Nevill v Fine Arts and General Insurance Company

JurisdictionUK Non-devolved
CourtHouse of Lords
Year1895
Date1895
[HOUSE OF LORDS.] LORD WILLIAM NEVILL APPELLANT; AND THE FINE ART AND GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, LIMITED. RESPONDENTS. 1896 Dec. 8. LORD HALSBURY L.C., LORD MACNAGHTEN., LORD SHAND., LORD DAVEY.

Defamation - Libel - Privileged Occasion - Excess of Privilege - Malice.

The appellant acted for some time as agent to an insurance company at his own offices. After some correspondence as to a change of terms upon which the parties could not agree, the company's secretary sent to persons who insured through the appellant a circular stating that the agency of the appellant at his offices had “been closed by the directors.” The appellant having brought an action for libel against the company the judge ruled that the statement was capable of a defamatory meaning but that the occasion was privileged. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, that the statement was a libel, that it was untrue, and that the defendants had exceeded the privilege, but did not find actual malice: —

Held, that judgment must be for the company, on the grounds that the statement was not capable of a defamatory meaning, that it was true, that the occasion was privileged, that the finding of the jury as to excess of privilege was insufficient, and that there was no evidence of malice for the jury.

The decision of the Court of Appeal ([1895] 2 Q. B. 156) affirmed.

IN 1892 the appellant became agent to the respondents, and conducted the agency at his own offices, 27, Charles Street, St. James'. After some months the appellant told the respondents that he desired better terms, and a correspondence passed between them on the subject. In December 1893 the respondents' secretary wrote to the appellant that the board had come to the decision to terminate the agreement with him. An alteration of the terms was made and the appellant continued to act at his offices as agent for the respondents, and a correspondence ensued as to terms for the future. On March 13 1894, in answer to a question as to the appellant's intentions, his solicitor wrote to the respondents' secretary that the appellant wished to sever all connection with the company, as he did not consider the terms they had offered would justify him in continuing. On March 15 the following circular was sent by the respondents' secretary to certain persons who transacted insurance business with the company through the appellant's office: —

“28 Cornhill, London,

“15th March, 1894.

“Dear

“In forwarding the enclosed renewal notice, I beg to inform you that the West End office of this Company has been opened at 19 St. James' Street, S.W., under Mr. Murray Faulkner.

“The agency of Lord William Nevill at 27 Charles Street, St. James' Square, has been closed by the Directors. I shall therefore be obliged if you will kindly direct all communications to our West End Secretary at 19 Saint James' Street, and I shall at all times be pleased to afford you any assistance in all matters relating to insurance against fire, burglary, accident, employers' liability and all risk.

“Yours faithfully,

(Sd.) Claude G. Hay, Secretary.”

The clerk who drafted the circular was called as a witness at the trial and testified that his first draft stated that the appellant had resigned his agency to the company, that the secretary was displeased with those words and told him to prepare another draft stating that the directors had closed the agency, the secretary saying that his object was to induce the appellant's clients who had hitherto insured through him to continue insuring directly with the company.

The appellant brought an action of libel against the respondents upon the circular, alleging in the statement of claim that the statement about the agency was untrue; and (alternatively) alleging that the statement meant that the appellant had been dismissed by the respondents from his employment as their agent for some reason discreditable to him.

Pollock B., before whom the action was tried, ruled that the circular coupled with the circumstances under which it was published was capable of a defamatory meaning, but that the occasion was privileged, and asked the jury — (1.) whether it was a libel; (2.) whether the respondents published it falsely and maliciously; (3.) whether the words meant that the appellant had been dismissed for some reason discreditable to him. The jury found that it was a libel and assessed the damages at 100l., but could not agree as to the second and third questions. In answer to further questions by the learned Baron, the jury found — (1.) that the statement made by the respondents that “the agency of Lord William Nevill has been closed by the directors “was not true; (2.) that in making that statement the respondents had exceeded the privileged occasion which entitled them to give a notice with regard to the agency being at an end. On further consideration Pollock B. entered judgment for the plaintiff for 100l. The Court of Appeal (Lord Esher M.R., Lopes and Rigby L.JJ.) set aside the verdict and judgment and entered judgment for the defendants.F1 The plaintiff brought this appeal.

Asquith Q.C. and A. H. Poyser for the appellant. The statement in the circular that the appellant's agency had been closed by the directors was capable of a defamatory meaning, and might be so construed by reasonable persons: it would probably be so interpreted by the persons to whom the circular was sent. It was therefore for the jury to say whether under all the circumstances it was a libel. The jury found that it was, and moreover that it was untrue. Capital and Counties Bank v. HentyF2 is relied on as an authority that the statement was not libellous, but there the statement was absolutely true; here it was not. The statement could not possibly refer to the change of terms and what took place in December 1893; it must have been intended to lead people to suppose that the directors had just closed the special agency which had existed since December 1893, whereas that agency was in fact closed by the appellant's resignation. The judge having ruled that the occasion was privileged it was for the jury to say whether the publication was made in the exercise of the privilege. It is not necessary for the jury to find express malice, or whether malice was shewn by the defendant's exceeding the privilege: it is enough if the jury find that the communication did exceed the privilege. And the evidence of the excess may be extrinsic or intrinsic. Here there was both, from the wording of the circular and also fro the evidence of the clerk who drafted it. The law on this subject is well expressed in a considered judgment of the Queen's Bench delivered by Lord...

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140 cases
5 books & journal articles
  • Cases referred to in 1983
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    • DSC Publications Online Nigerian Supreme Court Cases. 1983 Preliminary Sections
    • 22 November 2022
    ...and Anor. (1978) 2 L R N 78 318 Ndidi & Onwunalu v. Osademe (1971) 1 All N.L.R. 14 at 16. 399 Neville v. Fine Art & General Insurance Co. (1897) A.C. 68 H.L. 23 New Brunswick Railway Co. v. British and French Trust Corporation Ltd. (1939) A.G. 1, 43. 44 New Plymouth Borough Council v. Taran......
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    • 22 November 2022
    ...1 All N.L.R. 291. 11. Knupffer v. London Express Newspaper Ltd. (1944) A.C. 116 H.L. 40 12.Neville v. Fine Art & General Insurance Co. (1897) A.C. 68 H.L. 13.Lockhart v. Harrison (1928) 139 L.T. 521 H.L. 14. Goldstein v. Foss and Another 6 R & C 157; E.R. K.B. 409. 15.Peters v. Bradlaugh (1......
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    • DSC Publications Online Sasegbon’s Judicial Dictionary of Nigerian Law. First edition Preliminary Sections Volume 3
    • 6 February 2019
    ...Neka B.B.B. Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. A.C.B. Ltd. (2004) 2 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 858) 521……18 Neville v. Fine Art & General Insurance Co. (1897) A.C. 68..………..….…318 New South Wales v. Commonwealth 20 C.L.R. 54……….........……….....…475 Newswatch Comm. Ltd. v. Atta (2006) 12 N.W.L.R. (Pt. (993) 144.................
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    • Telford Georges: A Legal Odyssey
    • 21 November 2008
    ...Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234. Lord Reid quoted with approval the words of Lord Halsbury in Nevill v Fine Art and General Insurance Co Ltd [1897] AC 68, at 72, 73: “What is the sense in which any ordinary reasonable man would understand the words of the communication so as to expose the plain......
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