National Parliamentary Scrutiny Over EU Issues
| Author | Ronald Holzhacker |
| Date | 01 December 2002 |
| Published date | 01 December 2002 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1465116502003004004 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
National Parliamentary
Scrutiny over EU Issues
Comparing the Goals and Methods of
Governing and Opposition Parties
Ronald Holzhacker
University of Twente, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT
This article compares national parliamentary scrutiny over
European Union matters in two countries with coalition
governments, Germany and the Netherlands, based on inter-
views with members of parliament serving on their Euro-
pean Affairs Committee. While acknowledging that legal
powers and institutional structures are important when
evaluating parliamentary–government relations, the examin-
ation focuses on the goals and methods of party groups
when overseeing government. In Germany, the goal of the
governing coalition parties is to protect the government,
whereas in the Netherlands they scrutinize the government’s
position in order to be sure the compromise in the cabinet
sufficiently protects the party’s interests. Although the Dutch
governing parties normally support the government, a ‘float-
ing coalition’ occasionally emerges with ruling parties
working with parts of the opposition to amend a proposal
toward their own preferences. The study concludes that it is
not only the legal powers and institutional structures that
determine parliamentary scrutiny in a given member state,
but also party interactions.
459
European Union Politics
[1465-1165(200212)3:4]
Volume 3 (4): 459–479: 028520
Copyright© 2002
SAGE Publications
London, Thousand Oaks CA,
New Delhi
KEY WORDS
democratic deficit
European Union
floating coalition
national parliaments
political parties
04 holzhacker (jk/d) 25/10/02 3:05 pm Page 459
Introduction
Commentators have bemoaned for years the democratic deficit that allegedly
exists in the European Union (EU). Pointing a finger at the supranational insti-
tutions of the EU, critics complain about the excessive number of decisions
made by civil servants in Brussels’ bureaucratic labyrinth, the lack of account-
ability of the European Commission to elected officials and the ineffective-
ness of the European Parliament in overseeing and legitimizing decisions.
Most observers thus agree that the EU and the member states face a demo-
cratic deficit, which is eroding the tradition of parliamentary democracy in
Europe and undermining the sense of representativeness and legitimacy in
the political system.
Yet many of the most important and far-reaching decisions are increas-
ingly made within the intergovernmental institutions of the EU: the European
Council and the Council of Ministers. It is in these institutions that the prime
ministers (or heads of state) and other cabinet ministers gather to stake out
their positions and negotiate with their counterparts from other member
states. The process of decision-making in the member states preceding these
meetings may be subject to scrutiny by the national parliaments.
National parliaments, and the interaction between governing and oppo-
sition political parties within these institutions, are central to the system of
democratic representation and legitimacy in the member states. But in
research on parliamentary–government relations over EU matters, empirical
analysis of the main strategic actors within parliament – the political parties
– is often lacking. Political parties are the premier mass–elite linkage insti-
tutions in parliamentary democracies, connecting the object of voter choice
in periodic elections to the decision-making processes of government and ulti-
mately to public policies.
The emergence of multi-level forms of governance in the EU has influ-
enced the national parliaments of the member states in two fundamental
ways. First, increasing proportions of sovereign decision-making in import-
ant policy areas are being transferred to the EU level, decreasing the inde-
pendent decision-making capability of the nation-state. Second, to the extent
that the authority that has been transferred to the EU resides in the European
Council or the Council of Ministers, there has been a transfer of decision-
making authority from the parliamentary level to the member states’ exec-
utives. The power to reach decisions in policy areas that have traditionally
been vested in national parliaments now rests in part either in the supra-
national decision-making institutions of the EU or in national governments
when they vote in the intergovernmental decision-making institutions of
the EU.
European Union Politics 3(4)
460
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