National ideology and IR theory: Three incarnations of the ‘Russian idea’
| Author | Andrei P. Tsygankov,Pavel A. Tsygankov |
| Published date | 01 December 2010 |
| Date | 01 December 2010 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1354066109356840 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
European Journal of
National ideology and IR
International Relations
16(4) 663–686
theory: Three incarnations
© The Author(s) 2010
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DOI: 10.1177/1354066109356840
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Andrei P. Tsygankov
San Francisco State University, USA
Pavel A. Tsygankov
Moscow State University, Russia
Abstract
In an attempt to broaden our perspective on IR theory formation, this article seeks to highlight
the significance of ideology. Consistent with the recently revived sociology of knowledge
tradition in international studies, we view IR scholarship as grounded in certain social and
ideological conditions. Although some scholars have studied the political, ideological, and
epistemological biases of Western, particularly American, civilization, in order to achieve a
better understanding of global patterns of knowledge formation it is important to look at
cases beyond the West. We therefore look at the formation of IR knowledge in Russia, and
we argue that the development of a Russian theory of international relations responds
to the old debate on the ‘Russian idea,’ and three distinct ideological traditions that had
been introduced to the national discourse in the mid-19th century. Focusing on theories
and concepts of the international system, regional order, and foreign policy, as developed
by Russian scholars, we attempt to demonstrate how they are shaped by ideological and
therefore pre-theoretical assumptions about social reality.
Key words
IR theory, national ideology, Russia, ‘Russian idea,’ Self and Other, sociology of knowledge
There are spheres of thought in which it is impossible to conceive of absolute truth existing
independently of the values and position of the subject. (Mannheim, 1968 [1936]: 79)
Corresponding author:
Andrei P. Tsygankov, San Francisco State University, 1600 Holloway Avenue, San Francisco, CA 94132, USA.
Email: andrei@sfsu.edu
664
European Journal of International Relations 16(4)
Introduction
The recent revival of the sociology of knowledge tradition1 in international studies has drawn
scholarly attention to the fact that IR scholarship is grounded in certain social conditions and
may reflect ideological and cultural premises. In particular, some scholars (Crawford and
Jarvis, 2001; Hoffmann 1995 [1977]; Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004; Jones, 2006; Tsygankov
and Tsygankov, 2007) have come to view International Relations as a branch of research that
often reflects political, ideological, and epistemological biases of Western, particularly
American, culture. Implicit in the argument is the importance of ideology, especially national
ideology, in shaping the foundations of social science. In the case of the United States, an
essentially national ideology claims to have universal status, and the positivist methodology
then serves to shape knowledge in accordance with the standards of the particular local com-
munity — in part, for the purpose of shaping the world politically. As E.H. Carr observed in
1977, the ‘study of international relations in English-speaking countries is simply a study of
the best way to run the world from positions of strength’ (Carr, 2001: xiii).
If we are to move further down the path of analyzing the social and ideological foundations
of knowledge, it is important to look beyond the already explored case of the United States.
If ideology remains an ever-powerful influence on knowledge in the world of states, schol-
ars ought to research the relationship between ideology and IR theory formation outside of
the United States. Continuing with the above-quoted observation, Carr suggests that ‘The
study of international relations in African and Asian universities, if it ever got going, would
be a study of the exploitation of the weaker by the stronger’ (Barkawi and Laffey, 2006:
349). Recently, scholars from across the globe have attempted to understand IR from the
perspective of various peripheries — Asian (Acharya and Buzan, 2007; Callahan, 2004b,
2008; Shani, 2008), East European (Guzzini, 2007), Latin American (Tickner, 2003, 2008),
and Russian (Tsygankov, 2008; Tsygankov and Tsygankov, 2007) — suggesting emergence
of the new sub-discipline of comparative IR theory (Callahan, 2004a).
In an attempt to further broaden our perspective on IR theory formation and highlight
the significance of ideology, this article takes up the case of Russia. Defining ideology as a
systematic presentation of Self, Other, and their relationships, we argue that the Russian
theory of International Relations is grounded in three main ideological traditions. We refer
to these traditions as Westernism, Statism, and Civilizationism; each emphasizes a category
of, respectively, the West, the independent state, and a distinct civilization as the desired
identification of the Russian Self. Although these ideologies have recovered their currency
after the Soviet disintegration, they have their roots in the history of Russia’s relations with
Europe and the 19th-century debates about the ‘Russian idea.’ Those scholars who believe
in the importance of studying local knowledge in order to move away from intellectual
hegemony and ethnocentrism will benefit from analyzing potential ‘non-Western’ roots of
these phenomena. To make our case, we first hypothesize relationships between national
ideology and IR theory. We then describe the nature of Russia’s ideological disagreements
and debates about the ‘Russian idea.’ In the second half of the article we attempt to match
the ideologies of Westernism, Statism, and Civilizationism to the new Russian IR focusing
on, arguably, the better developed theories and concepts of the international system,
regional order, and foreign policy. Following Hayward Alker and other scholars (Alker,
1981; Alker and Biersteker, 1984; Alker et al., 1998), we do not make a sharp distinction
A. Tsygankov and P. Tsygankov
665
between IR theory as an academic/social institution and foreign policy discussions —
instead, we adopt a broad definition of International Relations theory, viewing it as a
systematically developed and culturally grounded image of the world. The conclusion
discusses the implications of our argument for International Relations theory.
National ideology and IR theory
The end of the Cold War produced new theoretical expectations of an increasing
economic and political convergence across nations. The concepts of globalization and
democratic peace anticipated that nations would redefine their interests to fit the stand-
ards of the newly emerging and West-defined openness in the world.2 Rooted in the
mainstream tradition of modernization theory, the vision of the worldwide ascendancy of
liberal capitalism is based on assumptions of the West’s moral and institutional superiority.3
The vision assumes the relative homogeneity and uniformity of the West relative to the
rest of the world. It also implies that countries outside the West have no distinct social
and ideological roots and therefore are unable to make their own contribution to world
development; at this post-historical point, all that is left to the non-Western world is to
patiently and passively wait to be absorbed by West-defined globalization.
Many scholars have justifiably criticized such assumptions as vastly unrealistic and
propose to move beyond the existing cannon of theorizing International Relations from
the perspective of the currently dominant Western civilization in general and the United
States in particular. They point to the empirical problems with such theorizing by drawing
scholarly attention to new geographic regionalization (Mansfield and Millner, 1997;
Stalling, 1995), social and economic inequality (Murphy, 2001), and political polariza-
tion, violence, and lawlessness (Mansfield and Snyder, 2007). No less importantly, they
also highlight the need to study how, instead of relying on the benefits of Western hege-
mony, to readjust to new international conditions nations often seek refuge by reformu-
lating their interests in a way that is consistent with their historical pasts and local
environments (Crane, 1999; Helleiner and Pickel, 2005; Tsygankov, 2004). Furthermore,
scholars have demonstrated the importance of studying patterns of local knowledge and
its implications for IR theory (Callahan, 2004a, 2004b; Guzzini, 2007; Inayatulla and
Blaney, 2004; Tickner, 2003; Tsygankov and Tsygankov, 2007; Waever, 1998).
In making sense of this persisting diversity of national policies and patterns of knowl-
edge, it is essential that we treat ‘nation’ and ‘national interest’ as open to various meanings
and interpretations, rather than something determined by the structure of the international
system. Several influential schools of thought suggest themselves as a framework for such
treatment. The sociology of knowledge (see especially Berger and Luckmann, 1966;
Harding, 1998; Mannheim 1968 [1936]) examines the social conditions of the emergence,
development, and decline of national ideas, arguing that such ideas only function meaning-
fully in and respond to particular social circumstances. Aristotelian practical reasoning
(Alker, 1997; Haan et al., 1983) views a theorist or ideas-producer as ethically involved
with, rather than neutral toward, social developments. The Frankfurt School (Habermas,
1973) more forcefully places theory in the center of social and political transformation.
And post-colonial...
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