Never again? The role of the global network of R2P focal points in preventing atrocity crimes

Published date01 June 2021
Date01 June 2021
DOI10.1177/09240519211017669
AuthorMartin Mennecke
Subject MatterArticles
Article
Never again? The role of
the global network of R2P
focal points in preventing
atrocity crimes
Martin Mennecke
University of Southern Denmark, Law Department, Odense, Denmark
Abstract
The Nuremberg judgement famously held that crimes against international law are committed by
men, not by abstract entities – but who, then, is to prevent these crimes? In 2005, all UN Member
States agreed that it was their responsibility to protect populations against atrocity crimes (short
R2P). In 2010, the idea wasborn to appoint senior government officials to act as individual R2P Focal
Points to help implement this historic pledge.This article critically examines the focal point idea and
its practice,focusing on the experienceof the Danish R2P Focal Pointas well as the role of the Global
Network of R2P Focal Point which today has members from 61 UN member states. The article
highlightsthe significant potentialof the R2P Focal Points but also a seriesof pre-conditions that need
to be met if the appointment of a R2P Focal Point is not to remain a mere gesture.
Keywords
Responsibility to protect (R2P), atrocity crimes, Focal Point, network, Denmark
1. INTRODUCTION
In September 2005, world leaders agreed on the sixtieth anniversary of the UN on lessons to be
drawn from the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica. Going forward, States and the international
community had a responsibility to protect populations from war crimes, crimes against humanity,
ethnic cleansing and genocide.
1
This new norm, also referred to as R2P, was to replace the
Corresponding author:
Dr. Martin Mennecke, Associate Professor, Law Department, University of Southern Denmark, Campusvej 55, 5230
Odense, Denmark.
E-mail: marme@sam.sdu.dk
1. UN General Assembly, ‘World Summit Outcome’ (24 October 2005) A/RES/60/1, paras 138-139.
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights
2021, Vol. 39(2) 161–181
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long-standing rhetorical pledge of ‘never again’ with commitment and action. Today, it is evident
that R2P did not end mass atrocities. Syria, Myanmar and South Sudan, to name but a few, have
each become the site of mass killings, widespread sexual violence and other massive human rights
violations. Some commentators have argued that R2P died in those new iterations of mass vio-
lence, while others have described this as the early stages of a ‘long and unsteady life’ of a new
norm.
2
Why is R2P so difficult to realise and how it could be done?
In 2010, a number of States, led by Denmark and Ghana, together with the Global Centre for
R2P, a key civil society organisation, agreed that the R2P norm needed a new, special mechanism
to advance its implementation: individual, senior officials that would act as governmental Focal
Points for R2P. This step was not enshrined in a new, legally binding instrument, but presented to
interested governments who then included the Focal Point idea into an informal summary of their
meeting.
3
As of November 2020, 61 States and two regional organisations, the European Union
(EU) and the Organisation of American States (OAS), have appointed an official to act as R2P
Focal Point, making this mechanism the most prominent and popular vehicle in the field of atrocity
prevention.
4
The Focal Points and their global network, to which the Global Centre for R2P acts as
secretariat, are the only implementation mechanism that were explicitly mentioned in a recent UN
resolution marking the fifteenth anniversary of R2P.
5
The UN Secretary General has called on
governments to appoint a R2P Focal Point, as members of the network regularly encourage other
States to join the initiative.
6
No other domestic, specialised body focused on preventing atrocity
crimes has gained a similar standing internationally.
The fast, cross-regional growth and recognition of the network of R2P Focal Points makes the
idea an impressive success story. Indeed, out of the numerous other recommendations on atrocity
prevention the Secretary General has made every year since his first report in 2009, the one to
appoint a R2P Focal Point has proven to be one of the most popular ones among States. What is the
explanation for this success? And what can be said about the practice and impact of the R2P Focal
Points and their global network? Both in the context of atrocity prevention and for the present
Special Issue, these are key questions to investigate. The more so as this development has not been
reflected yet in the academic literature on atrocity prevention. Specialised journals such as Geno-
cide Studies Prevention and Global Responsibility to Protect have not yet carried any in-depth
2. See respectively David Rieff, ‘R2P, R.I.P.’ (The New York Times, 7 November 2011)
11/08/opinion/r2p-rip.html> accessed 21 April 2021; and Jennifer Welsh, ‘Norm Robustness and the Responsibility to
Protect’ (2019) 4 Journal of Global Security Studies 53, 69.
3. Global Centre for R2P, ‘Fulfilling the Responsibility to Protect, Third Annual Ministerial Meeting on R2P, summary’
(24 September 2010) 2-3
CA000EE0FF-Full_Report.pdf> accessed 15 November 2020.
4. See Global Centre for R2P, ‘Members of the Global Network of R2P Focal Points’
members-of-the-global-network-of-r2p-focal-points/> accessed 15 November 2020.
5. UN Human Rights Council, ‘Fifteenth anniversary of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, as enshrined in the 2005 World Summit Outcome’ (24 July 2020)
A/HRC/44/L.14, para 2.
6. In fact, the UN Secretary General already spoke positively about the Focal Point initiative immediately after its
inception: ‘The role of regional and subregional arrangements in implementing the responsibility to protect. Report of
the Secretary-General’ (28 June 2011) A/65/877-S/2011/393, para 28; and subsequently ‘Responsibility to protect: State
responsibility and prevention’ (9 July 2013) A/67/929-S/2013/399, para 71. For States calling on others to appoint a
Focal Point, see UN General Assembly Official Records (27 June 2019) A/73/PV.93, 12 (Costa Rica), 14 (Slovenia); and
UN General Assembly Official Records (27 June 2019) A/73/PV.94, 19 (Ghana).
162 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 39(2)
analysis of R2P Focal Points and their work as an implementation mechanism.
7
This gap is
surprising, as the literature is increasingly turning towards issues of implementation.
8
For now,
research articles only call R2P Focal Points a ‘key example’ and ‘critical’
9
for atrocity prevention
‘becoming more institutionalized.’
10
In light of the general rise of R2P Focal Points, it seems
imperative to assess their actual potential and performance.
The present Special Issue offers a welcome opportunity and conceptual framework for such an
inquiry. Its introduction identifies six core dimensions for a discussion of focal points which will
be employed as an analytical grid. This article examines the idea and practice of the Global
Network of R2P Focal Points as it has developed over the past decade. This includes a case-
study of the experience of the Danish Focal Point for R2P, as Denmark is a founding member of the
Focal Points initiative and very active internationally regarding the implementation of R2P.
11
The
article builds on the author’s long-term, first-hand observations of the work done by the Danish
R2P Focal Point as well as interviews with the Danish Focal Point and the Global Centre for R2P.
12
First, the historical background, mandate and current status of R2P Focal Points in the field of atrocity
prevention will be described. The following section focuses on the role and experience of the Danish
Focal Point as an example of practice. The final section assesses the potential and record of R2P Focal
Points as implementers of the promise of ‘never again’ with reference to the conceptual framework of
government human rights focal points developed earlier in this Special Issue.
13
The article shows that the
R2P Focal Points together with their global network indeed can be key in helping a country to work with
R2P at the domestic and the international level – but the analysis highlights a series of pre-conditions that
need to be met if the appointment of a R2P Focal Point is not to remain a mere gesture.
2. THE HISTORY, IDEA AND CURRENT STATUS OF R2P FOCAL
POINTS AND THEIR NETWORK
This section will set out the background of the R2P Focal Point initiative and situate it in the
greater context of institutionalised atrocity prevention.
2.1. THEHISTORY AND IDEA BEHINDRESPONSIBILITY TOPROTECT AND THE R2P FOCAL POIN TS
When the R2P norm was agreed upon in 2005, it was seen as a milestone for the fight against
genocide and other mass atrocities.
14
The norm seemed to represent a new consensus among all
7. The landmark publication Alex J. Bellamy and Tim Dunne (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect
(Oxford University Press 2016) has more than 1100 pages and 53 chapters, but none is devoted to the R2P Focal Points.
8. Cf Cecilia Jacob and Martin Mennecke (eds), Implementing the Responsibility to Protect. A Future Agenda (Routledge
2020).
9. Welsh (n 2) 62.
10. Nicole Deitelhoff, ‘Is the R2P Failing? The Controversy about Norm Justification and Norm Application of the
Responsibility to Protect’ (2019) 11 Global Responsibility to Protect 149, 168.
11. Martin Mennecke, ‘Denmark and the Implementation of R2P’, in Jacob and Mennecke (eds) (n 8) 38-40.
12. As leading Danish academic expert, the author has since 2012 regularly discussed R2P matters with the Danish Focal
Point and through him gained access to the Focal Point meetings. The current Danish Focal Point is Ulf Melgaard,
Director of the Department for International Law at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The other interviewee is Savita
Pawnday, Deputy Executive Director at the Global Centre for R2P.
13. See Introduction of this Special Issue.
14. Alex J. Bellamy, Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect. From Words to Deeds (Routledge 2011) 24.
Mennecke 163
UN Member States that sovereignty could no longer serve as excuse for committing mass atrocities
as part of domestic affairs. Instead, as the Secretary General put it in a report in 2009, sovereignty
was redefined by three pillars of responsibility.
15
According to the first pillar of R2P, the State has
a responsibility to protect its popu lation against war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethn ic
cleansing and genocide. The second pillar of R2P is that States share a responsibility to assist
each other in this regard through encouragement and assistance, for example by means of capacity
building. But if the State in question manifestly fails to protect its population, the international
communityhasaresponsibilitytostepintoprotectthepopulation.ThisthirdpillarofR2P
encompasses measures such as sanctions, a referral of the situation to the International Criminal
Court and could ultimately also include military intervention if authorised by the UN Security
Council.
It is important to note that responsibility to protect has strong inherent relations to existing
human rights law.
16
At its core lies the prevention of the most serious violations human rights such
as genocide which protects core human rights such as the right to life and minority groups.
Similarly, the UN’s Framework of Analysis for the Prevention of Atrocity Crimes lists human
rights violations as an important early warning sign.
17
The UN Secretary General has emphasised
this relation and, together with other R2P proponents, led attention to the human rights system as
key venue for the implementation of R2P.
18
Especially at the Human Rights Council (HRC), States
have a range of options to work with R2P. This includes the Universal Periodic Review (UPR),
special sessions of the HRC, Special Rapporteurs, Commissions of Inquiry and other account-
ability mechanisms.
19
States established a Group of Friends of R2P at the HRC in 2015,
20
and in
July 2020, the first thematic stand-alone resolution on R2P was adopted by that Council.
21
Initially there was hope that States would exercise their newly defined responsibility to protect
both internally and vis-`a-vis each other. But at the same time widespread atrocities such as in
Darfur, Sudan, raised the question of who would ensure that governments indeed lived up to the
promise behind R2P. The 2005 World Summit Outcome did not address this question and referred
generically to ‘states’ and ‘the international community’.
22
As time passed, concerns arose that the
15. On the three pillars see UN Secretary General, ‘Implementing the responsibility to protect. Report of the Secretary-
General’ (12 January 2009) A/63/677.
16. ibid. paras 16-22; UN Secretary General, ‘Responsibility to protect’ (n 6), paras 49-55.
17. UN Office for the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect, ‘UN Framework of Analysis for Atrocity
Crimes’ (2014) 11 and 18-21.
18. See UN Secretary General, ‘A vital and enduring commitment: implementing the responsibility to protect’ (13 July
2015) A/69/981-S/2015/500, paras 30 and 73. In 2015, the Global Centre for R2P established a small office in Geneva
to advance the implementation of R2P at the UN Human Rights Council, cf. Global Centre for R2P, ‘Geneva and the
Human Rights Council’ accessed 15 November 2020. Also
the Focal Points identified Geneva as key venue, cf. Global Centre for R2P, ‘Summary of the Third Meeting of the
Global Network of R2P Focal Points, Accra, Ghana, 2013’ (13 October 2013) 5,
uploads/2020/01/3rd-r2p-focal-points-meeting-summary.pdf> accessed 15 November 2020.
19. On the relation between the UN Human Rights Council and the responsibility to protect, see, for example, Ekkehard
Strauss, ‘UN Human Rights Council and High Commissioner for Human Rights’ in Bellamy and Dunne (eds) (n 7) 315
ff.
20. As of November 2020, the Group of Friends of R2P in Geneva has over 50 members from all the UN’s regional
groupings: Global Centre for R2P, ‘Group of Friends of the Responsibility to Protect’
friends-of-the-responsibility-to-protect/> accessed 15 November 2020.
21. UN Human Rights Council (n 5).
22. See UN General Assembly, ‘World Summit Outcome’ (n 1) paras 138-139.
164 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 39(2)
R2P norm would unravel before long unless concerted efforts were made to further anchor R2P and
its implementation in the international and the domestic system.
23
In response, the UN Secretary
General appointed in 2008 a special adviser on R2P to advance both the conceptualisation and the
operationalisation of the new norm.
24
This new post was joined to the UN Office for the Prevention
of Genocide.
25
A year later, in 2009, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution agreeing to
continue the dialogue on R2P in order to avoid it disappearing from the international agenda.
26
The question remained, though, how States would take R2P to an operational level, beyond
discussions at the UN. In this situation the Global Centre for R2P, an advocacy group based in New
York, developed the notion of a R2P Focal Point. Interested States, including Denmark, were then
approached to test and refine the concept. The idea was to ‘personalise’ R2P in order to create a
contact point for external and internal stakeholders and to ensure that governments would engage
with R2P also outside the context of the UN General Assembly in New York.
The mandate of the Focal Point was seen to encompass a domestic and an external dimension.
At home, the Focal Point would help to develop and implement a national R2P plan, monitor and
gather information about relevant situations and coordinate national preventive and protection
measures. Internationally, the Focal Point would promote R2P as a norm, utilize the new Focal
Point network and coordinate international preventive and protection measures.
27
In lack of a
formally agreed definition, the network shaped an understanding through the informal summaries
of the annual network meetings: a national R2P Focal Point was seen as ‘a senior level official who
is responsible for promoting R2P domestically and supporting international cooperation on the
issue through participating in a global network’.
28
From the outset it seemed unrealistic to assign the implementation of the various R2P activities
to one government official.
29
Instead the idea was that this official, due to senior rank and place-
ment in capital, could help to initiate and catalyse internal conversations with other officials and
agencies on how to implement R2P. The Focal Point would be facilitator rather than implementer.
It was agreed that each country had to shape and place the Focal Point in light of its own
circumstances and capacities.
30
23. Bellamy (n 14) 28-31.
24. UN Security Council, ‘Letter Dated 31 August 2007 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the
Security Council’ (7 December 2007) S/2007/721.
25. On the work of the Joint Office and the Special Adviser see Edward C. Luck, ‘Getting There, Being There: The Dual
Roles of the Special Adviser’ in Bellamy and Dunne (eds) (n 7) 288 ff. The Office supports the two Special Advisers by
collecting information, conducting country assessments and providing technical assistance, including training, to
enhance the capacity of the United Nations, regional organizations, States and other actors.
26. UN General Assembly, ‘The responsibility to protect’ (7 October 2009) A/RES/63/308.
27. Global Centre for R2P, ‘Summary of the First Meeting of the Global Network of R2P Focal Points, New York, USA,
2011’ (13 June 2011) 2-4, ;
‘National R2P Focal Point Recommendations’ (26 June 2012) 2-3,
recommendations_r2p-focal-points.pdf>, both accessed 15 November 2020.
28. Global Centre for R2P, ‘Summary of the Second Meeting of the Global Network of R2P Focal Points, New York, USA,
2012’ (29 September 2012) 1,
pdf> accessed 15 November 2020.
29. Global Centre for R2P, ‘Summary of the First Meeting’ (n 27) 2.
30. See only Global Centre for R2P, ‘Policy Memo, Preparatory Workshop for the Second Meeting of the R2P Focal Points
Network’ (12 March 2012) 2,
Memo.pdf> accessed 15 November 2020; ‘Summary of the Second Meeting’ (n 28) 2.
Mennecke 165
The collaboration between the Global Centre for R2P and interested States resulted in a short
briefing note outlining the role of an R2P Focal Point.
31
This document never gained any official
status and was at no time formally endorsed by governments. Instead, it served and continues to
serve as informal terms of reference for what is a R2P Focal Point. Denmark, Ghana and the Global
Centre for R2P decided to institutionalize the idea and co-launched the R2P Focal Point initiative
in September 2010. In May 2011, Denmark, Costa Rica and Ghana co-hosted the inaugural
meeting of the new network where members discussed the role of the Focal Point and network.
32
In July 2011, Costa Rica, Denmark and Ghana introduced the new initiative to the UN General
Assembly.
33
2.2. THE CURRENT ROLE AND STATUS OF THE R2P FOCAL POINTS AND THEIR GLOBAL NETWORK
Ten years later, the number of personalised R2P assignments has grown from a handful of States at
its inception to almost a third of the UN membership. Who are these 63 Focal Points and what is
their impact on the implementation of R2P? What role do they play in the international architecture
of atrocity prevention?
In light of the absence of any formal criteria, countries have chosen a number of different
approaches to how to fill the position of the R2P Focal Point. Almost all current R2P Focal Points
are based in their country’s capital rather than with the respective UN Mission in New York. This
enables them to interact with the domestic system, which is key for the implementation of R2P
pillar one. The large majority of the Focal Points, however, works for the country’s Ministry of
Foreign Affairs which points to a focus on R2P’s pillars two and three. Indeed, this suggests that
many countries, despite of frequent proclamations to do the opposite, consider R2P primarily to be
a matter of international, not domestic, relevance.
34
Regarding the level of seniority, many coun-
tries have placed the task at the ambassadorial level.
35
The R2P Focal Points together make up the Global Network of R2P Focal Points. This informal
network has since 2013 met annually in the capital of a Member State to discuss the role of the
focal points and exchange good practices.
36
In the beginning, the meetings focused on the links
between R2P and other strands of work, for example R2P and capacity building or R2P, human
rights and the business sector.
37
Gradually the meeting agendas evolved from these generic,
thematic discussions to reflect a greater emphasis on the actual work of the R2P Focal Points.
This included sharing examples on how Focal Points could work with security actors on R2P
31. Global Centre for R2P, ‘National R2P Focal Point Recommendations’ (n 27).
32. Global Centre for R2P, ‘Summary of the First Meeting’ (n 27) 2-8.
33. See ibid. and ‘Statement by Denmark on behalf of Costa Rica and Ghana at the 2011 UN General Assembly Informal
Interactive Dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect’ (12 July 2011) para 7,
2020/06/2011-IID-Costa-Rica.pdf> accessed 15 November 2020.
34. See for example the different Focal Points introduced in Global Centre for R2P, ‘Summary of the Second Meeting’ (n
28) 2-4.
35. Cf Global Centre for R2P, ‘Summary of the First Meeting’ (n 27), 3.
36. The initial two meetings of the R2P Focal Point initiative, in 2011 and 2012, were held in New York. For an overview
of the meetings of the Global Network, see Global Centre for R2P, ‘Global Network of R2P Focal Points’
globalr2p.org/the-global-network-of-r2p-focal-points/> accessed 15 November 2020.
37. See Global Centre for R2P, ‘Summary of the Third Meeting’ (n 18), 4-5; ‘Summary of the Fourth Meeting of the Global
Network of R2P Focal Points, Gaborone, Botswana, 2014’ (17 June 2014) 1-3,
uploads/2020/01/2014-r2p-focal-points-meeting-summary.pdf> accessed 15 November 2020.
166 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 39(2)
trainings and how they could cooperate internationally to address specific country situations or
implement R2P in UN organs.
38
From the very beginning of the network, the underlying idea
included the notion that the network would gradually grow, including through active outreach and
recruiting.
39
On substantive R2P issues, Focal Points could reach out to peers in their region and
cooperate globally.
40
Active participation in the network is seen as part of what a Focal Point
does.
41
In practice, the network and its annual meetings provide a unique forum for Focal Points to meet
peers and increase their capac ity to advance the implementation of R2P.
42
This includes the
sharing of new ideas or of how challenges were overcome. To facilitate the building of a com-
munity and allow for frank exchanges, the network meetings are since 2017 only open for mem-
bers.
43
In that sense, the Global Network reflects R2P’s pillar 2, as Focal Points can assist each
other, in particular newly appointed Focal Points, in building capacity to protect their populations.
The annual network meetings are well attended, and, in some regions, Focal Points also meet
regularly outside the network gatherings to focus on regional issues.
44
Only recently, the members of the Global Network of R2P Focal Points have started to view
their group as a collective that can produce joint outcomes. On the initiative of a new steering
group currently composed of the focal points from Australia, Denmark, Ghana, Lithuania, Luxem-
burg and Slovenia, over 50 members of the Network in May 2019 wrote a letter to the UN
Secretary General, asking how the UN Secretariat sought to integrate an R2P lens into its preven-
tion work.
45
The following year, in May 2020, members of the Network published a statement on
the occasion of the 75th anniversary of the Second World War to highlight new atrocity risks
arising in the context of the pandemic COVID-19.
46
38. For example, Global Centre for R2P, ‘Summary of the Sixth Meeting of the Global Network of R2P Focal Points,
Seoul, Republic of Korea, 2016’ (10 September 2016), 4-5,
summary-of-the-sixth-annual-r2p-focal-points-meeting.pdf>; ‘Summary of the Seventh Meeting of the Global Net-
work of R2P Focal Points, Doha, Qatar, 2017’ (10 August 2017), 1-2,
01/2017-summary-of-the-seventh-annual-r2p-focal-points-meeting.pdf>; ‘Summary of the Eighth Meeting of the
Global Network of R2P Focal Points, Helsinki, Finland, 2018’ (28 September 2018), 3,
content/uploads/2018/09/2018-summary-of-the-r2p-focal-points-meeting.pdf> all accessed 15 November 2020.
39. Cf recommendation 3 (‘States should reach out to those who are not yet part of the Global Network [ ...] and
encourage them to appoint an R2P Focal Point’.) in Global Centre for R2P, ‘Summary of the Ninth Meeting of the
Global Network of R2P Focal Points, Brussels, Belgium, 2019’ (26 July 2019), 5,
uploads/2019/07/2019-9th-annual-r2pfps-summary.pdf> accessed 15 November 2020.
40. See ‘Statement by Denmark on behalf of Costa Rica and Ghana’ (n 33) para 7; Global Centre for R2P, ‘Summary of the
Ninth Meeting’ (n 39) 5.
41. See, for example, ‘Statement by Denmark at the 2012 UN General Assembly informal interactive dialogue on the
Responsibility to Protect’ (5 September 2012) 2,
mark.pdf> accessed 15 November 2020; Global Centre for R2P, ‘Summary of the Second Meeting’ (n 27) 1.
42. Interview with the Danish Focal Point, November 2020. See also UN Secretary General, ‘A vital and enduring
commitment’ (n 18) paras 24 and 69, Global Centre for R2P, ‘National R2P Focal Point Recommendations’ (n 27) 2,
and UN General Assembly Official Records (n 6) 10 (Australia), 13 (Guatemala), 18 (Hungary).
43. Cf Global Centre for R2P, ‘Summary of the Seventh Meeting’ (n 38) 1.
44. Slovenia has since 2013 biennially hosted meetings of the European R2P Focal Points.
45. On file with the author.
46. ‘Marking the 75th anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany and our Responsibility to prevent atrocities’ (8 May
2020)
bility-to-prevent-atrocities/> accessed 15 November 2020.
Mennecke 167
In the international institutional architecture of atrocity prevention, the R2P Focal Points and
their network continue to hold a special place, as there is no alternative means of implementation
that has attracted similar support. Some governments have opted to appoint a national mechanism
rather than a single official to oversee atrocity prevention efforts. The underlying idea of these
national mechanisms, however, is the same – to strengthen the focus on atrocity prevention in
capitals.
47
In addition, States have created further fora in international settings to advance R2P’s
operationalisation, in particular the Groups of Friends of R2P at the UN in respectively New York
and Geneva. These groups discuss regularly how to apply R2P in the UN context, deliver state-
ments on R2P at the UN Security Council, the UN General Assembly and the UN HRC and receive
briefings by relevant UN officials, including from the UN’s Joint Office on the Responsibility to
Protect and the Prevention of Genocide.
48
Both groups have each more than 50 Member States
whose R2P experts and Ambassadors attend their meetings. In general, however, the work of the
Groups of Friends does not touch on R2P’s domestic implementation. Neither is there participation
from capitals, but only from UN Missions (which steers the groups’ focus towards the international
aspects of R2P), and only occasionally the Groups of Friends meet at the ambassadorial level,
while the position of the R2P Focal Point is defined as being held by a senior level official. Most
notably, the membership in the Group of Friends of R2P is by country and not individualised –
which means there is no personal mandate to advance the implementation of R2P.
A key actor regarding the work of the Global Network and of individual R2P Focal Points is the
aforementioned Global Centre for R2P. The Global Centre has ever since the R2P Focal Point
initiative’s start been instrumental to its success – as its secretariat, by advocating states to appoint
a R2P Focal Point, informing R2P Focal Points about relevant developments or co-organising the
annual gatherings of R2P Focal Points. This role has been crucial for two reasons: first, as a
specialised civil society group, the Global Centre has provided continuity and accumulated expe-
rience whereas R2P Focal Points have been replaced on a regular basis, as especially foreign
ministries follow a system of staff rotation. Second, the Global Centre has been essential in
highlighting the specificit y of atrocity prevention compared to other agendas. While there is
overlap between R2P and protecting human rights, advancing the women, peace and security
agenda or working on stabilisation, R2P requires a specific focus on preventing atrocity crimes.
49
The focus is on identifying vulnerable groups that could become the victims of the most egregious
human rights violations and the potential perpetrators of such atrocities. This is different from
monitoring the general state of human rights in a country. It also leads to a discussion of mitigation
and response measures that reflect this specific priority and distinguish between, rather than
equate, victims and perpetrators.
The Global Centre focuses exclusively on R2P and could thus dev elop a special, in-depth
expertise in this particular field which only very few governments can match. The special status
of the Global Centre vis-`a-vis the Global Network of R2P Focal Points further manifested itself in
the production of a manual for R2P Focal Points which provides new Focal Points with an
introduction to their role. This handbook builds on input by individual R2P Focal Points and
47. For an overview, see Samantha Capicotto and Rob Scharf, ‘National Mechanisms for the Prevention of Atrocity
Crimes’ (2018) 11 Genocide Studies and Prevention 6.
48. The Global Centre for R2P functions as secretariat for both groups of friends of R2P and has compiled some of their
R2P statements: Global Centre for R2P, ‘Group of Friends of the Responsibility to Protect’ (n 20).
49. On the specificity of R2P compared to related agendas see Luck (n 25) 297-299; and Mennecke (n 11) 41-42 and 46-47.
168 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 39(2)
consultations with the Global Network but was conceptualised and written by the staff of the
Global Centre.
50
3. A CASE-STUDY: THE DANISH FOCAL POINT FOR THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
Having looked at the R2P Focal Point as a mechanism, the article now turns to a case-study to
learn more about the practice of the R2P Focal Points and the challenges they encounter. It is
important to reiterate from the outset that the set-up and practice of different R2P Focal
Points may differ considerably – also among neighbouring countries.
51
The following is thus
not meant to be a representative account of the work of a R2P Focal Point, but rather a case-
study of what is possible and relevant to consider when assessing the potent ial and perfor-
mance of R2P Focal Points.
3.1. THE CONTEXT:DENMARK AS A CHAMPION OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
Denmark can for a number of reasons serve as an interesting case. First, acting in a small State,
within a small foreign ministry, the Danish R2P Focal Point can serve as an example of what
opportunities and challenges exist in a small system.
52
Second, Denmark can exemplify how a R2P
Focal Point can act in a country that does not face immediate atrocity risks and where the focus of
attention automatically leans towards the foreign policy dimensions of R2P.
Denmark has since the beginning been among the core supporters of R2P.
53
It has joined all
relevant international networks and shown leadership in advancing R2P as a norm and regarding
its operationalisation. As mentioned, Denmark was among the co-founders of the Global
Network of R2P Focal Points and is currently represented in the network’s steering group.
Denmark has also joined both groups of friends of R2P in New York and Geneva and acts since
2019 as the co-chair of the group in New York. In addition, Denmark was in 2013 among the
initiators of another informal atrocity prevention network, namely the Global Action Against
Mass Atrocity Crimes (GAAMAC) and continues to serve on its steering group. Finally, Den-
mark is an active member of the International Atrocity Prevention Working Group (IAPWG)
which is small forum of like-minded governments that seeks to focus on applying R2P in
practice. There have so far been five Danish R2P Focal Points, and they have all been senior
officials in the legal service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Th e current Danish Focal Point is
the head of international law department and supported part-time by one working level official
and an external academic adviser.
50. Global Centre for R2P, Manual for R2P Focal Points, 2019. See for the manual’s history Global Centre for R2P,
‘Summary of the Sixth Meeting’ (n 38) 6; ‘Summary of the Seventh Meeting’ (n 38) 4; ‘Summary of the Eighth
Meeting’ (n 38) 4.
51. Interview with Global Centre for R2P, November 2020.
52. In the existing literature on implementing R2P, the focus is on the US Atrocity Prevention Board which draws on the
staff and resources of several government agencies, providing it with a very different capacity than that of an individual
Focal Point. See only Stephen Pomper, ‘Atrocity Prevention under the Obama Administration’, in Jacob and Mennecke
(eds) (n 8) 63-65.
53. Interview with Global Centre for R2P, November 2020. See also Mennecke (n 11) 38-40.
Mennecke 169
3.2. THE DANISH R2P FOCAL POINT AND RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AS A DISTINCT NORM
The impact and durability of a new norm depends on how afterits inception its supporters defend its
integrityand apply it in practice.R2P faced from early on a number of seriouschallenges. First, in spite
of the consensualadoption of R2P as partof the World Summit Outcomein 2005, some Member States
questioned first efforts to move towards the implementation of the new norm, as it constituted a
challengeto a traditional understandingof sovereignty.
54
Second,with reference to R2P beingadopted
through a non-binding UN GeneralAssembly resolution, therewas the question of the practicalvalue
of the new norm, beyond the rhetorical commitment to do better when facing the next genocide.
Finally, therewas the challenge to explain the addedvalue of R2P as a new norm, as its content could
seem covered by the work done under other headings includingconflict prevention.
55
In this context, it turned out to be very valuable that the Danish R2P Focal Point was placed
inside the international law department. The subtleties and sensitivities of R2P’s definition, includ-
ing its four atrocity crimes, its relation to existing human rights norms and general international
law and the need to stay precise when applying R2P were understood by the Danish R2P Focal
Point, as they made sense from a legal perspective.
56
There was no inclination to merge R2P with
the related but separate fields of conflict prevention, stabilization or development cooperation.
As part of the Focal Point’s work inside Denmark, the Danish R2P Focal Point in meetings with
other foreign ministry officials, for example from the development cooperation agency or from
geographical units focusing on partner countries, routinely made the effort to clarify R2P’s distinct
meaning, scope and its focus on four specific atrocity crimes. It proved particularly important to
highlight the differences between ongoing Danish efforts and what these would look like once an
atrocity prevention lens was added.
57
From an international law perspective, it was easy to see that
there were important differences between preventing atrocity crimes and regular human rights
violations or conflicts, as the notion of international criminal law and the argument for interna-
tional criminal courts is based on this distinction. Gradually, it became also obvious, however, that
any ad hoc outreach by the Danish R2P Focal Point would not be sufficient to make the conceptual
questions surrounding R2P go away. A more systematic approach seemed required, and first steps
in this regard were taken when R2P was integrated into the pre-deployment training of Danish
diplomats on human rights.
58
Also at the international level, the Danish R2P Focal Point undertook efforts to preserve the
integrity of R2P as a distinct norm. An important forum in this regard is the UN General Assembly
which since 2009 has annually hosted a discussion on the state of affairs regarding R2P. Under the
leadership of the Danish Focal Point, Denmark has actively participated in all these debates and on
several occasions pushed back on misinterpretations of the norm.
59
Thus in July 2011, in the
54. See, for example, the remarks during the first R2P debate at the UN General Assembly by several states: UN General
Assembly Official Records (23 July 2009) A/63/PV.97, 5-6 (Egypt) and 13 (Brazil); (24 July 2009) A/63/PV.98, 23
(China).
55. This was already early on the experience of various Focal Points: Global Centre for R2P, ‘Policy Memo, Preparatory
Workshop’ (n 30) 3.
56. Interview with the Danish Focal Point, November 2020.
57. ibid.
58. ibid.
59. The different Danish statements, and a summary of the R2P debate in the UN General Assembly can be found as
respectively ‘government statements’ and ‘event summary’ through Global Centre for R2P, ‘Resources’
balr2p.org/resources/> accessed 15 November 2020.
170 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 39(2)
context of first criticisms of NATO’s intervention in Libya, the General Assembly discussion
focused on the third pillar of R2P. Denmark remarked that ‘there should not be misgivings or
worries’ about R2P, but underscored that ‘the international community’s commitment to timely
and decisive response’ only becomes relevant ‘when a State cannot or does not want to tackle and
prevent the commission of such despicable crimes’.
60
In 2018, the Danish R2P Focal Point oversaw a further step to highlight the distinct nature of
R2P. Following the example set by Australia, Denmark in 2018, 2019 and 2020 su ccessfully
spearheaded an initiative in the UN General Assembly to make the annual exchange on R2P part
of the Assembly’s formal agenda.
61
This may seem to be a procedural matter of little significance,
but at the UN this request and the subsequent votes carried an important symbolic meaning. The
respective decisions clarified that Denmark and other states viewed R2P as an important and
distinct issue which necessitated a formal discussion in the UN General Assembly, and in turn
sent a signal to the UN Secretariat about the significance member states attributed to R2P.
62
The
efforts of the Danish R2P Focal Point to support the joint UN Office on the Prevention of Genocide
and Responsibility to Protect provide another example. As co-chair of the Group of Friends of R2P
in New York, Denmark regularly invites the UN Special Adviser on R2P to brief member states
about the specific needs and challenges to implement R2P. Moreover, in 2019, Denmark provided
the Office for a three-year period with an additional staff person to specifically assist the UN
Special Adviser on R2P in her work.
63
3.3. THE DANISHR2P FOCAL POINT AND RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AS A DISTINCT PRACTICE
In addition, the Danish R2P Focal Point put emphasis on advancing its application in practice, as
the acceptance for R2P as a distinct norm is expected to grow if its added value can be shown in
practice.
64
The following takes a closer look at the Focal Point’s efforts regarding R2P’s appli-
cation in international organisations and in specific country situations.
3.3.1. The Danish R2P Focal Point and R2P in international organisations
As member of the EU, Denmark sought from early on opportunities to apply R2P through the EU
as regional organisation that has additional capacities, for example regarding early warning and
assistance to countries facing atrocity risks. Together with like-minded partners, in particular the
R2P Focal Point of the Netherlands, the Danish R2P Focal Point pursued a two-pronged
approach.
65
First was a push to get the EU to appoint its own R2P Focal Point to advance R2P
as an operational norm within the organisation. The EU finally named its first R2P Focal Point in
2016, the first such Focal Point to be appointed by a regional organisation, with the OAS following
in 2019. Second, the Danish R2P Focal Point together with partners entered into discussions with
60. ‘Statement by Denmark on behalf of Costa Rica and Ghana’ (n 33) paras 2-3.
61. See, for example, the record of the most recent debate: UN General Assembly Official Records (4 September 2020) A/
74/PV.63, 11-19.
62. Interview with Global Centre for R2P, November 2020.
63. Denmark has also provided financial support to the Joint Office. Interview with the Danish Focal Point, November
2020.
64. This need to identify R2P’s added value has also been experienced by other R2P Focal Points. See for example Global
Centre for R2P, ‘Summary of the Sixth Meeting’ (n 38) 2.
65. Interview with the Danish Focal Point, November 2020.
Mennecke 171
the External Action Service (EEAS) of the European Union on how the EU could integrate R2P as
a practical matter into its work. This dialogue, over time, resulted into a number of concrete
outcomes. For example, the EEAS team working on conflict prevention and early warning inte-
grated specific atrocity risk factors into its work.
66
Furthermore, the EU Council Working Group
on UN affairs (CONUN) has made R2P a regular item on its agenda. This means that the EU and its
Member States routinely engage with R2P as a UN topic which includes preparing statements on
R2P for relevant UN meetings and discussing the annual R2P report by the UN Secretary General.
In addition, the Danish and Dutch R2P Focal Points initiated annual meetings of the R2P experts
based in capitals of EU Member States to facilitate the exchange of best practices and policy
discussions on how to further operationalize R2P in EU Member States and through the EU. As a
reflection of their growing understanding of R2P as an operational principle, the EEAS and EU
Member States each year produce an informal working document which lists the activities they
respectively intend to undertake to advance R2P’s implementation.
67
This document refers to all
three pillars of R2P and puts special emphasis on applying R2P in practice.
The Danish R2P Focal Point has also put made it a priority to advance the application of R2P at
the UN HRC in Geneva. This approach sought to emphasise the preventive nature of the R2P norm
by drawing on the relationship between R2P and human rights violations as early warning sign for
future atrocity crimes. At the outset, this proved to be difficult because a number of Member States
viewed R2P as a ‘New York topic’, referring in particular to the UN Security Council.
68
In concert
with like-minded partners, in particular other members of the IAPWG, Denmark contributed to
paving the ground for the establishment of a Geneva-based Group of Friends of R2P in 2015.
A new opportunity to advance the implementation of R2P in Geneva arrived with the Danish
membership in the UN Human Rights Council from 2019 to 2021. The Danish Focal Point oversaw
a number of efforts in this regard, including the application of an atrocity prevention lens to Danish
statements and actions in the HRC regarding Myanmar. In this context, Denmark put a special emphasis
on the need to hold accountable those responsible for atrocity crimes and contributed in 2018 to the
Council’s decision to establish the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar.
69
The Danish
R2P Focal Point also led Danish efforts in June 2020 to adopt together with like-minded countries the
first thematic R2P resolution at the Human Rights Council that would focus on how the Council, in line
with its prevention mandate, could strengthen its contribution to the prevention of atrocity crimes.
70
Similarly, in the fall session of 2020, Denmark tried to strengthen a thematic HRC Resolution on the
prevention of human rights violations by suggesting specific additional measures that would reflect an
atrocity prevention perspective such as the introduction of regular horizontal early warning briefings by
the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights to the Human Rights Council.
71
66. Cf UN Secretary General, ‘Responsibility to protect: from early warning to early action. Report of the Secretary-
General’ (1 June 2018) A/72/884-S/2018/525, para 13.
67. Interview with the Danish Focal Point, November 2020.
68. ibid. On the need to work with R2P at the UN Human Rights Council, cf. UN Secretary General, ‘Implementing the
responsibility to protect’ (n 15) para 16.
69. Interview with the Danish Focal Point, November 2020.
70. UN Human Rights Council (n 5). The adopted text made is a landmark as the Human Rights Council’s first thematic
statement on the responsibility to protect but does not provide much operational direction on how to work with R2P at
the Council.
71. Cf UN Human Rights Council resolution, ‘The contribution of the Human Rights Council to the prevention of human
rights violations’ (14 October 2020) A/HRC/RES/45/31.
172 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 39(2)
3.3.2. The Danish R2P Focal Point and R2P in specific country situations
As head of the international law department, the Danish R2P Focal Point does not have any
immediate role in deciding how the Danish Foreign Ministry responds to a specific country
situation unless there is a clear international law angle. This reflection of internal competencies
within the ministry indicates certain challenges for the work of the Focal Point and will be
discussed further in the next section. At this point, this article highlights a few instances where
the Danish Focal Point despite of his position outside the regional departments was able to
facilitate the implementation of R2P regarding specific countries.
The first example of the Danish Focal Point playing a key role is the Danish R2P engagement in
Ghana. In 2013, the annual meeting of the Global Network of R2P Focal Points was co-hosted by
Denmark and Ghana and held in Accra, Ghana.
72
Importantly, this meeting represented the first
international discussion on R2P among governments outside New York. The collaboration
between the co-hosts worked well and became the starting point for Danish R2P engagement in
Ghana.
73
Thus, the Danish R2P Focal Point decided to partner with the Kofi Annan International
Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra and the Global Centre for R2P to develop a
training on atrocity prevention for peacekeepers, which since annually has been taught at
KAIPTC.
74
In addition, the Danish Focal Point through personal outreach helped to develop a
strong interest for the R2P at the Danish embassy in Accra. This led, for example, to the Danish
embassy funding a Ghanaian civil society project which examined the capacity of Ghana’s domes-
tic institutions to engage with and implement R2P in Ghana.
75
As a result of this initial collabora-
tion, there have regularly been meetings between the Danish and Ghanaian Focal Points and their
staff.
Another example concerns Myan mar, one of Denmark’s development partner countrie s in
South East Asia. Prior to the genocidal violence against the Rohingya in August 2017, the Danish
R2P Focal Point had not been directly involved in Danish policies vis-`a-vis Myanmar. The massive
human rights violations that forced hundreds of thousands of Rohingya to flee into Bangladesh
changed this, as the question of accountability became a central feature of the international and the
Danish response.
76
The Danish R2P Focal Point could now engage in discussions on potential
responses with other Focal Points and in particular partners in the International Atrocity Prevention
Working Group, as accountability formed a key theme of the Danish membership in the UN HRC.
This work contributed to the decision of the UN HRC to establish the Independent Investigative
Mechanism for Myanmar.
77
In parallel, the Danish Focal Point participated actively in discussions
on the conduct of the UN regarding Myanmar and its seeming failure to act in accordance with the
‘Human Rights up Front’ initiative which had sought to make atrocity prevention a priority for
the UN Secretariat. This concern led first to an internal report examining and criticizing the role of
72. Global Centre for R2P, ‘Summary of the Third Meeting’ (n 18).
73. Interview with the Danish Focal Point, November 2020.
74. For further information on the most recent course, see Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, ‘Call
for Applications: Responsibility to Protect Course (R2P)’ accessed 15 November 2020.
75. West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), ‘Institutional Capacities for the Implementation of R2P in West
Africa – a Case Study of Ghana’ (February 2016).
76. Interview with the Danish Focal Point, November 2020.
77. UN Human Rights Council, ‘Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council on 27 September 2018’ (3 October
2018) A/HRC/RES/39/2.
Mennecke 173
the UN in Myanmar and since to a discussion on how the UN can improve its response in similar
situations in the future.
78
In addition to facilitating Danish atrocityprevention efforts in specific countries, theDanish Focal
Point has also mademore systematic efforts to integrate atrocity prevention into Denmark’s country
engagements. Supported by other departments of the Ministry, the Focal Pointinitiated two interna-
tional trainingworkshops that soughtto connect R2P with developmentcooperation in Danishpartner
countries.In 2016 and 2017, in respectively Kampala,Uganda, and Phnom Penh,Cambodia, the Focal
Point togetherwith colleagues from USAIDconvened Danish and otherdevelopment practitionersto
discussthe applicabilityand significance of atrocityprevention in developmentpractice.
79
Thismeant,
for example,that the UN Framework of Analysisfor the Prevention of AtrocityCrimes was applied as
an earlywarning tool to the concretecountry situationsparticipants were basedin. Potential mitigation
measures were discussed with a view to identify the added value of applying an atrocity prevention
‘lens’. For the Danish Focal Point, these two workshops meant that staff from a number of Danish
embassies received a basic, but context-specific atrocity prevention training.
4. R2P FOCAL POINTS AS GOVERNMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS
FOCAL POINTS
Having reviewed the practice of the Danish Focal Point, it is now time to take a step back and to
critically reflect on the potential and practical impact of an R2P Focal Point. This part draws on the
conceptual framework presented in the introduction of in this Special Issue where a governmental
human rights focal point is defined by a number of characteristics which are now examined in
greater detail for the R2P Focal Points.
80
4.1. FOCAL POINTS AS GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES
Lorion and Lagoutte posit that governmental human rights focal points are part of the formal
government structure and essentially different from other, independent actors in human rights
protection such as National Human Rights Institutions in line with the Paris Principles.
81
The
Danish R2P Focal Point corresponds to this description, as he is a government official based inside
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The nearly universal placing of the R2P Focal Po ints inside
government is also in line with the informal definition used in the documentation of the Global
Network of R2P Focal Points.
82
In practice, the governmental nature of the R2P Focal Point reflects a necessity notwithstanding
certain issues. It is a necessity because the key function of an R2P Focal Point is to facilitate a
government’s work on atrocity prevention.
83
This requires amongst others access to government
78. See Gert Rosenthal, ‘A Brief and Independent Inquiry into the Involvement of the United Nations in Myanmar from
2010 to 2018’ (29 May 2019) %20Report%20-
%20May%202019.pdf> accessed 15 November 2020.
79. Cf Mennecke (n 11) 48-52.
80. See S´ebastien Lorion and St´ephanie Lagoutte, ’What are Governmental Human Rights Focal Points?’ (2021) Neth-
erlands Quarterly of Human Rights, section 3.
81. See the ‘Paris Principles’ adopted by the UN General Assembly, ‘National institutions for the promotion and protection
of human rights’ (20 December 1993) A/RES/48/134.
82. Cf Global Centre for R2P, ‘Summary of the First Meeting’ (n 27) 3; ‘Summary of the Second Meeting’ (n 28) 1.
83. See on this already Global Centre for R2P, ‘Summary of the First Meeting’ (n 27) 4.
174 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 39(2)
meetings and files, intimate knowledge of governmental processes and trust of other government
agents to engage them in the process. Ideally, as stated in the original definition of the R2P Focal
Point, the Focal Point is a senior level government official to be able to unfold a certain ‘pull’
factor which obliges other government agents to engage with attempts to practice a country’s
responsibility to protect.
While the governmental nature of the R2P Focal Point is inherent to the mandate, it also entails
issues for the implementation of the mandate. As R2P originally was adopted at the UN and is
annually discussed in the UN General Assembly, many governments – especially in the Global
North – have decided to situate the R2P Focal Point in their foreign ministry.
84
There are a number
of significant challenges flowing from this. First, the Focal Point will naturally be inclined to view
R2P as a UN matter, which inevitably takes the attention from R2P’s first pillar that focuses on the
country’s responsibility to protect its own population against atrocity crimes. Second, if an R2P
Focal Point with base in the foreign ministry does seek to engage with pillar 1 issues, he will soon
encounter questions of competency, as other line ministries and domestic government agencies
may push back on the foreign ministry raising issues concerning the protection of the population at
home. Third, with the R2P Focal Point being part of the government, it may be difficult to
scrutinise domestic developments in a critical light. An R2P Focal Point inside government will
not be in a position to play a political role but be limited to carrying out policies that reflect the
political views of those in power. If the R2P Focal Point instead was independent of the regular
government structure, a holistic, self-critical approach to R2P and all of its three pillars, including
its meaning inside the country, might be more realistic – even if its implementation would raise
new issues.
4.2. FOCAL POINTS WITH AN EXPLICIT MANDATE ON HUMAN RIGHTS
The introduction’s second criteria refers to human rights as thematic focus of the focal point and
the question of their relationship to other, related actors in the field. The R2P Focal Points in the
Global Network indeed have a clear focus on hu man rights matters. At the core of a State’s
responsibility to protect lies the prevention of and response to atrocity crimes which often will
consist of massive human rights violations. A former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
remarked in this regard that R2P cannot be another agenda item, but must guide the work on human
rights.
85
This relation has also been reflected at the annual meetings of the Global Network of R2P
Focal Points, where there repeatedly have been discussions on human rights issues as a part of
implementing R2P. For example, in 2013, the Focal Points discussed the links between atrocity
prevention, the UN HRC and the UPR.
86
In 2014, they examined the relation between business,
human rights and atrocity crimes.
87
In the Danish context, the R2P Focal Point has a direct and explicit mandate on human rights, as
he is in the legal service who advises the foreign ministry on all international law issues including
human rights. Thus, the Danish R2P Focal Point oversees Denmark’s interactions with the treaty
84. Interview with Global Centre for R2P, November 2020.
85. ‘High Commissioner’s statement to High-Level Event on implementing R2P in the Geneva Context’ (19 November
2015) ¼16776&LangID¼E> accessed 15
November 2020.
86. Global Centre for R2P, ‘Summary of the Third Meeting’ (n 18), 5.
87. Global Centre for R2P, ‘Summary of the Fourth Meeting’ (n 37) 1-3.
Mennecke 175
bodies of the core human rights instruments as well as with the UN HRC, its special rapporteurs
and the UPR, which in turn provides him regularly with opportunities to apply R2P in practice.
88
The same applies to human rights commitments Denmark has entered into under regional frame-
works such as the European Convention on Human Rights. Another example is the organizing of
annual, bilateral human rights dialogues between Denmark and partner countries. There are thus a
number of human rights engagements, the Danish R2P Focal Point is responsible for and can
utilize to advance Danish efforts in the field of atrocity prevention.
Regarding the relation of the R2P Focal Point to other, related actors, there is no specific
guidance in the original documents outlining the Focal Point’s mandate. It is stated, though, that
the Focal Point is encouraged to reach out to other parts of government to ensure an effective,
holistic approach to atrocity prevention.
89
This suggestion reflects the clear limitations of the
capacity of a single government official, even when equipped with the title of a Focal Point, to
advance a country’s work on atrocity prevention. In the practice of the Danish R2P Focal Point,
this has from the beginning led to outreach efforts both inside and, to a lesser extent, outside the
foreign ministry.
90
Inside the ministry, the Danish R2P Focal Point has built an informal network
of key officials who support the Danish work on implementing R2P at their specific posts. This
includes the human rights experts in the Danish Missions to the United Nations in Geneva and New
York, but also staff at Danish embassies in countries with elevated atrocity risks. Outside the
foreign ministry, the Danish R2P Focal Point has on an ad hoc basis, on specific R2P issues such as
antisemitism or peacekeeping, worked together with for example the Ministry of Justice or the
Ministry of Defense. A more elaborate model has been adopted by the US. Here, the relations
between different government agencies working in different areas of atrocity prevention have been
institutionalized in the Atrocity Early Warning Task Force. The US Congress also has passed
special legislation, the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018, that calls for
inter-agency work in this field and guides it.
91
4.3. FOCAL POINTS AS CATALYSTS (NOT IMPLEMENTERS)
The third attribute of governmental human rights focal points is that their main role is to coordinate
or mainstream a certain policy – not to implement it. This approach is in line with the understand-
ing used by the Global Network for R2P Focal Points where their role is described as that of an
enabler, convener and catalyst rather than that of an implementer.
92
While R2P is narrow in scope,
as it focuses on the prevention of four specific atrocity crimes, it applies to various policy areas at
both the domestic and the international level. By way of illustration, the US Atrocity Early
Warning Task Force draws on contributions from the National Security Council, the Departments
of State, Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, Treasury, the intelligence community and
88. Interview with the Danish Focal Point, November 2020.
89. Global Centre for R2P, Manual (n 50) 24. See also Global Centre for R2P, ‘Summary of the Third Meeting’ (n 18) 2.
90. The following is based on the interview with the Danish Focal Point, November 2020.
91. The US State Department publishes an annual activity report for the Atrocity Early Warning Task Force. See U.S.
Department of State, 2020 Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 5 of the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities
Prevention Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-441) (7 August 2020), sec VI.a.
to-Section-5-of-the-Elie-Wiesel-Genocide-and-Atrocities-Prevention-Act-of-2018> accessed 15 November 2020.
92. See only Global Centre for R2P, ‘National R2P Focal Point Recommendations’ (n 27) 2-3.
176 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 39(2)
USAID.
93
This illustrates why a single R2P Focal Point cannot by himself be mandated to imple-
ment R2P.
The question is whether the R2P Focal Point is in a position to act as ‘catalyst’ and effectively
advance the coordination and mainstreaming of R2P. In practice, there are a number of challenges.
In most instances, national R2P Focal Points do not have a formalized mandate that empowers
them to be a catalyst within the government system.
94
Instead, depending on their seniority and
clout, their reach is limited even within their own agency. Only a high-ranking Focal Point can
request participation from other units, but also in that scenario the impact will depend on the
willingness - and resources - of the other units to contribute unless there exists a mandate appli-
cable to the ministry as a whole. Outside the Focal Point’s own ministry, he cannot ask other
agencies to coordinate or mainstream unless there is a formal mandate for the Focal Point to do so.
In fact, especially for R2P Focal Points based in a foreign ministry, this will pose a problem, as
actors that could be relevant for domestic atrocity prevention such as a ministry of justice or the
police might push back against the foreign ministry interfering with domestic matters. Any such
suggestion may remain just that, even if it identifies an obvious opportunity to address a R2P
concern.
In addition to generic questions of hierarchy and inter-ministerial coordination, implementation
entails challenges that are specific to R2P. As a legacy of NATO’s intervention in Libya in 2011,
there is a popular misconception of R2P being a new Western justification for carrying out military
interventions in the Global South.
95
This misconception may result in reluctance or even opposi-
tion to attempts by the Focal Point to coordinate or mainstream R2P matters. Other officials may
push back against R2P initiatives, as they may fear these could backfire because of what R2P –
incorrectly – is associated with. Another R2P-specific challenge for the Focal Point is that espe-
cially in countries in the Global North, potential stakeholders may oppose efforts to implement
R2P at the domestic level. While it internationally has become a commonplace for R2P advocates
to claim that no country is immune against develo ping atrocity risks, domestic officials may
dismiss this as irrelevant for their own country. Finally, it needs to be highlighted that there is
no official blueprint for what it means to mainstream R2P, a point returned to in the following
section.
Lorion also raises the question of whether focal points beyond coordination and mainstreaming
themselves have a role in implementation and how this might impact the focal point’s effort to
move other actors towards implementation.
96
For most members of the Global Network of R2P
Focal Points, there will always be a specific area where they can directly implement R2P as part of
93. See U.S. Department of State (n 91) Section 1.
94. There are only few examples of an outright legislative mandate for the executive to work on atrocity prevention and to
establish a dedicated body for that purpose. See for the US the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of
2018 (Public Law 115-441), 14 January 2019. In Denmark, there is no such formal basis. See on this also Capicotto and
Scharf (n 47) 17.
95. For a discussion of the academic literature see Alex J. Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect: A Defense (Oxford
University Press 2014) 112-132. For a government view, see only ‘Statement by Cuba at the 2013 UN General
Assembly informal interactive dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect’ (11 September 2013)
wp-content/uploads/2020/01/2013-IID-Cuba.pdf> accessed 15 November 2020. The prevalence of this view among
regular government officials is evident from the author’s own observations.
96. ebastien Lorion, Defining Governmental Human Rights Focal Points: Practice, Guidance and Concept (The Danish
Institute for Human Rights 2021) 58
Lorion%20Defining%20GHRFPs%20-%20DIHR%202021%20Final.pdf> accessed 10 May 2021.
Mennecke 177
their own portfolio as senior government official. In the case of Denmark, the Focal Point as senior
legal adviser in the foreign ministry is tasked with a number of matters where he can implement
R2P. For example, the Danish Focal Point is as senior legal adviser a central actor in the prepara-
tion of Denmark’s contribution to the UPR process under the UN HRC.
97
In practice this means
that the Danish Focal Point with regard to Denmark’s national report can choose to integrate R2P
language or address certain Danish policies as measures that help to prevent the development of
atrocity risk factors.
98
Similarly, the Danish R2P Focal Point can raise R2P issues and propose
questions or suggestions to address concerns in the process of other countries. In the ideal scenario,
this R2P-informed input to the wider process may help other government actors to realize why and
how R2P could play a useful role in their own approach. The R2P Focal Point can thus lead by
example and help to socialize the norm. In both instances, however, the Focal Point may also meet
reluctance from other actors to actually adopt an R2P-based approach to the process. This will
often relate back to the aforementioned misconceptions about R2P or to misgivings to publicly
speak of R2P outside the context of the UN General Assembly. In practice, this could materialize
as pushback by, for example, the Ministry of Justice or the Danish embassy in the state undergoing
the UPR process. In such scenario, the R2P Focal Point may yet again experience the limitations of
his catalytic role.
4.4. FOCAL POINTS AND SPECIALISED KNOWLEDGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS
The fourth attribute of governmental human rights focal points is that they act as interpreters who
translate specialized knowledge on human rights to relevant stakeholders outside their own spe-
cialist community. This element can easily be applied to the work of a R2P Focal Point, as he
frequently will meet questions as to how R2P is different from what already is being done under
headings such as ‘development cooperation’, ‘human rights’ or ‘conflict prevention’.
99
In the
academic literature on atrocity prevention, this process of translating R2P into concrete activities
is often referred to as ‘applying an atrocity prevention lens’,
100
but it is the individual R2P Focal
Point that has to understand what this means and translate it for his audience. This requires
specialized knowledge that also the Focal Point first has to acquire. Moreover, this type of
technical knowledge about what R2P means in practice is difficult to obtain, as the R2P commit-
ment unlike some human rights obligations is not spelled out in great detail in a lengthy conven-
tion. Neither is there a specialized treaty body that since its inception has examined and interpreted
the scope and practical meaning of R2P.
In practice, a R2P Focal Point will have to look for inspiration outside the World Summit
Outcome Document. Informal guidance can be gleaned from the annual R2P reports by the UN
Secretary General. They help to understand what R2P is and provide examples of its application
but are not written as operational guidelines. The aforementioned manual for R2P Focal Points
translates R2P into concrete actions a Focal Point could take. Moreover, the annual meetings of the
97. The relation between the UPR and R2P has been highlighted by the UN Secretary General, ‘Implementing the
responsibility to protect: accountability for prevention. Report of the Secretary General’ (10 August 2017) A/71/1016-
S/2017/556, paras 34-35; similarly, the Global Network of the R2P Focal Points in Global Centre for R2P, ‘Summary
of the Sixth Meeting’ (n 38) 3-4; and Mennecke (n 11) 42-46.
98. Interview with the Danish Focal Point, November 2020.
99. ibid.
100. On applying an atrocity prevention lens, see Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect (n 95) 165-167.
178 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 39(2)
Global Network regularly include sessions where Focal Points share their experiences in applying
R2P in practice, allowing members of the network to build specialized knowledge and skills as to
how to translate it to their audiences. For example, at the global network meeting in 2018, Focal
Points from Australia, Spain and Sweden spoke about their efforts to integrate R2P into their
State’s term on the UN Security Council.
101
The experience of the Danish R2P Focal Point includes the role of the interpreter. As the Focal
Point since the beginning has been placed in the legal service of the foreign ministry, there has
always been a specialized knowledge on human rights and the definitional scope of R2P. At the
same time, there is no formal requirement for actors in other departments or outside the foreign
ministry to cooperate with the Danish Focal Point on implementing R2P. Thus, the Danish Focal
Point and his support staff frequently find themselves in a situation where they need to translate
R2P so other stakeholders realize its potential added value to their work. A concrete example for
this can be found in the aforementioned two workshops the Danish R2P Focal Point co-organized
together with the ministry’s department for development cooperation on what role R2P could play
in the field for Danish embassies.
102
4.5. FOCAL POINTS AS PERMANENT STRUCTURES WITH ADEQUATE CAPACITIES
The remaining attribute characterizing governmental human rights focal points is that they repre-
sent a sustainable, permanent structure that provides them with adequate capacity to fulfil their
mandate. The appointment of most R2P Focal Points is an informal act within the respective
country’s foreign ministry.
103
There is no legislative act that makes the post as R2P Focal Point
permanent and there is no international treaty obligation to establish a national R2P Focal Point.
This could suggest that the position of R2P Focal Points is fragile – in practice, however, no
country has yet abolished the post.
104
One explanation for this ‘permanence’ of the post as R2P Focal Point could be that the countries
joining the Global Network mostly represent a group of stable supporters of R2P, which makes it
unlikely they would do away with the Focal Point post. Another, less positive explanation could be
that there is no accountability if a country names a Focal Point who does not carry out his mandate.
An inherent challenge to the permanence of R2P Focal Points is that the term of Focal Points
serving as foreign ministry officials will be limited to the time before they are rotated out to an
embassy posting. This will in practice make it difficult for some Focal Points, depending on the
time they are allowed to serve, to effectively carry out their mandate. It takes time to become
familiar with the specificities of the R2P agenda and to establish the role as a catalyst regarding
other relevant actors.
In terms of adequate capacity, many R2P Focal Points do not have designated support staff nor
yield over sufficient, earmarked resources that would allow to effectively mainstream R2P across
government.
105
Few exceptions exist to this general rule, including the Danish R2P Focal Point,
the R2P Focal Point of the EU and the US Atrocity Early Warning Task Force. The Danish Focal
Point, for example, is supported by a working level expert and an academic adviser – but also this
101. Global Centre for R2P, ‘Summary of the Eighth Meeting’ (n 38) 3-4.
102. See text to n 79 and Mennecke (n 11) 48-52.
103. Interview with Global Centre for R2P, November 2020.
104. ibid.
105. ibid.
Mennecke 179
support staff is not working exclusively on implementing R2P but doing this in addition to other
tasks.
106
Indeed, most Focal Points are not only working as R2P Focal Point but carry that hat in
addition to their regular portfolio and other add-on functions. In reality, many R2P Focal Points
only spend a very limited amount of time on their atrocit y prevention mandate. This lack of
adequate resources raises serious questions to the individual capacity and impact of the over 60
members of the Global Network of R2P Focal Points.
107
The agenda of the annual meetings of the Global Network seeks to accommodate the frequent
turn-over in Focal Points and the lack of capacity by offering different types of sessions to different
Focal Points. This includes training modules which illustrate on the one hand the need for spe-
cialized knowledge and on the other hand the lack of resources devoted to the post and work of the
R2P Focal Points.
5. CONCLUSION
Having reviewed the role and practice of the Danish R2P Focal Point and of the Global Network of
R2P Focal Points, it stands clear that the widespread nominations of R2P Focal Points and the
growth of their global network are a success story. They reflect a statement of over 60 UN Member
States on their commitment to work with R2P. In particular the Global Network has proven to be
important, as it has provided governments with space to discuss and develop the concrete meaning
of R2P among peers, leading to guidance on its implementation.
108
This leads in turn to increased
ownership and internalisation of R2P which is key to its consolidation as a norm. The network also
creates an international community which makes it less likely to abolish the post domestically. The
emerging identity of the Global Network as collective points to another potential, as the R2P Focal
Points as community, notwithstanding different viewpoints on specific country situations, could
push collectively for an increased implementation of R2P, for example by addressing regional
organisations or the UN. Furthermore, the analysis also has highlighted the key role of civil
society, as the R2P Focal Point initiative would not exist or continue to grow without the work
of the Global Centre for R2P. The indispensable role of civil society highlights the vulnerability of
institutionalising human rights protection through focal points. These experiences of the Global
Network of R2P Focal Points can offer inspiration to other types of focal points discussed in this
Special Issue.
For many governments, the appointment of a R2P Focal Point reflects support to the goal of
preventing new atrocity crimes. For others it may simply represent an opportunity to be part of a
network that represents the ‘good’ without any requ irement to commit resources or to report
regularly on the work done. Regardless, the mandate or even mere existence of a governmental
R2P Focal Point may remain unknown to the general public, wider civil society but also other parts
of the executive.
109
This means that the Focal Point c annot function as ‘reference point’ for
evaluating efforts made to achieve progress regarding atrocity prevention as described by Lor-
ion.
110
It is this lack of accountability that can raise questions about the impact and significance of
106. Mennecke (n 11) 54.
107. See also UN Secretary General, ‘A vital and enduring commitment’ (n 18), paras 25 and 74.
108. Cf. Colin Caughey in this Special Issue on the focal points and the Committee under the Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities.
109. Interview with Global Centre for R2P, November 2020, and own observations by the author.
110. Lorion (n 96) 63.
180 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 39(2)
having over 60 national and regional R2P Focal Points. Going forward, the Global Network of R2P
Focal Points may wish to consider steps such as mandatory annual reports by each focal point to the
network; periodic peer reviews by a panel of R2P focal points or a formal application process
before membership in the network is granted to new R2P Focal Points.
111
Such measures could
also increase the transparency of the atrocity prevention efforts undertaken by R2P Focal Points.
The process should be accessible both at the national and the international level and could include
regular check-ins by peer focal points, national and international civil society and the Joint UN
Office for the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect.
Important progress has been made institutionalizing atrocity prevention through the appoint-
ment of R2P Focal Points and the building of the global network, but the growing institutionaliza-
tion does not by itself lead to a growing implementation of R2P. In the next phase, the success of
the focal point initiative is to be measured by deeper individual engagement with R2P and a
strengthened global network, not further focal points. The most recent R2P report by the UN
Secretary General calls on member states to ‘fully utilise’ their R2P Focal Points.
112
States will
have to do more to exercise their responsibility to protect.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential co nflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or
publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
ORCID iD
Martin Mennecke Dr https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9099-4990
111. A performance review exists, for example, for the national contact points under the OECD Guidelines for Multi-
national Enterprises, see OECD, ‘NCP Evaluations Methodology’
contact-points-ncps/ncp-evaluations-methodology/> accessed 20 April 2021.
112. UN Secretary General, ‘Prioritizing prevention and strengthening response: women and the responsibility to protect’
(23 July 2020) A/74/964-S/2020/501, para 34 lit c.
Mennecke 181

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