A New “pragmatism”
| DOI | 10.1177/002070200906400205 |
| Author | Benjamin Schreer |
| Date | 01 June 2009 |
| Published date | 01 June 2009 |
| Subject Matter | NATO at 60 |
Benjamin Schreer
A new “pragmatism”
Germany’s NATO policy
| International Journal | Spring 2009 | 383 |
Recently, Germany’s anglo-saxon allies, in particular, have begun to wonder
about the future role of Germany within the Atlantic alliance. To some allies,
Germany has even become “the new France,” eroding NATO and aiming to
build a counterweight to the US-led transatlantic pillar.1While su ch
observations are widely off the mark, it seems that Germany’s recent NATO
policy has indeed been characterized by increasing “pragmatism.” This
pragmatism means that Germany perceives NATO as only one of a range of
security instruments and is more willing to openly challenge allies on
positions it regards as running counter to German interests.
The analysis here examines the major factors leading to a change in
Germany’s approach towards the alliance. It proceeds in three broad steps.
First, evidence for a shift in German NATO policy is provided. Second, the
most important external and domestic factors affecting German behaviour in
NATO are identified. In the final section, some predictions for future
Benjamin Schreer is deputy director of the Aspen Institute Germany in Berlin. He specializes
in defence and security policy.
1 Matthew Kaminski, “The battle of Bucharest,”
Wall Street Journal
, 4 April 2008, 11.
| Benjamin Schreer |
| 384 | Spring 2009 | International Journal |
German NATO policy are made, as well as some implications for the alliance
as a whole.
MORE DISCORD THAN COLLABORATION
In recent years German governments, sometimes backed by other western
European allies such as France and Belgium,have publicly raised objections
within NATO on a number of strategic issues. Germany has often found
itself in direct opposition to US positions. Given that during the Cold War,
Germany was a “reliable ally” to Washington, voicing concerns only behind
closed doors and in the end mostly following changes in US policy, such
behaviour suggests the emergence of a shift in German relations with NATO.
Indeed, empirical evidence supports the notion that German policy toward
NATO over recent years has been marked more by discord than by
collaboration. The disagreements include both conceptual and operational
issues of importance to NATO’s strategic agility.
The NATO-led international security assistance force (ISAF) in
Afghanistan is the most prominent example. The German government of
Chancellor Angela Merkel has made it clear that it wishes to pursue a
different concept of alliance solidarity and burden-sharing by not sending
regular com bat troops into south Afghanistan. Even though the mandate
would allow deployment to the south, Berlin has insisted on German
personnel staying in the north. Such political caveats on the use of German
troops have led to fierce criticism by allies such as Canada and Great Britain.
Furthermore, many German experts concur with their government’s policy,
arguing that the Afghan mission does not represent a case of alliance
solidarity. In their view, each NATO member should choose its individual
force contributions according to its own interests and risk-assessment.2
While technically this argument is correct, anglo-saxon allies hardly share
such a view politically. Finally, German policymakers so far have not agreed
with their allies’ assessment t hat NATO’s ISAF is now engaged in a fully
fledged counterinsurgency operation.3Thus, while German troops hav e
contributed to stability in northern Afghanistan since 2005, Berlin has also
played its part in hindering the alliance’s ability to find common ground on
a comprehensive Afghan strategy.
2 Christoph Bertram, “Afghanistan ist kein Bündnisfall,”
Die Zeit
, 16 February 2008,
www.zeit.de.
3 Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer, “Counter-what? Germany and
counterinsurgency in Afghanistan,”
RUSI Journal
153, no. 1 (February 2008): 42–46.
To continue reading
Request your trial