NATO Enlargement
| Author | Eric Bergbusch |
| Published date | 01 March 1998 |
| Date | 01 March 1998 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/002070209805300108 |
| Subject Matter | Essay |
ERIC
BERGBUSCH
NATO
enlargement
Should
Canada
leave
NATO?
THE
'NEW
NATO'
I
n
May
1997,
George
A.
Joulwan,
a
general
in
the
United
States
army
and
supreme
allied
commander
of
the
North
Atlantic
Treaty
Organi-
zation,
paid the traditional
farewell
visit
to
Canada
before
relinquish-
ing
his official
duties.
In
the
nature
of
things, this
was
an
occasion
to
show
the
flag
for
NATO,
to
review
the
state
of
play
with
the
Canadian
government,
and
to
thank
the
Canadian
forces
for
their
support
and
co-operation.
A
burly,
engaging
figure,
Joulwan
enthusiastically
presented
the
new
NATO'
to
a
meeting
organized
by
the Atlantic
Council
of
Canada.
In
direct,
vivid
language,
he
described
how
NATO
was
reaching
out
to
its
former
adversaries
-
to
Poland,
Hungary,
Russia,
and the
whole
array
of
countries
that
had
once been
encompassed
by
the
Warsaw
Treaty
Organization
(more
commonly
called
the
Warsaw
pact).
Of
course,
the
'new
NATO'
had
kept
the
attributes
that
had
enabled
it
to
give
its
members political
confidence
and
military
security
for
over
forty
years,
the
firm
base
on
which
Europe's
unprecedented
half-cen-
tury
of
prosperity, tranquillity,
and
freedom had
been
built.
Given
his
audience,
he
did not
need to
spell
out
that
the
popular
desire
in
central
Fellow
in
democratic
development
at
the
University
of
Saskatchewan
International
a
Director
of
the
Atlantic
Council
of
Canada,
andaformer
ambassador
to
Poland
and
the
German
Demo-
cratic
Republic.
I
would
like
to
thankJ
L.
Granatstein,
Jim
Hanson,
Gordon
Smith,
and
the
civilservants
to
whom
I spoke
for
their
comments
and
suggestions.
A
select
bibliography
is
available
on
request
at
dv920@freenet.
carleton.ca.
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
Winter
1997-8
Eric
Bergbusch
and
eastern
Europe
for
a
similar
measure
of
freedom
and
prosperity
was
what
finally
brought
the
cold war
to an
end.
While
the
new
NATO
had
not
abandoned the
vigilance
and
solidari-
ty
of
the
past,
Joulwan
was
at
pains
to
demonstrate
that
it now
went
well
beyond
collective
defence.
Through
a
series
of
special
instruments
devised
for
the purpose,
NATO
had
reached
out
to
Russia
and
its
other
interlocutors
east
and
south
of
the
Oder.
It
had
initiated
a
deep, con-
tinuing
institutional
dialogue
with
those
countries
and,
perhaps
more
important,
had
started
to
work
closely
with
a
number
of
them
on
mat-
ters
of
military management,
including
civilian
control,
training,
doc-
trine, communications, equipment,
and
peacekeeping
techniques.
Joulwan
took
considerable
and
justifiable
pride
in
how
the
new
NATO
programmes with their
elaborate
titles
-
the
North
Atlantic
Cooperation
Council
(subsequently transformed
into
the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership
Council),
Partnership
for
Peace,
and
Combined
Joint
Task Forces
-
grew
and
developed
during
his
time
as
supreme
commander.
They
not
only
created
a
pool
of
common
knowledge
and
a
capacity
to
work
together among
the
military
forces
involved,
but,
by
fostering
a
habit
of
co-operation,
they
also
helped
to
overcome
the
fears
and
suspicion
of
the past.
Almost
30
non-NATO
countries
had
missions
accredited
to
NATO
headquarters
in
Brussels
with
ready
access
to
its
senior
managers,
current thinking, and
specialized
programmes.
Those
missions
were
both
means
to
achieve
closer
collaboration
and
symbols
of
growing
ties.
All
this
was
quite
impressive
-
a
series
of
measures
that
were
work-
ing
and
held
promise for
the
future.
But when the
bluff
and
confident
general
was
asked
how
the
enlargement
of
NATO
would
strengthen
security
and
co-operation
in
Europe
-
specifically,
what
the
addition
of
new
members
would
contribute
to
the new
NATO
-
he
was
momentar-
ily
at
a
loss:
'Oh,
that
is
a
political
question
... '
He
quickly
rallied,
affirming
his
support
for
NATO's
official
policy
with standard
words
about
'extending
stability'
to
central
and
eastern
Europe.
What
he did
not
do
was
try
to
define
the
concrete benefits
that
would
accrue
to
NATO
members beyond
those
already
conferred
by
the
current
out-
reach
programmes.
It
was a
telling
moment.
Joulwan's
hesitation
puts him
in
good com-
pany.
Some
specialists
in
Europe and
the
United
States
complain
that
these
issues
have
not
been
sufficiently
aired
there,
although
their
debates
look
very
lively
indeed compared
to
the
relatively
few
voices
148
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
Winter
1997-8
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