Neither Adversaries Nor Partners: Russia and the West Search for a New Relationship
| Date | 01 December 1994 |
| Published date | 01 December 1994 |
| DOI | 10.1177/002070209404900402 |
| Author | Paul Marantz |
| Subject Matter | Article |
PAUL
MARANTZ
Neither
adversaries
nor
partners:
Russia
and
the
West
search
for
a
new
relationship
When
a
new Russian
state
emerged
from the
wreckage
of
the
Soviet
Union
in
December
1991,
there
was
much optimism
in
Russia
and
the
West
that
the
collapse
of
Soviet
power,
the
demise
of
Marxist-Leninist
ideology,
and
the
end
of
the
Cold
War
would
lead
to
a
more
tranquil
world,
one
in
which
Moscow
would
cease
to
be
a
threatening
adversary
and
would
instead
become
a
co-operative
member
of
the
international
community.
Yet
the
honeymoon
in
East-West
relations did
not
last
long.
Within
just
two
years,
it
became
apparent
that
this
optimism
had
been
misplaced.
Support
within
Russia
for
close
co-operation
with
the
West
declined,
Russian
foreign
policy
became
more
assertive
and
nationalistic,
and
Moscow
clashed
with
the
West
over
a
number
of
important
issues.
By
early
1994,
influential
figures
in
Russia
and
the
West
were
warning
of
deteriorating
relations.'
William
Perry,
the United
States
secretary
of
defense,
cautioned
that
even
'a
renewal
of
some
new
version
of
the
cold
war'
was
possible.2
What
went
wrong? How
has
Russian
foreign
policy
changed
in
recent
years?
What are
the
prospects
for
constructive
East-West
relations
in
the
future?
Associate
Professor
of
Political
Science,
University
of
British
Columbia,
Vancouver.
1
Zbigniew Brzezinski,
'The
premature partnership,'
Foreign
Affairs
73(March/
April
1994);
67-82;
Georgi
Arbatov,
'Eurasia
letter:
a
new
Cold
War?' Foreign
Policy,
no
95(summer
1994),
90-103; Alexei
K.
Pushkov,
'Letter
from Eurasia:
Russia
and
America
-
the
honeymoon's
over,'
Foreign
Policy,
no
93(winter
1993-4),
76-90.
2
New
York
Times,
15
March
1994,
A4.
International
Journal
XLIX
AUTUMN
1994
726
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL
Initially,
the
foreign
policy
of
the
new Russian
state
had
a
very
strong
pro-Western
orientation.
The
foreign minister,
Andrei
Kozyrev,
who
was
a
key
proponent of
this
policy,
fa-
voured
close
relations
with
the
West
on
both
practical
and
phil-
osophic
grounds.3
In
his
eyes,
the
central
objective
of
Russia's
foreign
policy
should
be
to
support
and
facilitate
the
process
of
economic
and
political
transformation
taking
place
inside
the
country.
He
saw
the
highly
industrialized
nations
of
the
West
as
the
main source
of
the economic
assistance
that
Russia
so
des-
perately
needed
if
it
was
to
make
the
difficult
transition
to
a
market
economy.
Only
the
West
could
provide
the
large-scale
foreign
aid,
loans,
trade, investment
capital,
advanced
technol-
ogy,
and
entrepreneurial
expertise
that
Russia
required.
Even
though
countries
such
as
South
Korea,
Japan,
and
Saudi
Arabia
might
also
be
of
assistance,
they
were
viewed
as
far
less
impor-
tant
than
the
United
States,
Germany,
and
other
major
Western
nations.
Improved
relations
with
the
West
would
also
facilitate
a
sharp
reduction
in
the
bloated
military
budget
which
had
absorbed
some
20
to
25
per
cent
of
the
gross
national product
under
the
Soviet
regime.
A
reduction
in
the
external
threat
would
allow
the
cut-back
of
the
military
to
proceed
safely.
Even
more
importantly,
improved
East-West
relations
would
undercut
the
position
of
the
still
powerful
military-industrial
complex
which
was
attempting
to
slow
the conversion
of
military
industry
to
civilian
production.
Beyond
these
important
practical
considerations,
however,
there
was
a
broader
rationale
for
a
pro-Western
policy. In
terms
of
the
recurring
division
within
Russia
between
Westernizers
and
Slavophiles,
Kozyrev
was
an
unabashed
Westernizer.
He
believed
that
it
was
vitally
important
for
Russia to
become
an
integral
member
of
the
Western
community
of
nations.
He
3
Jeff
Checkel,
'Russian
foreign
policy:
back
to
the
future?' RFE/RL
Research
Report
i(16
October
1992),
20-1.
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