Negative and Positive Liberty Revisited
| Published date | 01 April 1984 |
| Author | Nicholas Buttle |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9256.1984.tb00087.x |
| Date | 01 April 1984 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
24
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de troisi'eme cycle, Universite de Paris
I
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M.M.
(1982),
Regional Policy
and
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in
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PhD
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-0-000-0-
NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE LIBERTY REVISITED
Nicholas Buttle
In 'Two Concepts of Liberty', Isaiah Berlin has two principal objectives:
to establish
a
logical separation between the negative and positive senses of
liberty and to advance the priority of negative liberty over positive liberty
since the former
'is
grounded
so
deeply
in
the actual nature of men' that
it
is
an 'essential
part
of what we mean by being a normal human being'(Berlin,
1969,
p.165). These two objectives are, of course, connected since it
is
only if a
logical distinction can be achieved between negative and positive liberty that
the former can be afforded priority over the latter.
In
this
paper I
will
argue
that Berlin succeeds in neither of
his
objectives because,
in
his
own
terms, the
negative and positive senses of liberty cannot be distinguished without a serious
loss
in
the meaning of negative liberty.
senses of freedom because each
is
concerned
with
'clearly different
'
questions
(Berlin,
1969
,p.122).
'What
is
the area
within
which the subject
.
. .
is
or should be left to do
or
be
what
he
is
able to
do
or be without interference . .
.?'
(Berlin, 1969, p.121-2).
The positive sense of freedom,
in
contrast, is involved
with
the question, 'What
or
who
is
the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do
or
be,
-this
rather than that?' (Berlin, 1969,
p.122).
For Berlin, then, the
negative sense of freedom
is
concerned
with
the issue of interference
and
the
positive sense of freedom
with
the issue of control or determination. Berlin
believes that these questions are clearly different, since questions of interference
can be answered independently of questions
of
determination.
cal context, 'The answer to the question 'Who governs me?'
is
logically distinct
from the question 'How far does government interfere
with
me?' (Berlin, 1969, p.130).
However,
I
shall argue that
Berlin's
argument for the logical distinction between
negative and positive liberty fails, since questions
of
interference cannot be
answered
in
isolation from questions of determination without trivialising the
meaning of negative liberty.
For
Berlin a logical distinction exists between the positive and negative
The negative sense of freedom is involved
in
the question,
Thus,
in
the politi-
Imbi
Zity,
incapacity
and
interference
to place limits on
the
application of
the
concept.
not be used, for Berlin, to refer to any type of inability
to
achieve an objective
(i.e. doing or becoming),
but
only to such inabilities which result from
inter-
ference by human beings.
Thus,
'Mere incapacity to attain a goal
is
not a lack of
political freedom,' whereas, 'You lack political liberty or freedom only if you
are prevented from attaining a goal by human
beings.'
(Berlin, 1969, p.122).
Indeed, Berlin insists that the application of the concept of liberty to such
incapacities as
the
inability to
jump
more than ten feet in the air, or to read
because of blindness, or to understand
the
darker pages of Hegel, would be
'eccentric' (Berlin, 1969,
p.122).
Berlin makes,
then,
a distinction between
inabilities which are a product of incapacity and inabilities which are a product
of interference and insists that
it
would be appropriate to use the cancept of
negative liberty only
in
relation to the existence or absence of the latter.
In pursuing the analysis of
the
negative concept of freedom Berlin
is
careful
Accordingly, the concept should
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