Natural hazards, internal migration and protests in Bangladesh
| Date | 01 January 2021 |
| Published date | 01 January 2021 |
| Author | Kristina Petrova |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343320973741 |
| Subject Matter | Regular Articles |
Natural hazards, internal migration
and protests in Bangladesh
Kristina Petrova
Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Centre of Natural
Hazards and Disaster Science, Uppsala University
Abstract
Does internal migration following natural hazards increase the likelihood of protests in migrant-receiving areas? To
address the question, this study first looks at the extent to which experiencing different forms of natural hazards
contributes to a household’s decision to leave their district of residence. In a second step, the article explores whether
that internal migration flow increases the number of protest events in migrant-hosting districts. In doing so, it
contributes to the existing debate on the extent to which natural hazards impact the likelihood of social contention,
and the role of migration as a linking pathway in that relationship. The impact of climate-related shocks may erode
household assets and therefore adaptive capacity in ways that can eventually influence decisions to migrate to larger
urban centres. Although migrants are agents of economical and technological change, urban environments may
impose challenges to recently arrived migrants and their host communities, affecting the motivations and mobiliza-
tion resources of urban social groups to protest. As a consequence, the probability of urban unrest in these locations is
expected to increase. To test this, I use geo-referenced household-level data from Bangladesh for the period 2010–15,
which records households’ experiences of different forms of natural hazard and internal migration flows, available
from the Bangladesh Integrated Household Survey. It combines this with data on protests, derived from the Armed
Conflict Location and Event Data. Findings suggest that flood hazards in combination with loss of assets increase the
likelihood of internal migration, but unlike other types of domestic mobility, hazard-related migration does not
increase the frequency of protests in migrants’ districts of destination.
Keywords
Bangladesh, internal migration, natural hazards, protests, quantitative analysis
Introduction
Millionsofpeoplewillbeexposedtotheimpactsof
anthropogenic climate change, with projected increased
duration, frequency and magnitude of extreme weather
events (IPCC, 2018). Climatic changes are expected to
have serious impacts on land loss, with consequences on
crop production, livelihood diversification and food
security (IPCC, 2018). Migration is one adaptive
response to these impacts. Seasonal migration has long
been a key livelihood strategy and a tradition for many
communities (Baldwin, Fro
¨hlich & Rothe, 2019), but
climate change will most likely amplify existing migra-
tion patterns (Millock, 2015). For example, movements
from rural to urban areas are expected to increase
(Sedova & Kalkuhl, 2020). Despite general agreement
in academic discussions that climate change is rarely a
main cause of human mobility, it is expected to increas-
ingly play a role (Hugo & Bardsley, 2014).
Since the 1980s, some scholars have argued that
climate-related migra tion (also referred to as environ-
mental migration) could lead to mass displacement that
might result in conflict (Myers, 2002). Recent academic
research, however, has been cautious when discussing the
relationship and has challenged these expectations due to
limited theoretical and empirical foundations. Despite
case studies showing that natural hazards may contribute
to the likelihood of conflict through migration,
Corresponding author:
kristina.petrova@pcr.uu.se
Journal of Peace Research
2021, Vol. 58(1) 33–49
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343320973741
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quantitative studies do not agree on whether the pathway
is causal or even exists (Brzoska & Fro
¨hlich, 2016). The
impact of climate migration as a topic has also entered
political conversations internationally, where the theme
is regularly framed in the language of national security.
When looking at domestic discourses in countries
affected by environmental migration, Boas (2014), how-
ever, notes that the discussion rather concerns internal
forms of migration and centres around individual well-
being, as opposed to national security.
Focusing on the issue from a human security perspec-
tive, this study then asks whether natural hazards play a
role in people’s decisions to internally migrate, and
whether that is associated with increased protest fre-
quency in migrant-hosting areas. The study specifically
looks at a single case, Bangladesh, in order to unpack the
complex relationship while considering the context of
these local dynamics. Focusing on a broad conceptuali-
zation of conflict such as peaceful protests also accounts
for important variation. Qualitative case studies of the
societal impact of climate variability continuously high-
light the occurrence of land disputes, riots and nonvio-
lent protests as a more likely outcome than severe forms
of armed conflict. This subcategory of conflict does not
necessarily require the same level of organization an d
funding, entails lower personal risk, and in case of dis-
content could be more likely to occur in the aftermath of
a natural hazard (Buhaug & Seter, 2014).
Drawing on existing theoretical perspectives, I expect
that after having experienced a flood or drought, mem-
bers of households adapt to financial challenges at home
and attempt to diversify their income by migrating to
other, often urban areas in search of better living condi-
tions. Although the new environment offers potential
benefits, it also imposes unforeseen challenges. If not
properly managed, the subsequent internal migration
may amplify grievances and reconfigure social networks,
in turn affecting motives and mobilization of resources of
different urban social groups in districts of migrants’
destinations. As a result, local urbanites and migrants
may protest to voice their demands for better social and
governmental services.
To test these claims, the study utilizes fine-grained
geo-referenced data from Bangladesh between 2010 and
2015. The statistical analysis is conducted in two parts:
first, I rely on micro-level data from the Bangladesh
Integrated Household Survey, to examine the extent to
which experiencing different forms of natural hazards
such as floods and droughts contributes to a household’s
decision to leave their district of residence. Second, I
move from the household to the district level to explore
whether these internal migration flows increase the num-
ber of protests occurring in migrant-hosting districts,
using data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event
Data Project. The results suggest that flood hazards and
consequent loss of assets increase the likelihood of inter-
nal migration. I find that higher levels of total migration
to a district also increases the frequency of protests.
When separating natural hazard-related migration from
the rest of the inflow, however, estimated results suggest
that environmental migration does not affect the like-
lihood of protests, neither in itself nor as an addition to
the remaining ongoing internal migration.
Literature review
Academic research exploring the link betwe en climate
change, migration and conflict goes back to Robert
Malthus, who argued that global population growth
would gradually lead to environmental decline and con-
flict over renewable natural resources. Subsequently,
Homer-Dixon (1999) and Reuveny (2007), among
others, highlighted environmental migration as one of
the main pathways from environmental decline to vio-
lent conflict. Still, the empirical evidence for this path-
way is ambiguous and our understanding of whether
and when climate-related migration promotes the risk
of conflict remains limited (Raleigh, Jordan & Saleh-
yan, 2008; Gleditsch, 2021).
Existing studies find that when moving herds to more
resource-rich areas, the presence of pastoralists in the
vicinity of other groups may promote competition over
shared resources due to pre-existing socio-economic ten-
sion (Adem et al., 2012; Reuveny, 2007) or lack of
common conflict resolution mechanisms (De Juan,
2015). In these cases, shared practices and laws may
differ, leaving both communities more vulnerable to vio-
lence (Adano et al., 2012; Linke et al., 2015). Along
those lines, Koubi et al. (2018) show that even though
gradual climatic changes such as drought amplify envi-
ronmental migrants’ conflict perception, those who relo-
cate are unlikely to support the use of violence unless
they have been victimized (Linke et al., 2018). In terms
of state response, a study of Indian states shows that
weather-shock-driven internal migration increases the
risk of rioting if the host population is politically aligned
with the central government, as resource availability and
impunity increase migrant intimidation (Bhavnani &
Lacina, 2015). Cottier (2018) reports that droughts and
heavy rainfall increase the rates of rural–urban migration,
but finds no evidence that movements by ethnically dis-
tinct migrants increase the risk of nativist violence in
34 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 58(1)
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