly inexplicable with reference to the principle of self-preservation. This article
proposes that narrative culture (Bruner, 2010; Holstein and Gubrium, 2000; Loseke,
2007; Polkinghorne, 1988; Smith, 2005) – conceptualized specifically through the lens
of narrative criminology (Presser, 2009, 2012; Presser and Sandberg, 2017; Sandberg,
2010; see also Maruna, 2001) – is a key site for theorizing a task faced by all movements
that threaten the social order; namely, motivating self-interested individuals to contribute
to the advancement of collective goals, even when such contributions entail considerable
personal risk.
Corresponding author:
Paul Joosse, Department of Sociology, The 9th floor, Jockey Club Tower, Centennial Campus, University of
Hong Kong, Hong Kong.
Email: pjoosse@hku.hk
874426EUC0010.1177/1477370819874426European Journal of CriminologyJoosse
research-article2019
Article
2021, Vol. 18(5) 735–754
Past research into the etiology of rebellion tends to stress two generative compo-
nents that are distinct, yet complementary. First, pioneering moral entrepreneurs must
demonstrate the present feasibility of unruly speech or action. Wittingly or otherwise,
these individuals serve as ‘conversation-starters’ (Becker, 1963) who bestow move-
ments with repertoires for action (Tilly, 1993) and powerful ‘vocabularies of motive’
(Benford and Snow, 2000). Second, there must be a corresponding constituency that
stands poised for what McAdam (1982) called ‘cognitive liberation.’ These collectiv-
ities-in-waiting usually cohere through a shared sense of injustice (Gamson, 1992),
such that, once ‘activated,’ they become propitious replicators of the speech and
actions of the pioneering moral entrepreneurs (Blumer, 1969; Gamson and Meyer,
1996: 286).
Descriptions of this coupling – between the innovative signal and the mimetic base
– occupy a place of prominence in some of our most recognized social-theoretical
accounts of rebellious eruption. They apply, for example, to Charles Tilly’s discussion of
how ‘autonomists’ (2004: 11) coalesce into ‘scattered attacks’ (2003: 170–93). For Tilly,
initial acts of defiance and sabotage, if they are conducted successfully and with impu-
nity, can inaugurate ‘signaling spirals . . . [that] communicate the current feasibility and
effectiveness of generally risky practices and thereby alter the readiness of participants
to face the risks in question’ (2003: 176). This mechanism also comes to bear in the sub-
altern politics described by anthropologist James C. Scott (1990). For Scott, ‘public dec-
larations of [a] hidden transcript’1 can work to rapidly discharge a subjugated population’s
pent-up mutinous energy, such that:
If the first act of defiance succeeds and is spontaneously imitated by large numbers of others,
an observer might well conclude that a herd of cattle with no individual wills or values had been
stampeded inadvertently or by design. The same pattern of action can, however, be produced
when a subordinate group learns from a breakthrough event that they may now, more safely,
venture open defiance. (1990: 222)
One can see how such explanations serve to demystify individual participation in
rebellion. ‘Feasibility for action’ in these formulations is determined through an indi-
vidual-level wagering system in which notions of ‘safety in numbers’ and visions of
‘the bandwagon’ ameliorate fears associated with sticking one’s neck out.2 Thus,
although neither Tilly nor Scott (nor their fellow travelers) explicitly subscribe to
rational choice models for social movement mobilization (see Oberschall, 1994), in
these theorizations they make a tacit exception: in the midst of contemplations about
rebellious action specifically, an ineluctable calculus asserts itself, concentrating the
mind of the modal participant.
There can be no doubt that this rational-calculative framework is indeed helpful
for explaining recruitment to rebellion. But an exclusive reliance on its explanatory
power would risk occluding those features of uprisings that we know sometimes
make self-endangerment not just fearsome, but also meaningful and even attractive
to rebels: a sense of tragedy, an urge toward depressive romanticization, and even
exciting flirtations with self-annihilation (Falco, 1999; Gamson, 1989; Jarman and
O’Halloran, 2001; Katz, 1988; Lyng, 1990, 2004). Charles Kurzman’s (1996: 161)
736 European Journal of Criminology 18(5)
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